

ST THOMAS AQUINAS  
**SUMMA**  
THEOLOGIAE



VOLUME 19 (1a2æ. 22—30)  
THE EMOTIONS  
ERIC D'ARCY

ST THOMAS AQUINAS

*Summa Theologie*

THE EMOTIONS

Edited and translated by  
Eric D'Arcy

What men ought to do is conditional on what they can do, so St Thomas thought, and so his moral theology constantly consults the psychology of what they are and how they act. Following his treatise on the principles of morality, already published in this series, he turns first to their emotional dynamism, for men are not pure spirits, and opens his discussions with their reactions to the pain-pleasure principle. Two qualities stand out, his careful analysis of the types of human feeling which respects the singleness of human action, and his resolute departure from the Stoic, and even a Patristic tradition, that there is something morally shady about passion. This key-work on part of the background to morals is recommended to the academic and working psychologist as well as to the theologian.

The *Summa* provides the framework for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy. Steady endorsement for centuries by the Apostolic See has given it a position of singular authority—so much so that it is now the standard work of its kind in Catholic schools all over the world. For all Christians the *Summa* is invaluable as the witness of a developing tradition and the source of living theology.

The ultimate purpose of this edition is not narrowly ecclesiastical, but to present to Christians everywhere this treasury of wisdom which is part of their common heritage. It will appeal not only to the scholar and professional theologian, but also to

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ST THOMAS AQUINAS  
SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ



ST THOMAS AQUINAS

# SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

Latin text and English translation,  
Introductions, Notes, Appendices  
and Glossaries



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## HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI

WAS PLEASED to grant an audience, on 13 December 1963,  
to a group, representing the Dominican Editors and the  
combined Publishers of the new translation of the *Summa  
Theologiae* of St Thomas, led by His Eminence Michael  
Cardinal Browne, of the Order of Preachers, and the Most  
Reverend Father Aniceto Fernandez, Master General of the  
same Order.

## AT THIS AUDIENCE

THE HOLY FATHER made a cordial allocution in which he first welcomed the representatives of a project in which he found particular interest. He went on to laud the perennial value of St Thomas's doctrine as embodying universal truths in so cogent a fashion. This doctrine, he said, is a treasure belonging not only to the Dominican Order but to the whole Church, and indeed to the whole world; it is not merely medieval but valid for all times, not least of all for our own.

His Holiness therefore commended the enterprise of Dominicans from English-speaking Provinces of the Order and of their friends; they were undertaking a difficult task, less because the thought of St Thomas is complicated or his language subtle, than because the clarity of his thought and exactness of language is so difficult to translate. Yet the successful outcome of their efforts would undoubtedly contribute to the religious and cultural well-being of the English-speaking world.

What gave him great satisfaction was the notable evidence of interest in the spread of divine truth on the part of the eminent laymen concerned, members of different communions yet united in a common venture.

For these reasons the Holy Father wished it all success, and warmly encouraged and blessed all those engaged. He was happy to receive the first volume presented to him as a gesture of homage, and promised that he would follow with interest the progress of the work and look forward to the regular appearance of all the subsequent volumes.



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# GENERAL PREFACE

BY OFFICIAL APPOINTMENT THE SUMMA PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical Christian philosophy. Yet the work, which is more than a text-book for professional training, is also the witness of developing tradition and the source of living science about divine things. For faith seeks understanding in the contemplation of God's Logos, his wisdom and saving providence, running through the whole universe.

The purpose, then, of this edition is not narrowly clerical, but to share with all Christians a treasury which is part of their common heritage. Moreover, it consults the interests of many who would not claim to be believers, and yet appreciate the integrity which takes religion into hard thinking.

Accordingly the editors have kept in mind the needs of the general reader who can respond to the reasons in Christianity, as well as of technical theologians and philosophers.

Putting the Latin text alongside the English is part of the purpose. The reader with a smattering of Latin can be reassured when the translator, in order to be clear and readable, renders the thought of St Thomas into the freedom of another idiom without circumlocution or paraphrase.

There are two more reasons for the inclusion of the Latin text. First, to help the editors themselves, for the author's thought is too lissom to be uniformly and flatly transliterated; it rings with analogies, and its precision cannot be reduced to a table of terms. A rigid consistency has not been imposed on the editors of the different volumes among themselves; the original is given, and the student can judge for himself.

Next, to help those whose native tongue is not English or whose duty it is to study theology in Latin, of whom many are called to teach and preach through the medium of the most widespread language of the world, now becoming the second language of the Church.

The Latin is a sound working text, selected, paragraphed, and punctuated by the responsible editor. Important variations, in manuscripts and such major printed editions as the Piana and Leonine, are indicated. The English corresponds paragraph by paragraph and almost always sentence by sentence. Each of the sixty volumes, so far as is possible, will be complete in itself, to serve as a text for a special course or for private study.

THOMAS GILBY O.P.



ST THOMAS AQUINAS  
SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ  
VOLUME 19  
THE EMOTIONS  
(1a2æ. 22-30)

Latin text, English translation, Introduction,  
Notes and Glossary

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# EDITORIAL NOTES

## THE LATIN TEXT

THE TEXT is substantially that of the Leonine edition, with some of the more important variants from the Piana edition given in footnotes.

## TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION

Translating the treatise *De passionibus animæ* raises some peculiar difficulties, which are summarized in the Introduction. In preparing to set these out I found that I could not, without some violence, separate two kinds of problem: first, some remarks about the general intellectual and philosophical context of the treatise which belong to an Introduction; and second, a number of special conceptual and linguistic points which, in other volumes of the present edition, are made in the Appendices. I have therefore gathered them all into a single account in the Introduction, to which the relevant references are made in the footnotes to the English text. Shorter explanations are given in footnotes, and no separate Appendices have been found to be necessary.

## FOOTNOTES

Those marked by an asterisk etc., give the principal textual variants. Those signified by a superior number are the references given by St Thomas himself. Those signified alphabetically are editorial references and explanatory remarks.

## REFERENCES

Biblical references are to the Vulgate; bracketed numbers to the Psalms are those of versions based on the Hebrew text. Patristic references are to Migne (PG, Greek Fathers; PL, Latin Fathers). Abbreviations to St Thomas's works are as follows:

*Summa Theologie*, without title. Part, question, article, reply; e.g. Ia. 3, 2 ad 3. 1a2æ. 17, 6. 2a2æ. 180, 10. 3a. 35, 8.

*Summa Contra Gentiles*, CG. Book, chapter; e.g. CG I, 28.

*Scriptum in IV Libros Sententiarum*, Sent. Book, distinction, question, article, solution or *quæstiuncula*, reply; e.g. III Sent. 25, 2, 3, ii ad 3.

Commentaries of Scripture (*lecturæ, expositiones*): Job, *In Job*; Psalms, *In Psal.*; Isaiah, *In Isa.*; Jeremiah, *In Jerem.*; Lamentations, *In Thren.*; St Matthew, *In Matt.*; St John, *In Joan.*; Epistles of St Paul, e.g. *In ad Rcm.* Chapter, verse, *lectio* as required.

Philosophical commentaries: On the *Liber de Causis*, *In De causis*. Aristotle: *Peri Hermeneias*, *In Periherm.*; Posterior Analytics, *In Poster.*; Physics, *In Physic.*; *De Cælo et Mundo*, *In De Cæl.*; *De Generatione et Corruptione*, *In De gen.*; Meteorologica, *In Meteor.*; *De Anima*, *In De anima*; *De Sensu et Sensato*, *In De sensu*; *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, *In De memor.*; Metaphysics, *In Meta.*; Nichomachean Ethics, *In Ethic.*; Politics, *In Pol.* Book, chapter, *lectio* as required. Also for Expositions on Boëthius, *Liber de Hebdomadibus* and *Liber de Trinitate*, *In De hebd.* and *In De Trin.*, and on Dionysius *De Divinis Nominibus*, *In De div. nom.* References to Aristotle give the Bekker annotation.

*Quæstiones quodlibetales (de quolibet)*, *Quodl.*

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge my particular indebtedness to Dr Anthony Kenny of Balliol College, Oxford, for the great help he gave me in preparing this volume. I wish also to record my gratitude to the Myer Foundation for a very generous grant-in-aid, awarded through the Australian Humanities Research Council, which enabled me to go to Oxford for the purpose.

# INTRODUCTION

THE TREATISE *De passionibus animæ* in the *Summa Theologiae* is to be found in the *Prima Secundæ*. The whole of the *Pars Secunda* is concerned with man's journey to God. The first five questions investigate the ultimate goal of human life, and the remaining two hundred and ninety-eight questions are devoted to man's activity in so far as it bears upon his reaching that goal: the *Prima Secundæ* to general, and the *Secunda Secundæ* to special, considerations regarding that activity. In the *Prima Secundæ*, Questions 6–48 study the acts themselves, and Questions 49–114 the sources of those acts. In studying the acts, St Thomas first (qq. 6–21) takes acts that are exclusively human, and then (qq. 22–48) those acts which are common to man and the other animals. It is these last which he calls *passiones animæ*, or often simply *passiones*.

This Introduction falls into three parts. In the first, an attempt is made to state the principal general difficulty that confronts the modern reader, and especially the modern translator, of the treatise. Next, three specific problems of translation are discussed. Finally, I mention some philosophical issues raised by the treatise that strike me as particularly interesting.

## I

In translating any part of the *Summa*, of course, one meets important terms and phrases for which there is no exact English equivalent: how is one to render, for instance, *forma*, *conveniens*, *per se* and *per accidens*, *intellectus in actu est intelligible in actu?* But in translating the present treatise it is the opposite difficulty that is even more acute: there are many terms in the modern vocabulary of the emotions which had no exact counterpart in medieval Latin. There were more or less exact equivalents for words like *wood*, *kidney*, *camp*, *water*, *bread*, *wine*, *oil*. One says 'more or less' equivalent because, for instance, there are memories conjured up by the Latin word *panis* of which the English *bread* is quite innocent; and *wine* and *oil* have whole clusters of associations in Mediterranean countries which they do not have in most English-speaking countries. Mr George Steiner wrote, in the course of an article about the translation of poetry: 'Even the simplest words carry a charge of specific energy, of historical association, social usage, and syntactic tradition. They rise to the surface of speech from great depths of national or regional sensibility, barnacled with undeclared remembrance. *Pain* is not wholly rendered by *bread*. It has to a French ear resonances of want, of radical demand, which the English

word does not; the two words differ in historical texture as does a French from an English loaf.' In the case of many words for mental attitudes, states, or experiences, the difference is even greater. What Latin words are the equivalent of *resentful*, *amused*, *tactful*, *selfish*, *insecure*, *frustrated*, *sanguine*, *falling in love*, (feeling) *romantic*? As several of these words show, the problem is not due simply to differences in etymology.

The difficulty that arises with one-one equivalents is often even more obvious in the drawing of distinctions. There were medieval Latin words to distinguish seven kinds of sword and nine kinds of laurel: but not to make many of the distinctions which we have discerned and labelled between emotional experiences and states. For instance, there are important differences between *loving* and *liking*; but St Thomas has to give a single account of *amor*. Professor Ryle, in discussing the emotions, distinguished between inclinations, moods, agitations and feelings; and in sorting through feeling-words alone, he distinguishes between pangs, qualms, glows, flutters, throbs, thrills, and twinges. Think of some of the distinctions that we make, cutting across both these sets of distinctions: e.g. *reserved*, *diffident*, *shy*, *nervous*, *embarrassed*, *abashed*, *offended*, *rebuffed*; *mawkish*, *callow*, *sentimental*, *tender*, *affectionate*. Again, there are French words that English has taken over without anglicizing: *chagrin*, *ennui*, *poignant*, *maladroit*, *blasé*. Now plainly, one part of St Thomas's task is to classify emotion-words; and he could not classify words that were not in use. Yet some of the terms just mentioned, and a great many others in our modern vocabulary, have Latin ancestry, and it would often be possible, without doing very great violence to the original, to make St Thomas look a good deal more 'modern' than his account really warrants.

For the problem is more than a matter of vocabulary: man's self-awareness, and his insight into his own passional and emotional life, have deepened and sharpened enormously since the thirteenth century. This is not the case in purely *philosophic* writing; modern philosophy has, until quite recently, been mainly concerned with the problem of knowledge, with the cognitive rather than the orectic aspects of human experience. It is true that there were Rationalist and Empiricist accounts of the passions: Descartes wrote a pamphlet *Les Passions de l'Ame*, Locke wrote of them in Book II of the *Essay*, and Hume in Book III of the *Treatise*. But these were perhaps the parts of these philosophers' work that aroused the least interest, and would be generally ranked among their least successful. In the field of *literature*, however, the case is very different. Mr Cyril Connolly once remarked that, although the English language we use is that of Dryden and Milton, the intellectual world we inhabit is that of Flaubert and Baudelaire: a world enormously different from that of the high Middle Ages. Flaubert and Baudelaire themselves stand at the end of a long

development that arose in the fifteenth century. We stand on the shoulders of Shakespeare and Rousseau and Dostoievsky; St Thomas wrote before Renaissance Humanism was born. To compare the depth and self-awareness of man's passional and emotional life evidenced in the medieval lyrics and romances with that of the Shakespearian tragedies and problem plays is a little like comparing the anatomical knowledge of trecento painters with that of Michelangelo. One may therefore well hesitate to give the title 'The Emotions' to a translation of St Thomas's *De passionibus animæ* for fear that one will raise expectations in the modern reader that the treatise will disappoint. However, there are more specific reasons for hesitation over rendering the title; so, having made these general remarks, I turn to three specific problems that confront the translator.

## II

(1) *Passiones animæ*. The first question concerns the title-term of the treatise, *passiones animæ* itself. Should one render it *passions* or *emotions*? I think that these are the only two real candidates; *affections* and *feelings* are possibilities, but not very serious ones.

*Affections*, on the one hand, is too restricted; to apply it to hope, despair, fear, daring, or anger would be rather odd: yet these five constitute one of the two classes of St Thomas's *passiones animæ*. *Feelings*, on the other hand, extends too widely. In one direction, it applies as readily to purely physical feelings as those experiences or states which St Thomas calls *passiones animæ*: to physical repletion or discomfort, to biliousness, muscular stiffness, physical euphoria, restlessness and fatigue, even to simply being hot or cold. In other directions, the English *feelings* applies to non-objectified moods like foreboding, anxiety, or boredom (whereas for St Thomas, every *passio animæ* has an object, and it is by this that each species of *passio* is differentiated from the others); it also applies to attitudes of will, e.g. to determination and reluctance; it even applies to purely intellectual attitudes, such as 'feeling profoundly suspicious' of the soundness of an argument or theory. The seat of St Thomas's *passiones*, on the other hand, is precisely the sensory orexis of the soul: not the intellect or will, and not the physical organism, though the physiological modification constitutes their *materia*.

To my mind, therefore, the choice for the English translation of *passiones animæ* lies between *passions* and *emotions*. Now there is quite a lot to be said for *passions*: and three things in particular. First, it is the term used by the classical philosophers writing on the subject in English: by Hobbes throughout *Leviathan* I, 6; by Locke in the *Essay* II, 20; by Butler (together with 'affections' and 'appetites') in the *Preface* to the

*Fifteen Sermons*, and the Sermons themselves, especially the second and the eleventh; and by Hume throughout *Treatise* II and, of course, the *Dissertation on the Passions*. Second, the translation *passions* makes it easier to bring out some of the points that St Thomas makes by treating a *passio* as a case of *pati*, suffering or undergoing. The third, and quite the most important consideration, is a logical one. St Thomas frequently treats the *passiones animæ* as a sub-division of *passio*, passivity, being-acted-upon, the tenth of the *prædicamenta*: as opposed to *actio*, activity, the ninth of the *prædicamenta*. Aristotle's *kategorai* was translated in Latin as *prædicamenta*, and his doctrine of the ten categories, as the list of irreducibly different types of thing which may be predicated of an individual, was taken into the Scholastic logic. His ninth category, *to poiein*, was rendered *actio*, and his tenth, *to paschein*, *passio*; and it is in the tenth category that St Thomas locates the *passiones animæ*.

A word must be said about this location, for it is clear that St Thomas frequently speaks about the *passiones animæ* as *acts*. For instance, in the prologue to 1a2æ. 6 he sets out the plan he means to follow throughout the rest of the *Pars Secunda*, and explains that in studying man's acts (11. 6–48) he will study first (qq. 6–21) those acts which are exclusively human, and then (qq. 22–48) those acts which are common to man and the other animals: and it is these latter that he calls the *passiones animæ*, or simply *passiones*. This would suggest, of course, that the *passiones* fall into the ninth category, *actio*. On the other hand, St Thomas often speaks of them as contrasting with, or parallel to, *actiones*. For instance, in the prologue to qq. 49–114, he says that he is turning from a consideration of *actus* and *passiones* to a study of the sources of human activity; and in 24, 4c he says that what was found (in 1a2æ. 1, 3 ad 3) to apply to *actus* must also be applied to the *passiones*. I do not think that this is an inconsistency; I think that St Thomas consistently assigns the *passiones* to the tenth category, *passio*: but he does not see them as pure inert passivity. Perhaps the English word that would best hit the point off is *reaction*: activity, yes, but an activity that is produced by some other agent: as Corvez renders it in French, *acte reçu*.<sup>1</sup> Lawrence Durrell speaks of one of his character's reflecting on 'the whole new range of emotions that Leila *liberated* in him'; he is indeed being acted upon, but is not inertly passive. A study by Peters and Mace shows that a thesis very like that of St Thomas is supported by ordinary usage in modern English.<sup>2</sup> They are arguing that the terms 'emotion' and 'motive'

<sup>1</sup>M. Corvez, *Somme Théologique, Les Passions de l'Ame*, 1 (Paris: Revue des Jeunes, 1949), p. 242

<sup>2</sup>R. S. Peters and C. A. Mace, 'Emotions and the Category of Passivity': *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1961–2, pp. 120–1

are not classificatory, but 'are rather terms used to relate states of mind such as fear, anger, and jealousy to the two distinctive frames of reference, activity and passivity'. They show that when it is *action* that is in question, these states of mind may often be referred to as *motives* for acting; we may say that a person acted *out of* fear, or jealousy, or anger. But in another sort of situation we may say that he is overcome by fear, anger, or jealousy, or disturbed by them; or that he has his actions invigorated, or his judgement clouded, distorted, or heightened, by them. In such cases the person is being *acted on*; and therefore, Peters and Mace remark, we use the term *emotion* and its derivatives to pick out the fact of the person's *passivity*. In logic, then, Peter's and Mace's position seems to be close to St Thomas's; but in the translating of St Thomas, the term *passion* would have the advantage of showing the conceptual kinship that St Thomas sees, and exploits, between *passio* = *passivity*, and *passio* = *these states of mind*. To render *passio* as *emotion* is to conceal this important point completely.

Despite these considerations, however, there are two points which seem to me to tell decisively against 'passion' and in favour of 'emotion'. First, in modern English, the term 'passion' is used only of visitations that are vehement, even violent; its spread is not much wider than the adjective 'passionate'. It is true that Hume speaks of the 'calm passions'; but even in the eighteenth century this was a little odd, and today would verge on the paradoxical. The second point is, I think, conclusive. St Thomas holds that there are eleven species of *passiones animæ*: love and hatred, desire and aversion, pleasure and sorrow, hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger; and he argues that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, all the others fall under one or other of these species. Now the term 'emotion' can be applied to each of these fairly naturally, whether vehemently felt or not; but the term 'passion' would be applied to hope and despair, fear and daring, only, I think, when one was straining a little after effect: and to the other seven only when they were vehemently felt.

Accordingly throughout Volumes 19 and 20 in the present edition, *passiones animæ*, or *passiones*, is rendered *emotions*. There are two exceptions: in 22, 1 and 26, 2 it is rendered *passions*, because this seemed the best way to bring out the point that St Thomas is drawing on his doctrine that the *passiones animæ* form a sub-division of *passio*, the tenth category. Finally, perhaps one may be permitted to insist that the word *emotions* is only the best translation available; it is not perfect. What we call 'emotions' are engaged by far more things than sensory-good and sensory-evil; what St Thomas calls *passiones* are not. It would be unfair to convey the suggestion that St Thomas was speaking weakly and lamely of all reactions to good and evil of any kind.

(2) *Apprehensiva/appetitiva, concupiscibilis/irascibilis.*

St Thomas begins the treatise by inquiring where the emotions are seated, and he argues: in the soul rather than the body, though the physiological modification is the *materia* of each emotion; next, in the *pars animæ appetitiva* rather than *apprehensiva*; and next, in the *pars appetitiva sensitiva* rather than *intellectiva*. The translation of the terms *anima*, *sensitiva* and *intellectiva* as *soul*, *sensory* and *intellectual* respectively hardly calls for comment; but it may be helpful to say something about *apprehensiva* and *appetitiva*.

St Thomas divides the powers of the soul horizontally, so to say, into the vegetative, the sensory and the intellectual, and the latter two—vertically, one might say—into *apprehensiva* and *appetitiva*: i.e. there is both a sensory and an intellectual power of *apprehensio*, and both a sensory and intellectual *appetitus*.

Now the obvious English word for *appetitus* is, of course, *appetite*: but there are two things which tell too strongly against it. First, St Thomas's *appetitus* applies to the will, i.e. at the intellectual as well as the sensory level, whereas the English *appetite* does not: to say that a man is strong-willed is quite different from saying that he is a man of strong appetites. Even at the sensory level, *appetitus* applies to any kind of object, whereas *appetite* is commonly restricted to the areas of food, drink, and sex; and it would be very odd indeed to speak of hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger as reactions of the sensory appetite as they certainly are of the *appetitus sensitivus*. Second, the object of St Thomas's *appetitus* is the evil as well as the good, the unpleasant as well as the pleasant: it urges one away from what is undesirable as well as towards what is desirable. The English *appetite* does not; as Hobbes says, 'Endeavour when it is towards something which causes it, is called appetite; when fromward something, it is generally called aversion.' Russell has noted the common strain in these opposed experiences; he writes, 'Love and hate are ethical opposites, but to philosophy they are closely analogous attitudes towards objects.'

Since therefore the English word *appetite* fails to reproduce this dual aspect, I propose to render *appetitus* and *appetitiva* as *orexis* and *orectic*. This has two advantages: first, it may serve as a reminder that St Thomas's *appetitus* has much the same meaning and scope as Aristotle's *'όρεξις*, rather than that of the English *appetite*; second, in modern psychology the terms *orexis* and *orectic* are used to distinguish the affective and conative aspects of an act from the cognitive.

This last point has prompted me to translate *apprehensiva* as *cognitive*. I am not best pleased at making a division in terms of a Latin-root word and a Greek-root word, but *cognitive* is much more readily intelligible than any more pedantically satisfying but factitious word such as *epi-*

stemic; and cognitive/orectic has the advantage of current psychological usage.

St Thomas divides the sensory orexis into the *appetitus concupisibilis* and the *appetitus irascibilis*. The object of the former is the pleasant or the unpleasant; the object of the latter is the pleasant that will be difficult to attain or the unpleasant that will be difficult to avoid (*bonum arduum vel malum arduum*). The division is important, since St Thomas classifies the eleven principal species of the emotions in terms of it: six are reactions of the *concupisibilis*, and five of the *irascibilis*. How then should these terms be translated?

St Thomas himself suggests that the *concupisibilis* is so named because, of all the emotions seated in it, *concupiscentia* (desire) is the one felt most keenly: and that the *irascibilis* is so named because, of all the emotions seated in it, *ira* (anger) is the one most readily perceived (25, 2 ad 1 and 3 ad 1); for in each case he accepts the rule that the name of a faculty is taken from its most significant characteristic. I doubt whether this is a rule of English terminology; and further, it would be odd to say that hatred and grief were emotions of the 'desiring' orexis, and downright misleading to say that hope and fear were emotions of the 'irascible' orexis. It may be better, then, to look at the provenance of the two terms; for St Thomas took the words from William of Moerbeke's Latin translations of Aristotle. In *De anima* III Aristotle divides the powers of the soul into the *logistikon*, the rational, and the *orexis*, the non-rational; then, within the non-rational, he divides the *aisthetike*, the sensory orexis, into *epithumetike* and *thumike*. These distinctions are assumed or applied in several other works of Aristotle. Moerbeke rendered *thumike* 'irascibilis' and *epithumetike* sometimes 'concupisibilis' and sometimes 'appetitiva'; St Thomas consistently used *concupisibilis*, which enabled him to use *appetitus* and *appetitiva* for either the intellectual or the sensory orexis, and for both the powers of the latter. Now Aristotle's distinction *logistikon*, *thumikon*, *epithumetikon* was continuous (though not synonymous) with that made in Plato's famous doctrine of the 'three parts of the soul': *logistikon*, *thumos*, *epithumia*; and this has been traditionally rendered Reason, Spirit, Affection or Desire. I therefore propose to translate *appetitus irascibilis* and *appetitus concupisibilis* as the spiritual orexis and the affective orexis respectively.

(3) *Motus*. The term *motus* occurs in the fourth line of the treatise and runs through the whole of the twenty-seven questions devoted to the study of the emotions.

In many places I have felt quite free to translate *motus* with whatever English word most naturally fits the context: commonly, of course, with *movement* or *motion*, but also by *functioning* (24, 3), *reaction* (25, 3), *impulse*

(23, 2), *process* (23, 2), *attraction* (23, 1 ad 3), and *affections* (22, 2 ad 3). I have allowed myself such freedom when it is clear that St Thomas is not using *motus* strictly as a model. Sometimes he makes this clear by the examples he chooses. For instance, in the first paragraph of 23, 2 he distinguishes two bases for contrasting one *motus* or *mutatio* with another: first, their standing in opposite relationships to the same term, e.g. generation, which is coming-into-existence, and dissolution, which is going-out-of-existence; second, their standing in the same relationship to opposite terms, e.g. bleaching and blackening. The natural word for these four *motus* is, I think, *process*, and the argument of the paragraph is not obscured by using it. Again there are other places where it is clear that St Thomas is not using *motus* strictly as a model, since he couples or contrasts a word that connotes *motus* in the literal sense with a word that does not: e.g. *movet* with *repugnans* (23, 1 ad 3); *motus* with *abominatio* (23, 4); *appetit* with *fugit* (23, 2). In such cases it seems quite safe to use the English word that makes the sentence read most naturally.

In many places, however—and they are central to the whole treatise—I have felt constrained to translate *motus* as *movement*: places, namely, when it is being used as a controlling model. This is perhaps the most interesting philosophical issue in all of these twenty-seven questions; so we may now look at it, together with some other matters that strike me as being of particular philosophical interest.

### III

It is, of course, not only the philosopher who will find matters of importance and interest in these three volumes; they are, for instance, of great interest to the moral and ascetic theologian. From the sixteenth century onwards, there have been many spiritual writers who would have us distrust or even discount human feelings and emotions; they hardly ever speak of ‘affections’ without the adjective ‘inordinate’. This is not St Thomas’s attitude; he sees the emotions as an integral part of human and Christian life. For the philosopher, however, there are several matters of particular interest: and of these none, I think, is of greater interest than the role assigned to physical movement as a model of emotional experience.

Let us begin by looking at a crucial passage:

Passions are differentiated by the agents that produce them: these, in the case of those passions which are emotions, are their objects. Now there is a two-fold basis for distinguishing one agent from another: one, a difference in their intrinsic natures; the other, a difference in the active powers they exercise. When it is the emotions that are in question, this second kind of difference follows the pattern of physical agencies. Now a

physical agent A either attracts the patient P, or repels it. In the case of attraction, A does three things. First, it produces in P an inclination or tendency to move towards A . . . Second, if P is outside its natural place, A will produce in it actual movement towards that place . . . Third, when it reaches the place, P will come to rest . . . A similar account holds for the case of repulsion.

When the movement in question is that of an orectic faculty F, it is a good G that plays the part of the attracting agent, and an evil the part of the repelling one. First then, G produces in F an inclination towards G, a sense of affinity with G, a sense that G and itself are naturally fitted for each other; this is the emotion called love. The corresponding contrary, when it is some evil which is the agent, is hatred. Second, if G is not yet possessed, it sets up in F a movement towards attaining this good which it has come to love. This is desire; the opposite is aversion or disgust. Third, once G is possessed, F finds repose in its possession. This is pleasure, or joy; the opposite is sadness, or grief.

The emotions of the spirited orexis, of course, presuppose that inclination or tendency towards the good or away from the evil which arises in the affective orexis, and which is concerned only with the good simply *qua* good or the evil simply *qua* evil. If the object is a good not yet possessed, we have either hope or despair. If it is an evil which has not yet befallen one, we have either fear or courage. If it is a good already possessed, there will be no corresponding emotion in the spirited orexis, for it is no longer a good 'to be attained only with difficulty'. But if it is an evil which is already in process of taking place, the emotion of anger is aroused.

One sees then that there are three pairs of emotions belonging to the affective orexis: love and hatred; desire and aversion; pleasure and sadness. There are also three in the spirited orexis: hope and despair; fear and courage; and anger, which has no contrary. The emotions therefore comprise eleven distinct species, six in the affective orexis and five in the spirited (23, 4).

Here clearly, as in several other key places, the reference to *movement* is not simply an *obiter dictum*. Furthermore, it is not made by way of mere illustrative analogy; it is used strictly as a model. Several reflections suggest themselves.

First, it would be pleasant to think that St Thomas was speaking of *movement* in some metaphorical sense: for instance, in the way that we speak of 'a moving performance', of being 'moved to tears' or 'moved to contribute'; or even in the sense that an organ 'moves' when it begins to twitch or pulse when the blood flows into it after a period of quiescence. However the passage just quoted, and others where movement is providing a strict model—e.g. 25, 2, 25, 3, 26, 2—leave room for no such interpretation. It is physical movement, involving local motion in the ordinary sense,

that St Thomas plainly has in mind. Sometimes he is thinking in terms of the medieval theory of bodies having 'natural places'. The antiquated physics need not trouble us: one could easily transpose such cases into those of a body's being brought into the earth's gravitational field and acquiring an 'inclination' to move towards the centre of the earth, or a steel needle's being magnetized and acquiring a 'tendency' to point north and south. At other times St Thomas is obviously thinking of a human agent, for he speaks of the agent's *finis* coming 'first in one's intentions, but last in actual achievement' (e.g. in 25, 2); the human agent may be directing a projectile at a target, or himself setting out on a journey towards some chosen *finis*. Despite these minor variations, however, movement is serving as a model in all these passages.

The use of models has probably hindered progress more often than it has furthered it in many fields of intellectual inquiry. In theology, Aristotle's analysis of material substance in terms of prime matter and substantial form was used for a long time as a model in the analysis of the sacraments; it worked fairly well for baptism, and less and less satisfactorily as it was applied to the other six sacraments. In physics, progress has often consisted in replacing the old mechanical models with purely mathematical ones. In philosophy, Plato took the notion of function, which is useful and perfectly meaningful when applied to the organs of the body and to man-made instruments, and used it as a model for political institutions; and he postulated the division of the soul into three parts on the model of his division of the State into three classes. Hegel attempted to analyse the basic processes of reality in terms of the model of human debate. Aristotle and Hume, in analysing causal relationships, took as their respective models a man making a statue and a pair of billiard balls in collision; and this surely explains in some measure why these analyses took so little account of what Mr Warnock calls 'the variety of items which may be cited as cause and effect'—for instance, actions, happenings, changes, processes, permanent states, objects, failures to act, or non-occurrences. It is a remarkable fact in the history of philosophy that justification for the use of such models has usually not been attempted; it has been assumed, not argued, that the *explicandum* has the same logical structure as the model. In most cases, as Fr John Burnheim has remarked, philosophers have taken their stand on purely intuitive considerations such as the 'depth of insight' or 'degree of intelligibility' that the view of things suggested by their model affords.

Now to my mind St Thomas's use of movement as a model in his account of the emotions is another example of the same thing. As we have seen, it serves two related purposes. First, it provides a model for analysing a given emotional episode: the tripartite division *inclination/movement/*

*repose* is paralleled by the tripartite division *love/desire/pleasure* and *hatred/aversion/grief*; and second, it provides the framework on which the emotions are classified into eleven distinct species. As in so many other cases where philosophers have used models, objections arise under three headings.

First, counter-examples suggest themselves. Take, for instance, the case of *admiratio*, surprise. St Thomas distinguishes *admiratio* about purely intellectual things, which we often call *wonder* in English, from the *passio* whose object is, of course, sensory; but his model compels him to divide this into sensory-good and sensory-evil which is in some way unexpected. He treats surprise at an unexpected good as a factor increasing pleasure, and classes surprise at an unexpected evil as a sub-species of fear. But we are often surprised at something unexpected or unusual that strikes us as neither good nor evil, pleasant nor unpleasant: simply 'surprising'. To express the same objection from a different point of view, the movement model demands that surprise should presuppose our liking or disliking the object in question: whereas in fact surprise does not necessarily presuppose an orectic attitude to the object, but simply a cognitive one, in the light of which the object strikes a person as unusual. It is a pity that such objections present themselves, for in so many cases what St Thomas writes on the point itself is very sensitive to the nuances of actual linguistic usage, and very acute in its observation of each stage in the experience itself. But the inflexibility of the model gives a rigidity to his total framework that is very different from his flexibility in studying the particular steps.

For this is a second heading of objection. The attempt to draw hard-and-fast lines does less than justice to the flexibility of emotional language and experience. It is perfectly true, for example, that we often distinguish between *amor* and *concupiscentia*. If a woman shows interest in something she sees in a shop window, and her husband asks, 'Do you like it?' and then, 'Do you want it?', he is asking two questions, not the same question twice. But in many situations the distinction is not so clear. To the question 'What did you think of the burgundy?', one might say with equal appropriateness, 'I liked it very much' or 'I enjoyed it very much'; and one would be puzzled by someone who said, 'Well, I liked it too, but I did not enjoy it.' The fact that St Thomas draws hard-and-fast lines in such cases, where neither ordinary language nor experience seems to warrant his doing so, is not due to a failure of sensitivity or acumen, but simply to the tyranny of the model. Here, as so often before and since in the history of philosophy, the use of a model seems to have created a kind of *a priori* framework into which a writer has been led to squeeze his concepts, rather than seeking to make explicit the logical structure already present in the language which expresses them.

And this leads to the third objection. St Thomas offers no argument for the thesis that the *passiones animæ* follow the model of *motus*. He simply asserts, ‘Where the emotions are in question, the pattern followed is that of physical agencies.’ But what reason is there for thinking that the logical structure of the human emotions is the same as that of the movements of inanimate substances? Suppose that, instead of the division into discrete stages and species, we were to take Brentano’s celebrated suggestion:

Sorrow—that is, longing for the absent good—hope that it will fall to our share—desire to produce it for ourselves—courage to undertake the attempt—decision to do the deed. The one extreme of the series is a feeling, the other an act of will, and they seem to be widely separated from each other. But if we consider the intermediate terms, and only compare with each other those that are neighbouring, do we not see the most intimate connexion and almost imperceptible transition?

How are we to choose between Brentano and St Thomas? Brentano puts forward some sort of reason; St Thomas really offers us none: his model of physical action or movement must be accepted, if at all, as self-justifying.

It is important to insist that this does not mean that all—or any—of St Thomas’s theses are mistaken, but simply that they are not supported by argument. It would be possible to put forward very powerful arguments for many of them. For instance, St Thomas holds that every emotion has an object and, indeed, that its classification will be determined by its object. His reason is the parity with physical movement: emotions follow the model of movements; every movement is directed towards some goal; therefore, etc. Now Dr Anthony Kenny has put forward a similar thesis; but he has directly supported it with argument, particularly by attempting to make explicit the logical structure implicit in the language in which emotional experience is expressed. Mr Gosling has challenged him—not only his views, but also his arguments, and has himself brought forward counter-arguments at some length.<sup>1</sup> One thing that makes their discussion philosophically interesting and important is precisely the fact that they are not proposing two rival models, but have deployed arguments in considerable detail and of a high level of sophistication for opposing theses which are developed discursively and literally.

Perhaps it is even more important to insist that to express some regrets over St Thomas’s use of the movement-model is by no means to imply that the account to which it led is of second-rate philosophical quality. It was no accident that, when I sought to recall other writers who have used

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<sup>1</sup>A. Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), especially Chapter IX. J. C. B. Gosling, ‘Emotion and Object’, *Philosophical Review*, October 1965

models, the names that immediately suggested themselves were four of the very greatest in the history of philosophy. To show just how suggestive is St Thomas's study of the emotions I shall conclude this Introduction by drawing attention to one small point and one large point in his account.

The smaller point concerns his account of *love*. Love is distinct from desire, says St Thomas, as the *inclinatio* of a body to move is distinct from its actual movement. In English, of course, an inclination is very close to a desire, and a hard-and-fast distinction between the two would be even more odd than some of the other rigid distinctions which we have noticed. But when St Thomas comes to work out what, in the orectic reaction, is the parallel of the three stages in the physical model, he does not call the first stage *inclinatio*; he uses a number of terms, especially *coaptatio*, *complacentia*, and *connaturalitas*.

These words constitute another headache for the translator; hard enough in themselves, there is the additional difficulty that, despite the suggestion of *placere* in the word *complacentia*, one must not translate it with a word that suggests pleasure, since that belongs to the third, not the first, stage of the orectic process. I proposed to translate the words respectively *a sense of affinity with some object*, *a feeling of its attractiveness*, *a sense that it and oneself are naturally fitted for each other*. When I discussed this proposal with Dr Kenny, he objected, not only on the score of the clumsiness of the phrases, but also because they must accommodate 'natural love' as well as sensory and intellectual love, and therefore apply to inanimate things as well as animals and men; *sense and feelings*, he felt, failed on this count. His own suggestions were: *attachment to some object*, *innate tendency towards it*, *favourable attitude to it*. These suggestions were obviously far more elegant than my own; yet even to them I objected—very diffidently—among other things that 'innate tendency' would not apply to sensory love and intellectual love, which are acquired, not innate. If therefore it is true, as I have suggested earlier, that St Thomas lacked some of the linguistic resources that we now enjoy, it seems that in other ways he was much more richly equipped than we are: and I suspect that these were conceptual, not merely verbal, riches. Mr Nowell-Smith coined the term *pro-attitude*, and it covers several aspects of St Thomas's three words; but he expressed himself as dissatisfied with it even for the limited role he assigned it, and it certainly will not perform many of the tasks that St Thomas's terms carry out very successfully.

The larger point raises issues that ramify widely into several branches of philosophy. There is room here only to broach them.

St Thomas was much more free of mind/body dualism than were most philosophers from Descartes onwards until the middle of this century. Though he occasionally uses dualistic language, his *ex professo* doctrine is

that man is a single substance. For him, the soul is not in the body as the pilot in the ship or the prisoner in the cave; rather, the soul is the (substantial) form of man; the human person is an embodied soul or an ensouled body. This makes for a more sensitive and balanced account of the emotions, and leads St Thomas to two important theses in philosophical psychology. The classical Rationalist and Empiricist philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, largely through their being saddled with dualistic assumptions, held the two opposite theses—both of them, to my mind, mistaken. First, they treated the objects of the emotions as causes of them, and were therefore led to hold that there was only a contingent relationship between an emotion and its object; for St Thomas, however, the emotions are intensional by their very nature, and indeed it is in terms of its object that he assigns each emotion to its particular species. Second, the Rationalists and Empiricists saw a merely contingent (again causal) connection between an emotion and its overt expression. For St Thomas, however, an emotion is an experience of the matter-spirit composite; it is seated indeed in the soul, but the physiological modification that it involves is its *materia*, not just its cause.

This last thesis has implications for the philosophy of logic. For St Thomas, if one may paraphrase, the connection between an emotion and its overt expression is obviously not merely contingent; but neither could one call it logically necessary in the sense that this term was used until recently. It was for a long time a ‘dogma of empiricism’, as Quine has called it, that any connection between two states of affairs or two meaningful propositions must be either logically necessary, a matter of mere meaning and definition, or else merely contingent, a matter of sheer empirical fact. Now it is interesting that when Wittgenstein rejected this dogma,<sup>1</sup> one thing (perhaps the main thing) that led to his doing so was the conviction that the connection between a feeling and its overt expression was neither of these. It is true that his views on the logical axiom have never been clearly spelt out, and that the particular connection uppermost in his mind was that between pain and pain-behaviour. But his suggestions lend spice to our reading of St Thomas’s analysis of emotional experience in general; and when we think of his classification of the emotions, we may well wonder about the mutual relationships he discovers between them. He puts hope, for instance, after love. Is it simply a matter of contingent fact that hope does not come before love, or after hatred? But then, is it merely a matter of meaning and definition?

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<sup>1</sup>He also rejected the identification of the object of a feeling with its cause, at least in the case of fear. *Philosophical Investigations*, I. 476



# De passionibus animæ in generali

POST HOC CONSIDERANDUM est de passionibus animæ: et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. In generali autem quatuor occurruunt circa eas consideranda:

primo quidem, de subjecto earum;  
secundo, de differentia earum;  
tertio, de comparatione earum ad invicem;  
quarto, de malitia et bonitate ipsarum.

## on emotions in general

NEXT WE MUST STUDY the emotions: first in general (22-25); then individually (26-48). The general questions fall under four headings:

- first, the seat of the emotions (22);
- second, their classification (23);
- third, their mutual relationships (25);
- fourth, their morality (24).

## Quæstio 22. de subjecto passionum animæ

Circa primum quæruntur tria:

1. utrum aliqua passio sit in anima;
2. utrum magis in parte appetitiva quam in apprehensiva;
3. utrum magis sit in appetitu sensitivo quam intellectivo,  
qui dicitur voluntas.

*articulus 1. utrum aliqua passio sit in anima*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod nulla passio sit in anima. Pati enim est proprium materiæ: sed anima non est composita ex materia et forma, ut in Primo habitum est.<sup>2</sup> Ergo nulla passio est in anima.

2. Præterea, *passio est motus*, ut dicitur in *Phys.*;<sup>3</sup> sed anima movetur, ut probatur in *De Anima*.<sup>4</sup> Ergo nulla passio est in anima.

3. Præterea, passio est via ad corruptionem; nam *omnis passio magis facta abicit a substantia*, ut dicitur in *Topic.*<sup>5</sup> Sed anima est incorruptibilis. Ergo nulla passio est in anima.

SED CONTRA est quod Apostolus dicit, *Cum essemus in carne, passiones peccatorum quæ per legem erant, operabantur in membris nostris*.<sup>6</sup> Peccata autem sunt proprie in anima. Ergo et passiones quæ dicuntur *peccatorum* sunt in anima.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod *pati* dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo communiter,

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 15, 2, 1, i. *De veritate* xxvi, 1 & 2

<sup>2</sup>Ia. 75, 5

<sup>3</sup>*Physics* III, 3. 202a25

<sup>4</sup>*De Anima* I, 3. 405b32 ff

<sup>5</sup>*Topics* VI, 6. 145a4

<sup>6</sup>*Romans* 7, 5

<sup>a</sup>Just as St Thomas heads Question 22 *De subjecto passionum animæ*, he will head Question 50 *De subjecto habituum*; but it would be quite misleading to translate each of them as ‘The subject of the so-and-so’s’. For the sense of Question 50 is, ‘What kinds of things have dispositions?’; whereas the sense of the present Question is, ‘In what part of the human person is emotion experienced?’

<sup>b</sup>Two explanatory remarks seem called for. (1) St Thomas’ own term for the topic of this treatise is *passiones animæ*. The best English equivalent of this is ‘The Emotions’ (cf Introduction, pp. xix–xxi); but a literal translation would be ‘The Passions of the Soul’. One therefore sees why the first question that occurs to him is, ‘Is it possible for the soul to *have* passions?’ Could there possibly be any passion in the soul? If so, then next, in which part of the soul are they to be located: the cognitive or the orectic? And next, if in the orectic, in which orexis, the sensory or

## Question 22. the seat of the emotions<sup>a</sup>

Under the first of these headings there are three points of inquiry:

1. can the soul be subject to passion?
2. are the emotions seated in the orectic part of the soul rather than in the cognitive?
3. are they seated in the sense-orexis rather than in the intellectual orexis, i.e. the will?

### *article 1. can the soul be subject to passion?*<sup>b</sup>

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that the soul cannot be subject to passion. For the Latin noun *passio*<sup>c</sup> is formed from the verb *pati*, to suffer. Now only material things are capable of suffering; and we have shown that the soul is not material.<sup>2</sup> The soul therefore cannot be subject to passion.

2. *Passion is a kind of movement*<sup>d</sup> as Aristotle says;<sup>3</sup> and he shows in another place that the soul does not move.<sup>4</sup> The soul therefore cannot be the subject of passion.

3. Passion leads to dissolution: *as passion is intensified, a substance decays*, to quote Aristotle.<sup>5</sup> But the soul is not liable to dissolution. It is therefore not subject to passion.

ON THE OTHER HAND St Paul says, *When we were merely our natural selves, the passions of sin to which the law bound us worked on our natural powers.*<sup>6</sup> Now strictly speaking, it is in the soul that sin is present. So the soul is subject to those passions at least which are called 'the passions of sin'.

REPLY: The Latin verb *pati*, to suffer or undergo or be acted upon, is used

the intellectual (cf Introduction pp. xxi-xxiii)? (2) The Latin *passiones animæ*, usually abbreviated by St Thomas to *passiones*, is translated throughout the rest of this volume as 'emotions'; but in Article 1 it is translated 'passions'. This seems to be the best way of making it clear that St Thomas assumes that *passio* = emotion is a sub-division of Aristotle's tenth category *τὸ πάσχειν*, *passio* = passivity, being-acted upon (as opposed to the ninth category *τὸ ποιεῖν*, *actio* = activity (cf Introduction p. xx). The running together of these two senses of *passio* is not simply a play upon words; the subsequent discussion shows that St Thomas sees a conceptual kinship as well as a verbal identity between the two usages.

<sup>c</sup>*pati* is the infinitive (*patior* is a deponent verb); it is from the perfect participle *passus* that the noun *passio* is formed.

<sup>d</sup>There is a double ambiguity here. 1. *Passion* may mean either (a) emotion, or (b) passivity—i.e. Aristotle's tenth of the categories he enumerates: *Categories* 4. 1b25.

2. *Motion* may mean either (a) local motion, or (b) the passage from potentiality to actuality.

secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiamsi nihil abjiciatur a re: sicut si dicatur ærem pati quando illuminatur. Hoc autem magis est perfici quam pati. Alio modo dicitur proprie pati, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abjectione; sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abjicitur id quod non est conveniens rei: sicut cum corpus animalis sanatur dicitur pati, quia recipit sanitatem, ægritudine abjecta. Alio modo quando e converso contingit: sicut ægrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur infirmitas, sanitate abjecta.

Et hic est propriissimus modus passionis. Nam *pati* dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem; quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens maxime videtur ad aliud trahi. Et similiter dicitur, quod quando ex ignobiliori generatur nobilior est generatio simpliciter, et corruptio secundum quid; e converso autem quando ex nobiliori ignobilior generatur.<sup>7</sup>

Et his tribus modis contingit esse in anima passionem. Nam secundum receptionem tantum dicitur quod *sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati*.<sup>8</sup> Passio autem cum abjectione non est, nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem; unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animæ nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet compositum patitur. Sed in hoc est diversitas: nam quando hujusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius magis proprie habet rationem passionis quam quando fit in melius; unde tristitia magis proprie est passio quam lætitia.

I. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pati, secundum quod est cum abjectione et transmutatione, proprium est materiæ; unde non invenitur nisi in compositis ex materia et forma. Sed pati, prout importat receptionem solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiæ, sed potest esse cujuscumque existentis in potentia. Anima autem, etsi non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid potentialitatis secundum quam convenit sibi recipere et pati: secundum quod *intelligere pati est*, ut dicitur.

<sup>7</sup>De generatione I, 3. 318b2

<sup>8</sup>De Anima I, 5. 410a25

The word *passions* is used here in the categorial sense: the mind is *acted upon*, in so far as it *receives* some new ‘perfection’ or quality, viz. some new knowledge or intellectual insight.

i.e. some physiological modification: e.g. a man goes red with anger and pale with fear, his pulse-rate quickens with desire, his muscles tense with hate. Modern physiology can state these modifications in much more explanatory detail: e.g. adrenalin or glucose is poured into the blood, the activity of the endocrine gland is increased or decreased, etc.

On St Thomas’ theory of actuality and potentiality any creature is to some extent in passive potentiality; only God is pure, unmixed actuality. The human soul is in

in three ways. First, in a perfectly general sense, it is used whenever any quality is received, even if the recipient loses nothing in the process: for instance, one might say that the air 'suffers' or 'undergoes' illumination. However, this would be better styled 'acquiring' a new quality than 'suffering' something. More strictly, the word *pati* is used when a thing acquires one quality by losing another; and this may happen in two ways. Sometimes the quality lost is one whose presence was inappropriate in the subject: for example, when an animal is healed, it may be said to 'undergo' healing, for it recovers its health by shedding its illness. At other times, the opposite happens: for example, a sick man is called a 'patient' because he contracts some illness by losing his health.

It is this last kind of case which is called *passio* in the most correct sense. For the word *pati* is used when a thing is drawn to some agent; and the more a thing is withdrawn from that which properly belongs to it, the more naturally is it said to be drawn to something other than itself. Aristotle makes a rather similar point: he says that when an entity of a higher order arises from one of a lower order, we call the process 'generation' pure and simple, and 'corruption' only in some qualified sense; and vice versa.<sup>7</sup>

Now *passio*, in each of these three senses, may be found in the soul. For first, the remark *thinking and understanding are in some sense passions*<sup>8e</sup> applies to that kind of passion which involves reception pure and simple. Those kinds of passion in which some quality is lost, however, always involve some bodily change;<sup>f</sup> passion strictly so called cannot therefore be experienced by the soul except in the sense that the whole person, the matter-soul composite, undergoes it. But here too we must distinguish: the bodily change may be for the better or for the worse; and it is in the latter case that the term *passion* is used more properly. Thus sorrow is more naturally called a passion than is joy.

Hence: 1. Suffering of the kind that involves losing some quality can indeed take place only in material things. But suffering of the kind that involves merely receiving some quality is not so confined; it may occur in anything which is in some sort of potentiality. Now the soul, of course, is not material; but it is in that sort of potentiality which enables it to receive and, in this sense, to 'suffer'.<sup>g</sup> Thus Aristotle can say, *thinking is a kind of passion.*<sup>h</sup>

active potentiality in so far as it has the ability to perform the various kinds of mental and psychic acts; it is in passive potentiality in so far as it has the capacity to undergo the various kinds of mental and psychic experience.

<sup>b</sup>i.e. there is a passive as well as an active element in our intellectual activity; some new knowledge or insight is acquired and therefore 'received'.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod pati et moveri, etsi non conveniat animæ per se, convenit tamen ei per accidens, ut dicitur.<sup>9</sup>

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passione quæ est cum transmutatione ad deterius. Et hujusmodi passio animæ convenire non potest nisi per accidens; per se autem convenit composito, quod est corruptibile.

*articulus 2. utrum passio magis sit in parte appetitiva quam in apprehensiva*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod passio magis sit in parte animæ apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva. Quod enim est primum in quolibet genere videtur esse maximum illorum quæ sunt in genere illo, et causa aliorum, ut dicitur.<sup>2</sup> Sed passio prius invenitur in parte apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva: non enim patitur pars appetitiva nisi passione præcedente in parte apprehensiva. Ergo passio est magis in parte apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva.

2. Præterea, quod est magis activum videtur esse minus passivum; actio enim passioni opponitur. Sed pars appetitiva est magis activa quam pars apprehensiva. Ergo videtur quod in parte apprehensiva magis sit passio.

3. Præterea, sicut appetitus sensitivus est virtus in organo corporali, ita et vis apprehensiva sensitiva. Sed passio animæ fit, proprie loquendo, secundum transmutationem corporalem. Ergo non magis est passio in parte appetitiva sensitiva quam in apprehensiva sensitiva.

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit, quod *motus animi*, *Græci πάθη, nostri autem quidam,\* sicut Cicero, ‘perturbationes’, quidam ‘affectiones’ vel ‘affectus’, quidam vero, sicut in Græco habetur, expressius ‘passiones’ vocant.<sup>3</sup>* Ex quo patet quod passiones animæ sunt idem quod affectiones. Sed affectiones manifeste pertinent ad partem appetitivam, et non ad apprehensivam. Ergo et passiones magis sunt in appetitiva quam in apprehensiva.

\*Piana reads *παθος* and omits *quidam*

<sup>9</sup>ibid, and id III, 4. 429b25

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 15, 2, 1, ii. *De veritate* xxvi, 3. *In De div. nom.* 2, lect. 4. *In Ethic* II. 291–302, *lect.*

<sup>2</sup>Metaphysics II, 1. 993b24

<sup>3</sup>De civitate Dei IX, 4. PL 41, 258

2. It is true that suffering and movement are not to be attributed to the soul directly; but they may be attributed to it indirectly or consequentially,<sup>1</sup> as Aristotle says.<sup>2</sup>

3. This argument holds for the kind of passion which induces a change for the worse. Such passions belong to the soul only consequentially; strictly speaking, they belong to the matter-soul composite, and that is certainly capable of dissolution.

*article 2. are the emotions seated in the orectic part of the soul rather than in the cognitive?<sup>3</sup>*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. One would expect the emotions to be seated in the cognitive part of the soul rather than in the orectic. For the first member of a given genus is superior to, and the cause of, all the others, to paraphrase Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> Now an emotion must be present in the cognitive part of the soul before being present in the orectic part, since the latter does not feel it until the former has been affected by it. The emotions must therefore be thought of as seated in the cognitive rather than in the orectic part of the soul.

2. The more active a thing is, the less is it passive; for the categories of action and passion are mutually opposed. But the orectic part of the soul is obviously more active than the cognitive. Therefore the emotions, since they form a subdivision of the category *passion*, are seated rather in the cognitive part.

3. The experience of emotion always involves some physiological modification. But the faculty of sense-perception is a power of the physical organism as much as is the sense-orexis. There seems therefore no more reason to locate the emotions in the latter than in the former.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Augustine says, *Those motions of the soul which the Greeks call πάθη are called by some Latin writers, such as Cicero, 'agitations' and by some 'affections'; but others follow the Greek more closely, and call them 'passions'.<sup>3</sup>* The emotions therefore, being passions of the soul, are identical with the affections. But the affections obviously belong to the orectic part of the soul, not the cognitive. The emotions must therefore be seated in the orectic rather than in the cognitive part.

<sup>1</sup>For example, if a learned man makes a journey, it would be odd to say, *tout court*, that his learning 'moves'; but perhaps the statement could be made with suitable qualifications—one may compare such expressions as 'his secret went with him'.

<sup>2</sup>St Thomas' terminology for and classification of the faculties of the soul are summarized in Introduction, pp. xxii-xxiii.

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod, sicut jam dictum est,<sup>4</sup> nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt: unde Philosophus dicit quod bonum et malum, quæ sunt objecta appetitivæ potentiae, sunt in ipsis rebus.<sup>5</sup> Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem secundum quod in seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod *verum et falsum*, quæ ad cognitionem pertinent, *non sunt in rebus, sed in mente*.<sup>6</sup> Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intensio e converso se habet in his quæ pertinent ad perfectionem, et in his quæ pertinent ad defectum.

Nam in his quæ ad perfectionem pertinent, attenditur intensio per accessum ad unum primum principium, cui quanto est aliquid propinquius tanto est magis intensem—sicut intensio lucidi attenditur per accessum ad aliquid summe lucidum, cui quanto aliquid magis appropinquit tanto est magis lucidum. Sed in his quæ ad defectum pertinent, attenditur intensio, non per accessum ad aliquod sumnum, sed per recessum a perfecto: quia in hoc ratio privationis et defectus consistit. Et ideo quanto minus recedit a primo tanto est minus intensem; et propter hoc in principio semper invenitur parvus defectus, qui postea procedendo magis multiplicatur.

Passio autem ad defectum pertinet, qui est alicujus secundum quod est in potentia. Unde in his quæ appropinquant primo perfecto, scilicet Deo, invenitur parum de ratione potentiae et passionis; in aliis autem consequenter plus. Et sic etiam in priori vi animæ, scilicet apprehensiva, invenitur minus de ratione passionis.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa quia est magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad rem prout est in seipsa: per actionem enim exteriorem venimus ad consequendas res.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in *Primo* dictum est, duplickey organum animæ potest transmutari.<sup>7</sup> Uno modo transmutatione spirituali

<sup>4</sup>art. I

<sup>5</sup>This is a gloss upon, rather than a direct citation from, the passage in the *Metaphysics* quoted in the next sentence

<sup>6</sup>Metaphysics VI, 4. 1027b25

<sup>7</sup>ia. 78, 3

<sup>8</sup>It must not be taken from this that St Thomas thinks that we do not directly perceive material objects, but only sense-data. For him, the external object is not

**REPLY:** The term 'passion' implies, as we have said,<sup>4</sup> that the patient is drawn to something in the agent. But the soul is drawn to things by its orectic, rather than its cognitive, faculties. For through its orectic faculties the soul is drawn towards things as they are in themselves: as Aristotle says, good and bad (the objects of the orectic faculties) are in things themselves.<sup>5</sup> But a cognitive faculty is not drawn to things as they are in themselves; it comes to know them by means of representations, which it either already has, or receives in the appropriate way:<sup>b</sup> so Aristotle goes on to say, *true and false* (the objects of the cognitive powers) *are not in things themselves, but in the mind.*<sup>6</sup> So passion, and therefore emotion, is seated in the orectic rather than in the cognitive part of the soul.

Hence: 1. There are opposite rules for measuring the degree of a quality according as it is excellence or defectiveness that is in question.

An excellence obviously increases as the first and unique source of the excellence is approached—somewhat as the brightness of a lighted object increases as it approaches the source of light. A deficiency increases, however, not with proximity to, but with distance from, what is perfect and supreme: that is precisely what makes a thing defective. Naturally then, the less a thing departs from the appropriate source, the less defective it is. So it is that defects are commonly slight to begin with, and grow worse as time goes by.

Now passion or passivity implies by its very nature some sort of deficiency: a thing is passive in so far as it is in potentiality to being actualized and thus improved. Those creatures therefore that come nearest to God, the first and completely perfect being, have little of potentiality and passivity in them; others, of course, have more. Accordingly one will find less of passivity, and so less of passion and the emotions, in the cognitive faculties, since they are the more primary powers of the soul.

2. The orectic powers are said to be the more active because they are more closely connected with our external activity. But this arises from the very thing which makes them, in the relevant sense, more passive—their relationship with things as they are in themselves;<sup>c</sup> for by external activity we come to possess those things.

3. We have shown elsewhere that there are two ways in which an organ or faculty may be modified.<sup>7</sup> First, there is non-physical modification,

logically inferred from our mental image of it, but immediately (i.e. without *logical medium*) perceived in it.

<sup>c</sup>In contrast, namely, with the cognitive powers, which are designed to generate within us *representations* of external things, not to take possession of the things in their physical reality.

secundum quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se invenitur in actu apprehensivæ virtutis sensitivæ; sicut oculus immutatur a visibili, non ita quod coloretur, sed ita quod recipiat intentionem coloris. Est autem et alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem; puta quod calefit aut infrigidatur, vel alio modo simili transmutatur. Et hujusmodi transmutatio per accidens se habet ad actum apprehensivæ virtutis sensitivæ: puta cum oculus fatigatur ex forti intuitu, vel dissolvitur ex vehementia visibilis.

Sed ad actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur hujusmodi transmutatio: unde in definitione motuum appetitivæ partis materialiter ponitur aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi: sicut dicitur, quod *ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor.*<sup>8</sup> Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in actu sensitivæ virtutis appetitivæ quam in actu sensitivæ virtutis apprehensivæ; licet utraque sit actus organi corporalis.

*articulus 3. utrum passio sit magis in appetitu sensitivo quam intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod passio non magis sit in appetitu sensitivo quam in appetitu intellectivo. Dicit enim Dionysius quod Hierotheus *ex quadam est doctus diviniore inspiratione, non solum discens, sed etiam patiens divina.*<sup>2</sup> Sed passio divinorum non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, cuius objectum est bonum sensibile. Ergo passio est in appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in sensitivo.

2. Præterea, quanto activum est potentius tanto passio est fortior. Sed objectum appetitus intellectivi, quod est bonum universale, est potentius activum quam objectum appetitus sensitivi, quod est particulare bonum. Ergo ratio passionis magis invenitur in appetitu intellectivo quam in appetitu sensitivo.

3. Præterea, gaudium et amor passiones quædam esse dicuntur. Sed hæc inveniuntur in appetitu intellectivo, et non solum in sensitivo;

<sup>8</sup>De *Anima* I, I. 4036r. Aristotle is making a distinction: the logician, he says, defines anger as a craving for retaliation, or the like; the natural philosopher defines it as the overheating of the blood around the heart. The latter, he says, describes the matter, the former gives the form or formula of the essence

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 15, 2, 1. IV *Sent.* 49, 3, 1. *De veritate* 26, 3. *In Ethic.* II, lect. 15

<sup>2</sup>De *divinis nominibus* 2. PG 3, 648. This book, written apparently by a Syrian monk about the beginning of the sixth century, was thought during the Middle Ages to have been the work of St Paul's Athenian convert, Denys the Areopagite, though its authority had been questioned from the beginning by Hypatius of Ephesus. Lorenzo Valla criticized the legend in the fifteenth century; he was followed by other scholars, including Cajetan, and since the last century it has had no critical support

when it receives the representation of some external object. This is essential to the act of sense-perception; for instance, the eye is affected by seeing coloured objects, not in the sense that it itself becomes coloured, but in the sense that it receives the impression of colour. Second, there may be a physical modification of the organ, when the physical state of the organ is affected; it becomes, say, hot or cold, or is otherwise altered in some such way. This second kind of modification is quite incidental to the act of sense-perception: it happens, for instance, when the eye is fatigued by excessive concentration, or damaged by too strong a light.

In the functioning<sup>d</sup> of the sensory orexis, however, the physical modification is essential. Thus, in defining the various affections of the sensory orexis, one mentions the modification of the relevant bodily organ: anger, for instance, is said to be *the overheating of the blood around the heart*.<sup>8</sup> One sees then that the notion of passivity, and so of the passions and emotions, is more fully verified in the functioning of the sensory orexis than in that of sense-perception, even though each involves the action of some part of the physical organism.

*article 3. are the emotions seated in the sensory orexis rather than in the intellectual orexis, i.e. the will?*<sup>a</sup>

**THE THIRD POINT:**<sup>1</sup> 1. It would not seem to be the case that the emotions are seated in the sensory rather than in the intellectual orexis. For Dionysius says that Hierotheus was taught by a kind of divine inspiration; his was not only a study of, but a passion for, the things of God.<sup>2</sup> But a passion for the things of God cannot be seated in the sensory orexis, whose object is the good things of the senses. So passion and emotion can be found in the intellectual orexis as well as in the sensory.

2. The more powerful the agent, the stronger the passion it produces. But the object of the intellectual orexis—good in general—is a more powerful agent than is the object of the sensory orexis—some particular good. The notion of passion and emotion is therefore better verified in the functioning of the intellectual than of the sensory orexis.

3. Joy and love are emotions. Now it must be possible for them to occur in the intellectual orexis as well as in the sensory, since the Scriptures

<sup>a</sup>The Latin word is *actus*, both here and in the next sentence: a reminder that a passion (in the categorial sense) is commonly a received act or movement. Introduction, p. xx.

<sup>b</sup>The relevant parts of the St Thomas' anatomy of the mental powers are summarized in Introduction, pp. xxii–xxiii.

alioquin non attribuerentur in Scripturis Deo, et angelis. Ergo passiones non magis sunt in appetitu sensitivo quam in intellectivo.

SED CONTRA est quod dicit Damascenus describens animales passiones, *Passio est motus appetitivæ virtutis sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali;* et aliter, *Passio est motus irrationalis animæ per suspicionem\* boni et mali.*<sup>3</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut jam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutatio corporalis.<sup>4</sup> Quæ quidem invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam naturalis. In actu autem appetitus intellectivi non requiritur aliqua transmutatio corporalis, quia hujusmodi appetitus non est virtus alicujus organi. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi: ut etiam patet per definitiones Damasceni inductas.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod passio divinorum ibi dicitur affectio ad divina, et conjunctio ad ipsa per amorem: quod tamen fit sine transmutatione corporali.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo passionis non solum dependet ex virtute agentis, sed etiam ex possibiliitate patientis; quia quæ sunt bene possibilia multum patiuntur etiam a parvis activis. Licet ergo objectum appetitus intellectivi sit magis activum quam objectum appetitus sensitivi, tamen appetitus sensitivus est magis passivus.

3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod amor et gaudium et alia hujusmodi, cum attribuuntur Deo vel angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus, absque passione. Unde dicit Augustinus, *Sancti angeli et sine ira puniunt, et sine miseriæ compassione subveniunt. Et tamen istarum nomina passionum, consuetudine locutionis humanae, etiam in eos usurpantur, propter quamdam operum similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem.*<sup>5</sup>

\*Piana reads *susceptionem*, by the reception

<sup>3</sup>De Fide orthodoxa. II, 22. PG 94, 941. St John of Damascus, d. 749, the last of the Greek Fathers

<sup>4</sup>art. I, and art. 2 & 3

<sup>5</sup>De civitate Dei IX, 5. PL 41, 261

attribute them to God and the angels. The emotions are therefore no more present in the sensory orexis than in the intellectual.

ON THE OTHER HAND, this is how Damascene describes the emotions: *Emotions are movements of the sensory orexis caused by our imagining sense-good or sense-evil; in other words, Emotions are movements of the non-rational part of the soul caused by the thought of something pleasant or unpleasant.*<sup>3</sup>

REPLY: We have remarked that emotion always involves some physiological modification.<sup>4</sup> Such a modification occurs in the functioning of the sensory orexis; and it is not the mere reception of a representation, the non-physical alteration which we have seen to be involved in sense-perception; it is a physical one. Nothing physical, however, is involved in the functioning of the intellectual orexis, which is not the faculty of a bodily organ. The emotions therefore belong rather to the functioning of the sensory orexis than to that of the intellectual: as the quotations from Damascene suggest.

Hence: 1. The phrase *a passion for the things of God* means here a passionate desire for the things of God, and union with them through love; but this involves no physiological modification.

2. The intensity of a given passion varies, not only with the active power of the agent, but also with the passive capacity of the patient; sensitive creatures suffer greatly even from slight pressures. So the object of the intellectual orexis may indeed be a more powerful agent than the object of the sensory orexis, but the latter's passive capacity is the greater.

3. When love, joy, and the like, are attributed to God or the angels or man's intellectual orexis, they refer simply to acts of will which produce indeed the same sort of result as does action prompted by emotion, but are not in fact accompanied by emotion. As Augustine says, *The holy angels feel no emotion of anger when they inflict punishment, and feel no emotion of pity when they render help. But ordinary usage applies to them the terms for the various emotions because the actions which an angel performs are similar to those prompted in us by the emotions, although he himself is not subject to the weakness of those emotions.*<sup>5</sup>

## Quæstio 23. de differentia passionum ab invicem

Deinde considerandum est de passionum differentia ab invicem. Et circa hoc quæruntur quatuor.

1. utrum passiones quæ sunt in concupiscibili sint diversæ ab his quæ sunt in irascibili;
2. utrum contrarietates passionum irascibilis sint secundum contrarietatem boni et mali;
3. utrum sit aliqua passio non habens contrarium;
4. utrum sint aliquæ passiones differentes specie, in eadem potentia, non contrariæ ad invicem.

*articulus 1. utrum passiones quæ sunt in concupiscibili sint diversæ ab his quæ sunt in irascibili*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod passiones eadem sint in irascibili et in concupiscibili. Dicit enim Philosophus quod passiones animæ sunt *quas sequitur gaudium et tristitia*.<sup>2</sup> Sed gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili. Ergo omnes passiones sunt in concupiscibili. Non ergo sunt aliæ in irascibili, et aliæ in concupiscibili.

2. Præterea, super illud, *Simile est regnum cœlorum fermento*, etc.,<sup>3</sup> dicit *Glossa Hieronymi*. *In ratione possideamus prudentiam, in irascibili odium vitiorum, in concupiscibili desiderium virtutum*.<sup>4</sup> Sed odium est in concupiscibili, sicut et amor, cui contrariatur, ut dicitur.<sup>5</sup> Ergo eadem passio est in concupiscibili et irascibili.

3. Præterea, passiones et actus differunt specie secundum objecta. Sed passionum irascibilis et concupiscibilis eadem objecta sunt, scilicet bonum et malum. Ergo eadem passiones sunt irascibilist et concupiscibilis.

SED CONTRA: Diversarum potentiarum actus sunt specie diversi, sicut videre et audire. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt duæ potentiae dividentes

<sup>1</sup>cf *De veritate* XXVI, 4

<sup>2</sup>Ethics II, 5. 1105b23

<sup>3</sup>Matthew 13, 33

<sup>4</sup>Gloss. Ordin. V, 46. PL 26, 94

<sup>5</sup>Topics II, 7: 113b1

<sup>a</sup>In this Question, criteria are sought for deciding when one emotion is to be distinguished from or contrasted with another, and for classifying all the emotions into (eleven) species. Question 25 will consider how those species are to be arranged in order.

## Question 23. the classification of the emotions

Next we must consider how the emotions are to be classified.<sup>a</sup> There are four points of inquiry:

1. are the emotions of the affected orexis different from those of the spirited?
2. are two emotions of the spirited orexis mutually contrary only when their respective objects are the good and the bad?
3. is there any emotion which has no contrary?
4. are there any emotions of the spirited orexis which fall under different species but are not mutually contrary?

*article 1. are the emotions of the affective orexis different from those of the spirited?*<sup>b</sup>

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that the same emotions belong both to the affective orexis and the spirited. For Aristotle says that the emotions are *those mental states which are followed by joy and sorrow.*<sup>2</sup> But joy and sorrow belong to the affective orexis. Therefore all the emotions belong to the affective orexis, and not some to the affective and some to the spirited.

2. In commenting on the text, *The kingdom of heaven is like yeast*,<sup>3</sup> Jerome says, *We need practical wisdom in the reason, hatred of vice in the spirited faculty, love of virtue in the affective.*<sup>4c</sup> But hatred and love belong to the affective orexis, as Aristotle says.<sup>5</sup> Therefore the same emotion may be found both in the affective orexis and in the spirited.

3. Passions, like actions, differ from each other when, and only when, they have different objects. Now the emotions are passions; and the emotions of the spirited orexis have the same objects as those of the affective, viz. sense-good and sense-evil. The same emotions must therefore belong to both the spirited orexis and the affective.

ON THE OTHER HAND, the acts of two different faculties fall under two different species: seeing and hearing, for example. But the affective and the

<sup>b</sup>For St Thomas' distinction between the affective orexis (*appetitus concupisibilis*) and the spirited orexis (*appetitus irascibilis*), Introduction p. xxiii.

<sup>c</sup>St Jerome is speaking in terms of Plato's doctrine of the three parts of the soul: *τὸ λογικόν, τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*. These are commonly rendered in English: Reason, Spirit, and Desire.

appetitum sensitivum, ut in *Primo* dictum est.<sup>6</sup> Ergo, cum passiones sint motus appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est,<sup>7</sup> passiones quæ sunt in irascibili erunt aliæ secundum speciem a passionibus quæ sunt in concupiscibili.

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod passiones quæ sunt in irascibili et in concupiscibili differunt specie. Cum enim diversæ potentiaæ habent diversa objecta, ut in *Primo* dictum est,<sup>8</sup> necesse est quod passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa objecta referantur. Unde multo magis passiones diversarum potentiarum specie differunt; major enim differentia objecti requiritur ad diversificandam speciem potentiarum quam ad diversificandam speciem passionum vel actuum. Sicut enim in naturalibus diversitas generis consequitur diversitatem potentiaæ materiæ, diversitas autem specie diversitatem formæ in eadem materia, ita in actibus animæ, actus ad diversas potentias pertinentes sunt non solum specie, sed etiam genere diversi; actus autem vel passiones respicientes diversa objecta specialia comprehensa sub uno communi objecto unius potentiaæ differunt sicut species illius generis.

Ad cognoscendum ergo quæ passiones sunt in irascibili, et quæ in concupiscibili, oportet assumere objectum utriusque potentiaæ. Dictum est autem in *Primo*<sup>9</sup> quod objectum potentiaæ concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum. Sed quia necesse est quod interdum anima difficultatem vel pugnam patiatur in adipiscendo aliquod hujusmodi bonum, vel fugiendo aliquod hujusmodi malum, inquantum hoc est quodammodo elevatum supra facilem potestatem animalis: ideo ipsum bonum vel malum secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis est objectum irascibilis.

<sup>6</sup>IA. 81, 2

<sup>7</sup>above 22, 3

<sup>8</sup>IA. 77, 3

<sup>9</sup>IA. 81, 2

viz. the formal objects. For St Thomas, two faculties are mutually distinct when their characteristic acts fall under different species; two acts fall under different species when they have different formal objects; and the formal object of an action  $\phi$  is that aspect of a thing which must be present if the thing is to be  $\phi$ able: or better, ‘The formal object of  $\phi$ ing is the object under that description which *must* apply to it if it is to be possible to  $\phi$  it. If only what is P can be  $\phi$ d, then “thing which is P” gives the formal object of  $\phi$ ing . . . “Other people’s property” is a description of the formal object of *stealing*, just as “one’s own spouse” is a description of the formal object of *divorcing*.’ (A. Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will*, London, 1963, p. 189.) In Article 2 of the present Question, St Thomas will propose difference of formal objects as another criterion for distinguishing between emotions. The formal

spirited are the two different faculties of the sensory orexis, as we have seen.<sup>6</sup> Since therefore the emotions are movements of the sensory orexis, as we have also seen,<sup>7</sup> the emotions of the affective faculty and those of the spirited fall under different species.

**REPLY:** The emotions of the affective orexis and those of the spirited fall under different species. Since different faculties have different objects, as we have shown,<sup>8</sup> the passions of two different faculties must have as their respective objects the objects of those faculties.<sup>d</sup> *A fortiori* then, the passions of two different faculties must fall under different species: for it takes a much greater difference of object to say that two faculties are distinct than to say it of two passions or two actions. For just as, in classifications of the things of Nature, difference of genus arises from difference in matter, and difference in species from difference in form:<sup>e</sup> so in classifications of mental experiences, the actions of two different faculties will differ in genus, not just in species; whereas the actions and passions of the same faculty fall under different species within the same genus.

In deciding therefore which passions and emotions belong to the spirited orexis and which to the affective, one must begin by recalling the respective objects of these two faculties. We found<sup>9</sup> that the object of the affective faculty is sense-good and sense-evil *sans phrase*, i.e. the pleasurable or the painful. But there are times when the soul finds that the acquisition of some good or the avoidance of some evil is possible only with difficulty, or even by fighting; it is beyond our ready power and control. So it is that the object of the spirited orexis is a sense-good or sense-evil *qua arduous*, i.e. in so far as its acquisition or avoidance involves some kind of difficulty or struggle.

object of a passion or emotion will be similarly defined: hence, the formal object of fear is a future evil; of envy, another's good; of remorse, one's own past sins.

<sup>e</sup>St Thomas assigned the matter of earthly bodies and that of heavenly bodies to different genera. The central argument for hylemorphism, the doctrine that physical substances are composed of 'prime matter' and 'substantial form', was based on their (observed) capacity for undergoing substantial change; prime matter was capable of receiving successively many different substantial forms. Now Aristotle had held that the heavenly bodies were not made out of the four elements, but of a fifth; and that they were incorruptible and unchangeable, except for local motion. St Thomas followed him, concluding that the fifth element, *quintessentia*, of the heavenly bodies was in potentiality to no substantial form other than its own; the heavenly bodies must therefore be made of an entirely different sort of prime matter from that of the earthly bodies. On this basis then, viz. 'difference of matter', heavenly and earthly bodies were assigned to different genera. Earthly bodies, however, having the same kind of matter, would fall under different species within the same genus on account of their 'difference of form'.

Quæcumque ergo passiones respiciunt absolute bonum vel malum pertinent ad concupiscibilem: ut gaudium, tristitia, amor, odium, et similia. Quæcumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem: ut audacia, timor, spes, et hujusmodi.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in *Primo* dictum est,<sup>10</sup> ad hoc vis irascibilis data est animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis in suum objectum tendere prohibetur, vel propter difficultatem boni adipiscendi, vel propter difficultatem mali superandi. Et ideo passiones irascibilis omnes terminantur ad passiones concupiscibilis. Et secundum hoc etiam passiones quæ sunt in irascibili consequuntur gaudium et tristitia, quæ sunt in concupiscibili.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod odium vitiorum attribuit Hieronymus irascibili, non propter rationem odii, quæ proprie competit concupiscibili, sed propter impugnationem, quæ pertinent ad irascibilem.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum in quantum est delectabile movet concupiscibilem. Sed si bonum habeat quamdam difficultatem ad adipiscendum, ex hoc ipso habet aliquid repugnans concupiscibili, et ideo necessarium fuit esse aliam potentiam quæ in id tenderet. Et ratio est eadem de malis: et hæc potentia est irascibilis. Unde ex consequenti passiones\* concupiscibilis et irascibilis specie differunt.

*articulus 2. utrum contrarietas passionum irascibilis sit secundum contrarietatem boni et mali*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur, quod contrarietas passionum irascibilis non sit nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali: passiones enim irascibilis ordinantur ad passiones concupiscibilis, ut dictum est.<sup>2</sup> Sed passiones concupiscibilis non contrariantur nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali; sicut amor et odium, gaudium et tristitia; ergo nec passiones irascibilis.

2. Præterea, passiones differunt secundum objecta, sicut et motus secundum terminos. Sed contrarietas non est in motibus, nisi secundum contrarietatem terminorum, ut patet in *Physic.*:<sup>3</sup> ergo neque in passionibus est contrarietas† nisi secundum contrarietatem objectorum. Objectum

\*Piana reads *species*

†Piana adds *passionum*, which I have supplied in the translation

<sup>10</sup>Ibid

<sup>1</sup>Cf III *Sent.* 26, 1, 3. *De veritate* xxxvi, 4

<sup>2</sup>above art. 1 ad 1

The emotions of the affective orexis are therefore those which bear upon sense-good or sense-evil pure and simple: joy and sorrow, love and hatred, and the like. The emotions of the spirited orexis, on the other hand, are those which bear upon sense-good or sense-evil *qua* arduous, i.e. in so far as it is difficult to attain or avoid: courage, fear, hope, and the like.

Hence: 1. We have argued<sup>10</sup> that animals have been endowed with the spirited orexis to enable them to deal with the obstacles which hinder the affective orexis from attaining its objective, either because some good proves difficult to obtain or some evil difficult to avoid. So it is that all the emotions of the spirited orexis terminate ultimately in those of the affective, and are 'followed by joy or sorrow' as much as are the other emotions of the affective.

2. Jerome locates the hatred of vice in the spirited orexis, not because of the hatred-aspect—that of course belongs to the affective orexis—but because of the element of combativeness that it involves; and this belongs to the spirited orexis.

3. It is true that the good is attractive to the affective orexis in so far as it is pleasurable. But in so far as it is difficult to come by, the affective orexis finds it repugnant. Hence the need for another faculty inclining one to take issue with the difficulty. The same thing holds for avoiding evils. Now this is precisely the rôle of the spirited faculty. Hence the emotions of the affective orexis fall under different species from those of the spirited.

*article 2. are two spirited emotions<sup>a</sup> mutually contrary only when their objects are respectively sense-good and sense-evil?*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that two spirited emotions are mutually contrary only when their respective objects are sense-good and sense-evil. For we have seen that the spirited emotions are oriented towards the affective.<sup>2</sup> But the latter are mutually contrary only when their objects are respectively sense-good and sense-evil—love and hatred, joy and sorrow, and so on; so this must hold for the former also.

2. Two emotions are differentiated by their objects in the same way that two movements are differentiated by their objectives. Now two movements are to be contrasted only when their objectives are mutually contrary, as Aristotle remarks;<sup>3</sup> therefore two emotions are to be contrasted only when their objects are mutually contrary. But the object of any

<sup>a</sup>*Physics v, 3. 229a30*

<sup>b</sup>From now on I shall write simply 'affective emotions' for 'emotions of the affective orexis', and 'spirited emotions' for 'emotions of the spirited orexis'.

autem appetitus est bonum vel malum. Ergo in nulla potentia appetitiva potest esse contrarietas passionum, nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.

3. Præterea, *omnis passio animæ attenditur secundum accessum et recessum*, ut Avicenna dicit in *De naturalibus*:<sup>4</sup> sed accessus causatur ex ratione boni, recessus autem ex ratione mali; quia sicut *bonum est quod omnia appetunt*, ut dicitur *Ethic.*,<sup>5</sup> ita malum est quod omnia fugiunt. Ergo contrarietas in passionibus animæ non potest esse nisi secundum bonum et malum.

SED CONTRA timor et audacia sunt contraria, ut patet in *Ethic.*<sup>6</sup> Sed timor et audacia non differunt secundum bonum et malum, quia utrumque est respectu aliquorum malorum. Ergo non *omnis contrarietas passionum irascibilis est secundum contrarietatem boni et mali*.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod *passio quidam motus est*, ut dicitur in *Physic.*:<sup>7</sup> unde oportet contrarietatem passionum accipere secundum contrarietatem motuum vel mutationum: est autem duplex contrarietas in mutationibus et motibus, ut dicitur in *Physic.*<sup>8</sup> Una quidem secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, quæ quidem contrarietas est proprie mutationum, idest generationis, quæ est mutatio ad esse, et corruptionis, quæ est mutatio ab esse. Alia autem secundum contrarietatem terminorum, quæ proprie est contrarietas motuum: sicut dealbatio, quæ est motus a nigro in album, opponitur denigrationi, quæ est motus ab albo in nigrum.

Sic igitur in passionibus animæ duplex contrarietas invenitur: una quidem secundum contrarietatem objectorum, scilicet boni et mali; alia vero secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino. In passionibus quidem concupiscibilis invenitur prima contrarietas tantum, quæ scilicet est secundum objecta: in passionibus autem irascibilis invenitur utraque.

Cujus ratio est quia objectum concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est,<sup>9</sup> est bonum vel malum sensibile absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminus ut a quo, sed solum ut ad quem: quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum bonum, sed omnia appetunt ipsum: similiter nihil appetit malum inquantum hujusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum: et propter hoc malum non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic igitur *omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni est*

<sup>4</sup>*De Anima* II, 3 (8ra). Venice, 1508

<sup>5</sup>*Ethics* I, 1. 1094a3

<sup>6</sup>*Ethics* VI, 7. 116a3

<sup>7</sup>*Physics* III, 3. 202a25

orectic faculty is a good or an evil. Therefore in either sensory orexis, two emotions will be contrasted only when their objects are respectively sense-good and sense-evil.

3. *Every emotion involves a movement either towards or away from some object*, as Avicenna says.<sup>4</sup> Now such a movement towards an object is caused by its being a good, and such a movement away from it by its being an evil; for *the good is what all things want*, as Aristotle says,<sup>5</sup> and an evil is what things shun. Therefore two emotions are mutually contrary only when their respective objects are sense-good and sense-evil.

ON THE OTHER HAND fear and courage are contraries, as Aristotle shows.<sup>6</sup> But the contrast between them is not based on their objects being a good and an evil, for each of them is concerned with some threatened evil. Therefore contrast between their respective objects is not the only reason for holding that two spirited emotions are mutually contrary.

**REPLY:** Since *passion is a kind of movement*, as Aristotle says,<sup>7</sup> the criteria for contrasting two passions or emotions will be the same as those for contrasting two movements or processes; and these are two-fold.<sup>8</sup> First, two processes are mutually contrary when they stand in opposite relationships to the same term: thus generation—coming into existence—is the contrary of dissolution, going out of existence. Second, two processes may be mutually contrary because they stand in the same relationship to opposite terms: thus bleaching, the process of changing a thing from black to white, is the contrary of blackening, the process of changing a thing from white to black.

Accordingly, there are two possible criteria of contrast between two emotions: one, their having contrary objects, viz. sense-good and sense-evil; the other, their involving a movement towards and a movement away from the same object. Only the first of these can occur among the affective emotions; but among the spirited emotions, both occur.

For as we have seen,<sup>9</sup> the object of the affective orexis is sense-good or sense-evil *sans plus*. Now the good *qua* good can never be the object of an impulse away from itself, but only of one towards itself: nothing shuns the good *qua* good: it is precisely what all things want. Similarly nothing wants an evil *qua* evil: it is precisely what things shun; therefore an evil as such is never the object of an impulse towards itself, but only of one away from itself. Hence each of the affective emotions whose object is a good is a movement towards that good, viz. love, desire and pleasure; and each of them whose object is an evil is a movement away from it, viz.

<sup>4</sup>Physics v, 5. 229a21

<sup>5</sup>art. I

ut in ipsum, sicut amor, desiderium, et gaudium: omnis vero passio respectu mali est ut ab ipso,<sup>\*</sup> sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et tristitia. Unde in passionibus concupisibilis non potest esse contrarietas secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem objecto.

Sed objectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis, ut supra dictum est:<sup>10</sup> bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in ipsum tendatur in quantum est bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem spei; et ut ab ipso recedatur, in quantum est arduum et difficile, quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis. Similiter malum arduum habet rationem ut vitetur, in quantum est malum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem timoris; habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur sicut in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subjectionem mali, et sic tendit in ipsum audacia. Invenitur ergo in passionibus irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali, sicut inter spem et timorem: et iterum secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, sicut inter audaciam et timorem.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.

*articulus 3. utrum sit aliqua passio animæ non habens contrarium*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod omnis passio animæ habeat aliquod contrarium. Omnis enim passio animæ vel est in irascibili vel in concupisibili, sicut supra dictum est:<sup>2</sup> sed utræque passiones habent contrarietatem suo modo. Ergo omnis passio animæ habet contrarium.

2. Præterea, passio animæ habet bonum vel malum pro objecto, quæ sunt objecta universaliter appetitivæ partis. Sed passioni cujus objectum est bonum opponitur passio cujus objectum est malum. Ergo omnis passio habet contrarium.

3. Præterea, omnis passio animæ est secundum accessum vel secundum recessum, ut dictum est.<sup>3</sup> Sed cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus, et e converso. Ergo omnis passio animæ habet contrarium.

SED CONTRA ira est quædam passio animæ: sed nulla passio contraria ponitur iræ, ut patet in *Ethic.*<sup>4</sup> Ergo non omnis passio habet contrarium.

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod singulare est in passione iræ quod non potest habere contrarium, neque secundum accessum et recessum, neque secundum contrarietatem boni et mali.

\*Piana reads *ut ab ipsa*

<sup>10</sup>art. I

<sup>1</sup>cf. IA.2æ. 46, 1 ad 2. III Sent. 26, 1, 3. *De veritate* xxxvi, 4

<sup>2</sup>art. I

hatred, aversion or disgust, and sadness. Two affective emotions are never mutually contrary, therefore, on the score of their involving movement towards and movement away from the same object.

The object of the spirited orexis, however, as we have seen, is not sense-good or sense-evil *qua* good or evil, but *qua* difficult or arduous of attainment or avoidance.<sup>10</sup> Now an arduous good has a two-fold aspect: *qua* good it attracts us, and arouses the emotion of hope; *qua* arduous it repels us, and arouses the emotion of despair. Similarly with an evil which is difficult to avoid: *qua* unpleasant it tends to make us avoid it, and so arouses the emotion of fear; *qua* arduous it suggests a means of escaping subjection to the evil, and so the emotion of courage tends to make us face it. Two spirited emotions may therefore be mutually contrary either because they have contrary objects, viz. the good and the evil—e.g. hope and fear; or because they involve movement towards and movement away from the same object—e.g. courage and fear.

The answers to the objections have thus emerged in the course of the Reply.

*article 3. is there any emotion which has no contrary?*

THE THIRD POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that every emotion must have its contrary. For every emotion belongs either to the affective orexis or to the spirited, as we have seen;<sup>2</sup> and in each there are clear bases of contrariety. Every emotion therefore must have its contrary.

2. Every emotion has for its object a good or an evil, which are the sole objects of the orectic faculties. Now any emotion whose object is the good is the contrary of one whose object is the bad. Therefore every emotion must have its contrary.

3. Every emotion involves either movement towards or movement away from some object, as we have seen.<sup>3</sup> But for every movement towards a given point, there is the contrary movement away from that point; and *vice versa*. Therefore every emotion must have its contrary.

ON THE OTHER HAND anger is an emotion: yet there is no emotion which is its contrary, as Aristotle knew.<sup>4</sup> Therefore not every emotion has its contrary.

REPLY: The emotion of anger is unique in this, that it has no contrary: none based on a contrary attitude to the same object, and none based on having a contrary object, viz. a good which is the contrary of that evil which is the object of anger.

<sup>3</sup>art. 2

<sup>4</sup>Ethics IV, 5. 1125b26

Causatur enim ira ex malo difficulti jam injacente; ad cuius præsentiam necesse est quod aut appetitus succumbat, et sic non exit terminos tristitiae, quæ est passio concupisibilis: aut habet motum ad invadendum malum læsivum, quod pertinet ad iram. Motum autem ad fugiendum habere non potest; quia jam malum ponitur præsens vel præteritum. Et sic motui iræ non contrariatur aliqua passio secundum contrarietatem accessus et recessus.

Similiter etiam nec secundum contrarietatem boni et mali: quia malo jam injacenti opponitur bonum jam adeptum, quod jam non potest habere rationem ardui vel difficultis: nec post adeptionem boni remanet aliis motus nisi quietatio appetitus in bono adepto, quæ pertinet ad gaudium, quod est passio concupisibilis.

Unde motus iræ non potest habere aliquem motum animæ contrarium, sed solummodo opponitur ei cessatio a motu; sicut Philosophus dicit in sua *Rhetorica*<sup>5</sup> quod *mitescere opponitur ei quod est irasci*: quod non est oppositum contrarie, sed negative vel privative.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.

*articulus 4. utrum sint aliquæ passiones differentes specie in eadem potentia non contrariæ ad invicem*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod non possint in aliqua potentia esse passiones specie differentes et non contrariæ ad invicem. Passiones enim animæ differunt secundum objecta; objecta autem passionum animæ sunt bonum et malum, secundum quorum differentiam passiones habent contrarietatem. Ergo nullæ passiones ejusdem potentiarum non habentes contrarietatem ad invicem differunt specie.

2. Præterea, differentia speciei est differentia secundum formam. Sed omnis differentia secundum formam est secundum aliquam contrarietatem, ut dicitur in *Meta*.<sup>2</sup> Ergo passiones ejusdem potentiarum, quæ non sunt contrariæ, non differunt specie.

3. Præterea, cum omnis passio animæ consistat in accessu vel recessu ad bonum vel ad malum, necesse videtur quod omnis differentia passionum animæ sit vel secundum differentiam boni et mali, vel secundum differentiam accessus et recessus, vel secundum majorem vel minorem accessum

<sup>1</sup>*Rhetic II, 3. 1125b26*

<sup>2</sup>cf III *Sent. 21, 1, 3. De veritate xxxvi, e. In Ethic. II, lect. 5*

<sup>3</sup>*Metaphysics X, 10. 1058a7ff*      <sup>4</sup>The contrary of being angry is being calm.

<sup>5</sup>In the event, we find that St Thomas has a wider purpose than this statement of

## THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMOTIONS (I)

For what causes anger is some evil which will be hard to avert and which is already at hand. Then the orexis either capitulates, and the only emotion experienced is that of sadness, an affective emotion; or there is an impulse to attack the evil that threatens, and this is anger. There can be no impulse to take flight, since *ex hypothesi* the evil is already happening or has happened. So there is no emotion which is the contrary of anger on the score of involving the opposite attitude to the same object.

Similarly, there can be no emotion which is the contrary of anger on the score of its having a contrary object, i.e. some good. For the opposite of a present evil is a good which, being already possessed, cannot now be difficult or arduous of attainment. Furthermore, once given possession of the good, there is no room for any further impulse; there is only repose in that possession, and this is an aspect of joy, an affective emotion.

Anger is therefore an emotion of the soul which has no contrary. It has an opposite—the cessation of emotion: as Aristotle says, *becoming calm is the opposite of being angry*:<sup>5</sup> and that is not contrary, but negative or privative, opposition.<sup>a</sup>

The answers to the objections have thus emerged in the course of the Reply.

article 4. are there any emotions of the same faculty which fall under different species but are not mutually contrary?<sup>a</sup>

THE FOURTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that if two emotions of the same orexis fall under different species, they must be mutually contrary. For emotions are differentiated by their objects; and since these are sense-good and sense-evil, which are mutually contrary, emotions which are different must differ as contraries. Therefore if two emotions of the same faculty are not mutually contrary, they must fall under the same species.

2. Difference in species arises from difference in form.<sup>b</sup> But difference in form is always a difference of contrariety, as Aristotle says.<sup>2</sup> Therefore if two emotions of the same faculty are not to be mutually contrary, they must fall under the same species.

3. Every emotion involves a movement towards or away from sense-good or sense-evil. Any difference between two emotions must therefore arise either from the fact that their objects are respectively a good and an evil; or from the fact that one of them involves a movement towards the object

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the question suggests; in the Reply he gives a general classification of the eleven emotions which he considers cover our whole emotional life.

<sup>a</sup>cf footnote e to 23, I above, p. 19.

et recessum. Sed primæ duæ differentiæ inducunt contrarietatem in passionibus animæ, ut dictum est;<sup>3</sup> tertia autem differentia non diversificat speciem, quia sic essent infinitæ species passionum animæ. Ergo non potest esse, quod passiones ejusdem potentiarum animæ differant specie, et non sint contrariae.

SED CONTRA amor et gaudium differunt specie, et sunt in concupiscibili. Nec tamen contrariantur ad invicem, quin potius unum est causa alterius. Ergo sunt aliquæ passiones ejusdem potentiarum quæ differunt specie, nec sunt contrariae.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod passiones differunt secundum activa quæ sunt objecta passionum animæ. Differentia autem activorum potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo secundum speciem vel naturam ipsorum activorum —sicut ignis differt ab aqua; alio modo secundum diversam virtutem activam.

Diversitas autem activi vel motivi quantum ad virtutem movendi potest accipi in passionibus animæ secundum similitudinem agentium naturalium: omne enim movens trahit quodammodo ad se patiens, vel a se repellit. Trahendo quidem ad se, tria facit in ipso. Nam primo quidem dat ei inclinationem vel aptitudinem ut in ipsum tendat: sicut cum corpus leve quod est sursum dat levitatem corpori generato, per quam habet inclinationem vel aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit sursum. Secundo, si corpus generatum est extra locum proprium, dat ei moveri ad locum. Tertio dat ei quiescere in locum cum pervenerit; quia ex eadem causa aliquid quiescit in loco per quam movebatur ad locum. Et similiter intelligendum est de causa repulsionis.

In motibus autem appetitivæ partis bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo in potentia appetitiva causat quamdam inclinationem seu aptitudinem seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris, cui per contrarium respondet odium ex parte mali. Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum: et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiæ: et ex opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio. Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum dat appetitus

<sup>3</sup>art. 2 above

*abominatio* (etymologically of course connected with ‘ill omen’) might surely be translated *detestation* with as much justice as *disgust*. This presumably would locate it at the first step of the three-stage process which St Thomas discerns, on the model of physical agency. One is led to wonder how real is the distinction between

## THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMOTIONS (I)

and the other a movement away from it; or from differences in the intensity of the movement, whether towards or away from the object in question. Now in either of the first two cases, the emotions are mutually contrary, as we have seen.<sup>3</sup> In the third case, they will not fall under different species; if they did, there would be an infinite number of species of the emotions. Therefore emotions of the same faculty cannot fall under different species without being mutually contrary.

ON THE OTHER HAND love and joy belong to the same faculty, viz. the affective, and fall under different species. Yet far from being mutually contrary, one is the cause of the other. Therefore two emotions of the same faculty can fall under different species without being mutually contrary.

REPLY: Passions are differentiated by the agents that produce them: these, in the case of those passions which are emotions, are their objects. Now there is a two-fold basis for distinguishing one agent from another: one, a difference in their intrinsic natures—between fire, say, and water; the other, a difference in the active powers they exercise.

When it is the emotions that are in question, this second kind of difference follows the pattern of physical agencies. Now a physical agent A either attracts the patient P, or repels it. In the case of attraction, A does three things. First, it produces in P an inclination or tendency to move towards A: thus a light body A<sup>1</sup> which is airborne will, if it generates another body P<sup>1</sup>, communicate to P<sup>1</sup> its own lightness which will produce in P<sup>1</sup> an inclination or tendency to be airborne also. Second, if P<sup>1</sup> is outside its own natural place, A<sup>1</sup> will produce in it actual movement toward that place. Third, when it reaches that place, P<sup>1</sup> will come to rest; and this must be thought of as caused by A<sup>1</sup>, for that which is the cause of a thing's moving to a given place is quite properly called the cause of its coming to rest there. A similar account holds for the case of repulsion.

When the movement in question is that of an orectic faculty F, it is a good G which plays the part of the attracting agent, and an evil the part of the repelling one. First then, G produces in F an inclination towards G, a sense of affinity with G, a sense that G and itself are naturally fitted for each other; this is the emotion called love. The corresponding contrary, when it is some evil which is the agent, is hatred. Second, if G is not yet possessed, it sets up in F a motion towards attaining this good which it has come to love. This is desire; the opposite is aversion or disgust.<sup>c</sup>

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these two stages. What of loathing? Is this simply intense disinclination? Or is it the shrinking-away movement that follows disinclination? Cf Introduction, pp. xxvi-xxviii.

quietationem quamdam in ipso bono adepto: et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium, cui opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia.

In passionibus autem irascibilis præsupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum ex concupiscibili, quæ absolute respicit bonum vel malum: et respectu boni nondum adepti est spes et desperatio: respectu autem mali nondum injacentis est timor et audacia, respectu autem boni adepti non est aliqua passio in irascibili, quia jam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum est.<sup>4</sup> Sed ex malo jam injacenti sequitur passio iræ.

Sic igitur patet quod in concupiscibili sunt tres conjugationes passionum, scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga, gaudium et tristitia. Similiter in irascibili sunt tres; scilicet spes et desperatio, timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur. Sunt ergo omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili, sub quibus omnes animæ passiones continentur.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.

<sup>4</sup>art. 3

## THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMOTIONS (I)

Third, once G is possessed, F finds repose in its possession. This is pleasure, or joy; the opposite is sadness, or grief.

The emotions of the spirited orexis, of course, presuppose that inclination or tendency towards the good or away from the evil which arises in the affective orexis, and which is concerned only with the good simply *qua* good or the evil simply *qua* evil. If the object is a good not yet possessed, we have either hope or despair. If it is an evil which has not yet befallen one, we have either fear or courage. If it is a good already possessed, there will be no corresponding emotion in the spirited orexis; for it is no longer a good 'to be attained only with difficulty', as we have seen.<sup>4</sup> But if it is an evil which is already in process of taking place, the emotion of anger is aroused.

One sees then that there are three pairs of emotions belonging to the affective orexis: love and hatred; desire and aversion; pleasure<sup>d</sup> and sadness. There are also three in the spirited orexis: hope and despair; fear and courage; and anger, which has no contrary. The emotions therefore comprise eleven distinct species, six in the affective orexis and five in the spirited.

The answers to the objections have thus emerged in the course of this reply.

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<sup>d</sup>*gaudium*: though in 31, 3 St Thomas will say that *gaudium* is a species of *delectatio*.

## Quæstio 24. de bono et male in animæ passionibus

Deinde considerandum est de bono et malo circa passiones animæ. Et circa hoc quæruntur quatuor.

1. utrum bonum et malum morale possit in passionibus animæ inveniri;
2. utrum omnis passio animæ sit mala moraliter;
3. utrum omnis passio addat, vel diminuat, ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus;
4. utrum aliqua passio sit bona vel mala ex sua specie.

*articulus 1. utrum bonum vel malum morale inveniri possit in passionibus animæ*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod nulla passio sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale est proprium hominis: *mores enim proprie dicuntur humani*, ut Ambrosius dicit super Lucam.<sup>2</sup> Sed passiones non sunt propriæ hominum, sed sunt etiam aliis animalibus communes. Ergo nulla passio animæ est bona vel mala moraliter.

2. Præterea, bonum vel malum hominis est secundum rationem esse vel præter rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit.<sup>3</sup> Sed passiones animæ non sunt in ratione, sed in appetitu sensitivo, ut supra dictum est.<sup>4</sup> Ergo non pertinent ad bonum vel malum hominis, quod est bonum morale.

3. Præterea Philosophus dicit in II *Ethic*.<sup>5</sup> quod *passionibus neque laudamur neque vituperamur*. Sed secundum bona et mala moralia laudamur et vituperamur. Ergo passiones non sunt bonæ vel malæ moraliter.

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit,<sup>6</sup> de passionibus animæ loquens, *Mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si bonus*.

RESPONSIo: Dicendum quod passiones animæ dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo secundum se, alio modo secundum quod subjacent imperio rationis, et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra dictum est.<sup>7</sup>

Si autem considerentur secundum quod subjacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum vel malum morale: propinquior enim est appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et voluntati quam membra exteriora:

<sup>1</sup>cf II *Sent.* 36, 2. *In Ethic.* II, lect. 5. *De malo* x, 1 ad 1; XII, 2 ad 1; 3

<sup>2</sup>Prologue. PL 15, 1612

<sup>3</sup>*De div nom.* 4. PG 3, 733

<sup>4</sup>Ia2æ. 22, 3

## Question 24. the morality of the emotions

Next we must consider the morality of the emotions. There are four points of inquiry:

1. do judgements of moral good or evil apply to the emotions?
2. is all emotion morally evil?
3. does emotion increase or detract from the merit of an act?
4. is there any emotion which is always morally good or evil by its very nature?

*article 1. do judgements of moral good or evil apply to the emotions?*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that no emotion could be either morally good or morally evil. For these notions apply only to man: as Ambrose says, *Morality is something exclusively human.*<sup>2</sup> But man is not alone in having emotions; other animals have them too. Therefore no emotion can be either morally good or morally evil.

2. Human morality has reason for its criterion, as Dionysius says.<sup>3</sup> But the emotions belong, not to the reason, but to the non-rational part of man, as we have seen.<sup>4</sup> Therefore moral judgements do not apply to the emotions.

3. *We are not praised or blamed for our emotions*, as Aristotle says.<sup>5</sup> But we certainly are praised and blamed for what is morally good or evil. Therefore the emotions are not morally good or evil.

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine says of the emotions: *They are evil if our love is evil; good, if our love is good.*<sup>6</sup>

REPLY: There are two ways of looking at the emotions: intrinsically, or as subject to the control of reason and will. Now intrinsically of course the emotions are simply movements of the non-rational orexis; one cannot therefore ascribe to them moral, good or evil, which we have shown to involve the reason.<sup>7</sup>

But in so far as the emotions are subject to the control of reason and will, moral judgements do apply to them. For the sensory orexis is much more intimately linked to the reason and will than are the bodily members. Now

<sup>5</sup>Ethics II, 5. 1105b31

<sup>6</sup>De civitate Dei XIV, 7. PL 41, 410

<sup>7</sup>Ia2æ. 18, 5

quorum tamen motus et actus sunt boni vel mali moraliter, secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde multo magis et ipsæ passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariæ, possunt dici bonæ vel malæ moraliter. Dicuntur autem voluntariæ, vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod istæ passiones secundum se consideratæ sunt communes hominibus et animalibus aliis: sed secundum quod a ratione imperantur sunt propriæ hominibus.

2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam inferiores vires appetitivæ dicuntur rationales, secundum quod *participant aliqualiter rationem*, ut dicitur in *Ethic.*<sup>8</sup>

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod Philosophus dicit quod non laudamur aut vituperamur secundum passiones absolute consideratas: sed non removet quin possint fieri laudabiles vel vituperabiles secundum quod a ratione ordinantur. Unde subdit, *Non enim laudatur, aut vituperatur qui timet aut irascitur, sed qui aliqualiter*,<sup>9</sup> idest secundum rationem, vel præter rationem.

*articulus 2. utrum omnis passio animæ sit mala moraliter*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod omnes passiones animæ sunt malæ moraliter: dicit enim Augustinus<sup>2</sup> quod passiones animæ quidam vocant morbos vel perturbationes animæ. Sed omnis morbus vel perturbatio animæ est aliquid malum moraliter. Ergo omnis passio animæ moraliter mala est.

2. Præterea, Damascenus dicit quod *operatio quidem quæ secundum naturam motus est; passio vero, quæ præter naturam.*<sup>3</sup> Sed quod est præter naturam in motibus animæ habet rationem peccati, et mali moralis; unde ipse alibi dicit quod diabolus versus est ex eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est præter naturam.<sup>4</sup> Ergo hujusmodi passiones sunt malæ moraliter.

3. Præterea, omne quod inducit ad peccatum habet rationem mali. Sed hujusmodi passiones inducunt ad peccatum; unde *Rom.* dicuntur *passiones peccatorum.*<sup>5</sup> Ergo videtur quod sint malæ moraliter.

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit quod rectus amor omnes istas affectiones rectas habet: metuunt enim peccare, cupiunt perseverare, dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>8</sup>*Ethics* I, 13. 1102b13

<sup>9</sup>*Ethics* II, 5. 1105b31

<sup>1</sup>cf 1a2æ. 59, 2. *De Malo* XII, 1

the movements and actions of our bodily members are morally good or bad in so far as they are voluntary. *A fortiori* therefore the emotions, in so far as they are voluntary, are liable to be judged morally good or evil. They will be called voluntary to the extent that the will commands them, or at least does not check them.

Hence: 1. Intrinsically considered, the emotions are common to men and the other animals; but in so far as they are under rational control, they are distinctively human.

2. Even the lower orectic faculties may be called rational to the extent that *there is a sense in which they have some share in the life of reason*, as Aristotle says.<sup>8</sup>

3. Aristotle means that we are not praised or blamed for our emotions considered intrinsically; but he does not deny that they may become praiseworthy or blameworthy to the extent that they are under rational control. Thus he adds, *A man is not praised or condemned merely for being frightened or angry, but for being so in a certain way*,<sup>9</sup> viz. in harmony with reason, or in conflict with it.

#### *article 2. is all emotion morally evil?*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that all emotion is morally evil. For Augustine says that some writers refer to the emotions as diseases or disorders of the soul.<sup>2</sup> But diseases and disorders of the soul are moral evil.<sup>3</sup> Therefore all emotion is morally evil.

2. Damascene says, *Action is movement in harmony with nature; passion is movement in conflict with nature*.<sup>4</sup> But movements of the soul which are in conflict with nature are sinful and morally evil; as Damascene also says, the devil turned from a life in harmony with nature to one in conflict with it.<sup>4</sup> Such passions or emotions are therefore morally evil.

3. Whatever leads to sin is evil. But emotions lead to sin; St Paul calls them *the passions of sin*.<sup>5</sup> Therefore they must be morally evil.

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine says that when a man loves aright, all his emotions are healthy: he fears sin and desires perseverance; he feels sorrow for sin and takes pleasure in good deeds.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup>*De civitate Dei* ix, 4. PL 41, 258

<sup>3</sup>*De Fide orthodoxa* II, 22. PG 94, 941

<sup>4</sup>*De Fide orthodoxa* II, 4. PG 94, 876

<sup>5</sup>*Romans* 7, 5

<sup>6</sup>*De civitate Dei* XIV, 9. PL 41, 413

<sup>a</sup>On the analogue of diseases and disorders of the body, which are called physical evils.

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod circa hanc quæstionem diversa fuit sententia Stoicorum et Peripateticorum: nam Stoici dixerunt omnes passiones esse malas, Peripatetici vero dixerunt passiones moderatas esse bonas. Quæ quidem differentia, licet magna videatur secundum vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla est vel parva, si quis utrorumque intentiones consideret.

Stoici enim non discernebant inter sensum et intellectum, et per consequens nec inter intellectivum appetitum et sensitivum. Unde nec discernebant passiones animæ a moribus voluntatis, secundum hoc quod passiones animæ sunt in appetitu sensitivo, simplices autem motus voluntatis sunt in intellectivo. Sed omnem rationabilem motum appetitivæ partis vocabant voluntatem; passiones autem dicebant motum progredientem extra limites rationis. Et ideo eorum sententiam sequens Tullius. omnes passiones vocat animæ morbos: ex quo argumentatur, quod qui morbos sunt sani non sunt; et qui sani non sunt insipientes sunt: unde insipientes insanos dicimus.<sup>7</sup>

Peripatetici vero omnes motus appetitus sensitivi passiones vocant; unde eas bonas æstiment cum sunt a ratione moderatae, malas autem cum sunt præter moderationem rationis. Ex quo patet, quod Tullius in eodem libro Peripateticorum senteniam, qui approbabant mediocritatem passionum, inconvenienter improbat, dicens quod *omne malum etiam mediocre vitandum est: nam sicut corpus etiam mediocriter ægrum sanum non est; sic ista mediocritas morborum vel passionum animæ sana non est.*<sup>8</sup> Non enim passiones dicuntur morbi vel perturbationes animæ, nisi cum carent moderatione rationis.

1. Unde patet responsio ad primum.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod in omni passione animæ additur aliquid vel diminuitur a naturali motu cordis, inquantam cor intensius vel remissius movetur, secundum systolen aut diastolen: et secundum hoc habet passionis rationem. Tamen non oportet quod passio semper declinet ab ordine naturalis rationis.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod passiones animæ inquantum sunt præter ordinem rationis inclinant ad peccatum; inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a ratione pertinent ad virtutem.

*articulus 3. utrum passio addat vel diminuat ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod passio quæcumque semper diminuat de bonitate actus moralis. Omne enim quod impedit judicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas actus moralis, diminuit per consequens bonitatem actus moralis. Sed omnis passio impedit judicium rationis:

<sup>7</sup>De Tusculanis Quæstionibus III, 4

<sup>8</sup>ibid, 10

**REPLY:** The Stoics and the Peripatetics held different views on this question: the Stoics held that all emotion was evil, the Peripatetics claimed that, given due moderation, it was good. Verbally, the difference between their views seems considerable; but if one studies their meaning and intention, it amounts to very little.

The Stoics made no distinction between sense and intellect, and hence between the sensory orexis and the intellectual. Accordingly they made no distinction between the emotions and movements of the will, since the emotions belong to the sensory orexis and simple movements of the will to the intellectual orexis. They applied the term *will* to every orectic movement that was under rational control, and the term *emotion* to every one that was not. Cicero followed their opinion, calling the emotions diseases of the soul, and he concluded: diseased people are unsound, and unsound people are foolish; hence we call foolish people unsound.<sup>7</sup>

The Peripatetics, however, applied the term *emotion* to every movement of the sensory orexis. Accordingly they judged emotions to be good when they are under rational control, and evil when they are not; and from this they inferred, as a corollary, the doctrine of the 'golden mean' for the emotions. Cicero was therefore mistaken in attacking this doctrine on the score that *every evil, even in a moderate degree, is to be avoided; just as the body is not healthy if it is even moderately ill, the soul is not healthy if it has even a moderate degree of illness, viz. emotion.*<sup>8</sup> For the emotions are not 'diseases' or 'disturbances' of the soul, except precisely when they are not under rational control.

1. This shows how the first objection is to be answered.
2. Emotion always increases or decreases the natural rate of the heart-beat, the heart reacting to it by contracting or dilating; it is therefore always a form of passion or passivity. But there is no reason for thinking that passivity always implies some failure by natural and rational standards.
3. Emotion leads one towards sin in so far as it is uncontrolled by reason; but in so far as it is rationally controlled, it is part of the virtuous life.

*article 3. does emotion enhance or detract from the goodness or evil of an act?*

**THE THIRD POINT:**<sup>1</sup> I. It would seem that emotion always detracts from the goodness of a moral act. For the goodness of an act depends on rational judgement; so whatever impedes rational judgement detracts from the goodness of the act on which it bears. But emotion always impedes rational

<sup>1</sup>cf *De veritate* xxvi, 7. *De malo* III, II; XII, I

dicit enim Sallustius. *Omnes homines, qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, ira, et amicitia, atque misericordia vacuos esse decet.*<sup>2</sup> Ergo omnis passio diminuit bonitatem moralis actus.

2. Præterea, actus hominis quanto est Deo similior tanto est melior: unde dicit Apostolus, *Estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii charissimi.*<sup>3</sup> Sed Deus et sancti Angeli puniunt sine ira, sine miseriæ compassione subveniunt, ut Augustinus dicit.<sup>4</sup> Ergo est melius hujusmodi opera agere sine passione animæ quam cum passione.

3. Præterea, sicut malum morale attenditur per ordinem ad rationem, ita et bonum morale. Sed malum morale diminuitur per passionem: minus enim peccat qui peccat ex passione, quam qui peccat ex industria. Ergo maius\* bonum operatur qui operatur cum passione, quam qui operatur sine passione.

SED CONTRA est, quod Augustinus dicit quod *passio misericordiae rationi deservit quando ita præbetur misericordia ut justitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur poenitenti.*<sup>5</sup> Sed nihil quod deservit rationi diminuit bonum morale. Ergo passio animæ non diminuit bonum moris.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod Stoici sicut ponebant omnem passionem animæ esse malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animæ diminuere actus bonitatem: omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus passiones animæ solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout sunt perturbationes seu ægritudines.

Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinent quod etiam ipsæ passiones sint moderatae per rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius quanto ad plura quæ homini convenienter derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum membrorum per rationis regulam dirigantur: unde cum appetitus sensitivus possit obediere rationi, ut supra dictum est,<sup>6</sup> ad perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsæ passiones animæ sint regulatae per rationem.

\*Piana reads *minus*, less good

<sup>2</sup>Catalina 51

<sup>3</sup>Ephesians 5, 1

<sup>4</sup>De civitate Dei XIV, 5. PL 41, 261

<sup>5</sup>De civitate Dei IX, 5. PL 41, 261

<sup>6</sup>Ia2æ. 17, 7

judgement; as Sallust says, *When men deliberate over difficult issues, they need to be free from anger, personal antipathy or friendship, and pity.*<sup>2</sup> Therefore emotion always detracts from the goodness of a moral act.

2. A man's actions are better the more they resemble God: as St Paul says, *Being God's favoured children, you must be like him.*<sup>3</sup> But God and the angels inflict punishment without feelings of anger, and render help without feelings of pity, as Augustine says.<sup>4</sup> Such actions are therefore better performed without emotion than with it.

3. Moral evil has the same criterion as moral goodness: right reason. But moral evil is diminished by emotion: a sin prompted by passion is less serious than one committed in cold blood. Therefore a good act performed without emotion is better than one performed with it.

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine says that the emotion of pity is a true servant of reason as long as justice is preserved while mercy is shown, whether one is giving help to the needy or pardon to the repentant.<sup>5</sup> But nothing which serves reason detracts from moral goodness. Therefore emotion does not do so.

REPLY: The Stoics, holding as they did that all emotion is evil, concluded that emotion detracts from the goodness of an act: for whenever evil is mixed with good, the good is either totally destroyed, or at least enfeebled. And this is true enough if one reserves the term 'emotion' for disorderly functionings of the sensory orexis, looking on them as upsets or ailments of the moral system.

But if one applies the term 'emotion' to any functioning of the sensory orexis, one feature of human excellence will be the existence of the emotions and their control by reason. For the root of all human goodness lies in the reason; human excellence will therefore be the greater, the greater the number of human elements under rational control. Accordingly, no-one questions the fact that one requirement of moral goodness is that the actions of our bodily members be dictated by reason; but we have shown that the sensory orexis can be obedient to reason;<sup>6a</sup> therefore another element of moral goodness will be the control of our emotions by reason.

<sup>a</sup>The account of this in 1a2æ. 17, 7 is essentially as follows: The sensory orexis functions of course as a faculty of the soul, but also in dependence on the body's dispositions; under the first aspect it is completely subjectable to rational control, under the second it is not. It may also be suddenly aroused by sense-perception or the imagination. St Thomas therefore quotes with approval Aristotle's remark that reason governs the affective and spiritual orexis, not as an owner rules a slave, but as a constitutional government rules a free man.

Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et velit bonum et faciat exteriori actu: ita etiam ad perfectionem boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur, non solum secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum, secundum illud quod in *Psalm.* dicitur, *Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum,*<sup>7</sup> ut cor accipiamus pro appetitu intellegitivo, carnem autem pro appetitu sensitivo.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passiones animæ duplicitate se possunt habere ad judicium rationis. Uno modo antecedenter: et sic, cum obnubilent judicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas moralis actus, diminuunt actus bonitatem. Laudabilius enim est quod ex judicio rationis aliquis faciat opus charitatis quam ex sola passione misericordiæ.

Alio modo se habent consequenter, et hoc duplicitate. Uno modo per modum redundantiae, quia scilicet cum superior pars animæ intense movetur in aliiquid sequitur motum ejus etiam pars inferior: et sic passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo est signum intensionis voluntatis; et sic indicat bonitatem moralem majorem. Alio modo per modum electionis, quando scilicet homo ex judicio rationis eligit affici aliqua passione ut promptius operetur, cooperante appetitu sensitivo: et sic passio animæ addit ad bonitatem actionis.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod in Deo et in angelis non est appetitus sensitivus neque etiam membra corporea, et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in nobis.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod passio tendens in malum praecedens judicium rationis diminuit peccatum, sed consequens aliquo praedictorum auget ipsum, vel significat augmentum ejus.

#### articulus 4. utrum aliqua passio sit bona vel mala ex sua specie

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod nulla passio animæ secundum speciem suam sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale attenditur secundum rationem. Sed passiones sunt in appetitu sensitivo: et ita id quod est secundum rationem accidit eis. Cum ergo nihil quod est per accidens pertineat ad speciem rei, videtur quod nulla passio secundum suam speciem sit bona vel mala.

2. Præterea, actus et passiones habent speciem ex objecto. Si ergo aliqua passio secundum aliquam suam speciem esset bona vel mala, oportet quod passiones quarum objectum est bonum bonæ essent secundum suam speciem, ut amor, desiderium, et gaudium: et passiones quarum

<sup>7</sup>*Psalm. 83, 3*

<sup>1</sup>cf 2a2æ. 158, 1. *In Ethic. II, lect 7. De malo x, 1*

\*e.g. killing a man is a different kind of action from killing a rabbit; undergoing physical discomfort is a different kind of passion (i.e. of being-acted-upon) from undergoing a snub.

One sees then that, just as it is better that a man should not merely have the right intention, but also perform the good action: it is better that he be bent on the good, not merely with his will, but also with his sensory orexis. As the Psalmist says, *My heart and my flesh cry out for the living God:*<sup>7</sup> the word ‘heart’ suggesting the intellectual orexis, and the word ‘flesh’ the sensory.

Hence: 1. There are two ways in which emotion may be related to rational judgement: antecedently, and subsequently.

In the former case, it will cloud that rational judgement on which the moral worth of an act depends, and so detract from it. An act of charity is more praiseworthy when done from deliberate choice than simply from a feeling of pity.

But when emotion is subsequent to rational judgement, there are two possibilities. First, it may take the form of a kind of overflow: the higher part of the soul is so strongly bent upon some object that the lower part follows it. In that case, the presence of the emotion in the sensory orexis is a sign of the will’s intensity, and hence an index of greater moral worth. Second, it may be the outcome of choice: i.e. a man may make a deliberate decision to be affected by an emotion so that he will act more promptly, thanks to the stimulus of the sensory orexis. In this case too emotion adds to the action’s worth.

2. Since God and the angels have neither sensory orexis nor bodily members, goodness does not involve for them the due control of emotion and physical behaviour, as it does for us.

3. An emotion urging us towards wrongdoing lessens our guilt if it precedes rational judgement; but if it comes after it, in either of the ways just noted, it either makes the sin a more grievous one, or is an index of its being so.

*article 4. is there any emotion which is always morally good or evil by its very nature?*

THE FOURTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that there is no kind of emotion which is morally good or evil by its very nature. For judgements of moral good and evil are in place only at the level of reason. Now the emotions occur at the level of sense, so that rational considerations can bear upon them only accidentally. But nothing that is only accidental to a thing belongs to its nature. It seems therefore that there is no emotion which is either good or evil by its very nature.

2. The nature of an action or passion is determined by reference to its object.<sup>a</sup> If therefore an emotion were good or evil by its very nature, then—since the emotions are a sub-division of the category passion—those emotions would always be good whose object is some good thing, viz. love,

objectum est malum essent malæ secundum suam speciem, ut odium, timor, et tristitia. Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Non ergo aliqua passio est bona vel mala ex sua specie.

3. Præterea, nulla species passionum est quæ non inveniatur in aliis animalibus. Sed bonum morale non invenitur nisi in homine. Ergo nulla passio animæ bona est vel mala ex sua specie.

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit quod misericordia pertinet ad virtutem.<sup>2</sup> Philosophus etiam dicit quod verecundia est passio laudabilis.<sup>3</sup> Ergo aliquæ passiones sunt bonæ vel malæ secundum suam speciem.

RESPONSIÖ: Dicendum quod sicut de actibus dictum est,<sup>4</sup> ita et de passionibus dicendum videtur; quod scilicet species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo secundum quod est in genere naturæ: et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis. Alio modo secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et judicio rationis. Ethoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur, ut objectum passionis, aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione: sicut patet de verecundia, quæ est timor turpis, et de invidia, quæ est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem exterioris actus.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passionibus secundum quod pertinent ad speciem naturæ, prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus in se consideratur. Secundum vero quod appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi, jam bonum et malum rationis non est in\* passionibus ejus per accidens, sed per se.

2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod passiones quæ in bonum tendunt, si sit verum bonum, sunt bonæ; et similiter quæ a vero malo recessum a bono et per accessum ad malum sunt malæ.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod in brutis animalibus appetitus sensitivus non obedit rationi: et tamen in quantum dicitur quadam æstimativa naturali quæ subjicitur rationi superiori, scilicet divinæ, est in eis quædam similitudo moralis boni quantum ad animæ passiones.

\*Piana reads *ex*

<sup>2</sup>*De civitate Dei* IX, 5. PL 41. 260

<sup>3</sup>*Ethics* II, 7. 1108a32

<sup>4</sup>IA2æ. 1, 3 ad 3; 18, 5 & 6; 20, 1  
Aristotle, in this place, does indeed say that the modest man is praised; but he also says that modesty is not a virtue.

<sup>c</sup>One notices that these are sub-species respectively of two of the eleven supreme species, fear and sadness. Presumably St Thomas does not want to say that any of the supreme species of the emotions is good or evil by its very nature.

desire, and pleasure; and those would always be evil whose object is some evil thing, viz. hatred, fear, and sorrow. But this is clearly not the case. Therefore there is no emotion which is good or evil by its very nature.

3. The emotions are all found in the other animals. But only man is capable of moral goodness. Therefore none of the emotions can be good or evil by its very nature.

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine says that pity is a virtue,<sup>2</sup> and Aristotle that modesty is a praiseworthy emotion.<sup>3b</sup> There are therefore some virtues which are good, or evil, by their very nature.

**REPLY:** We must here apply to passions what we have already found to be the case with actions:<sup>4</sup> that they are to be classified from two different points of view. First, they may be classified merely as natural phenomena; from that point of view, moral considerations are irrelevant. But second, the passions and emotions may be classified from the moral point of view, in so far as they are part of the life of free and rational choice. In this way a particular kind of emotion may be good or evil by its very nature, because its object is one that is in tune with right reason, or at odds with it: for instance modesty, the fear of unchastity, or envy, chagrin over another person's good fortune.<sup>c</sup> Such emotions share in the morality of the particular kind of external action to which they correspond.

Hence: 1. The first objection bears upon the emotions considered as natural phenomena, i.e. only in so far as they affect the sensory orexis in itself. But in so far as that orexis is subject to rational control, moral considerations apply to it, not merely incidentally, but by the very nature of the case.

2. Those emotions are good which create a favourable attitude towards something truly good or an unfavourable one towards something really evil; and those emotions are evil which create an unfavourable attitude towards something truly good, or a favourable one towards something really evil.

3. In dumb animals, the sensory orexis is obviously not obedient to reason. Still, it has at least the guidance of the estimative faculty, which is subject to a higher reason, namely God's; and to that extent their emotions bear some resemblance to moral goodness.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup>St Thomas attributes to animals an 'estimative sense', a faculty by which they instinctively seek or avoid certain things, not because—or even in spite of—their being pleasant or unpleasant, but because they are useful or dangerous; his favourite examples are the bird's gathering straws to make a nest, and the lamb's fleeing from the wolf (ta. 78, 4).

## Quæstio 25. de ordine passionum ad invicem

Deinde considerandum est de ordine passionum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quæruntur quatuor.

1. de ordine passionum irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis;
2. de ordine passionum concupiscibilis ad invicem;
3. de ordine passionum irascibilis ad invicem;
4. de quatuor principalibus passionibus.

*articulus 1. utrum passiones irascibilis sint priores passionibus concupiscibilis, vel e converso*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod passiones irascibilis sint priores passionibus concupiscibilis. Ordo enim passionum est secundum ordinem objectorum. Sed objectum irascibilis est bonum arduum, quod videtur esse supremum inter alia bona. Ergo passiones irascibilis videntur præesse passionibus concupiscibilis.

2. Præterea, movens est prius moto. Sed irascibilis comparatur ad concupiscibilem sicut movens ad motum: ad hoc enim datur animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis prohibetur frui suo objecto, ut supra dictum est;<sup>2</sup> removens autem prohibens habet rationem moventis, ut dicitur in *Physic.*<sup>3</sup> Ergo passiones irascibilis sunt priores passionibus concupiscibilis.

3. Præterea, gaudium et tristitia sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Sed gaudium et tristitia consequuntur ad passiones irascibilis: dicit enim Philosophus quod *punitio quietat impetum iræ, delectationem loco tristitiae faciens.*<sup>4</sup> Ergo passiones concupiscibilis sunt posteriores passionibus irascibilis.

SED CONTRA, passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum.

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 26, 1, 3 and 2, 3. *De veritate* xxv, 2

<sup>2</sup>Ia2æ. 23, 1 ad 1. cf Ia. 81, 2

<sup>3</sup>*Physics* VIII, 4. 255b24

<sup>4</sup>*Ethics* IV, 5. 1126a20

<sup>a</sup>Question 23 put forward criteria for deciding when one emotion was to be distinguished from or contrasted with another, and for assigning them to eleven species. The present Question considers how those species are to be arranged in order.

<sup>b</sup>In this Question St Thomas used the expression *sunt priores* in several different senses without explanation, or even warning. Sometimes it means 'occur first'

## Question 25. how the emotions are mutually related

Next we must consider how the emotions are mutually related.<sup>a</sup> There are four points of inquiry:

1. how are spirited emotions related to the affective?
2. how are the affective emotions related one to another?
3. how are the spirited emotions related one to another?
4. what are the four principal emotions?

*article 1. do the spirited emotions have precedence over<sup>b</sup> the affective, or vice versa?*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that the spirited emotions have precedence over the affective. For the order of precedence of the emotions must follow that of their respective objects. Now the object of the spirited orexis is good—that-is-difficult-of-attainment, and as such superior to other goods. Therefore the emotions of the spirited orexis have precedence over those of the affective.

2. If A moves B, then A precedes B. But one thinks of the spirited orexis as moving the affective; for as we have seen, animals are endowed with it to enable them to overcome obstacles which hinder the affective orexis from enjoying its object:<sup>2</sup> and if one removes an obstacle to movement, one may be said to cause the movement, as Aristotle remarks.<sup>3c</sup> Therefore the emotions of the spirited orexis precede those of the affective.

3. Joy and sadness are affective emotions. But they are consequent upon spirited emotions: as Aristotle says, *Retaliation soothes the sting of anger, making sadness give way to joy.*<sup>4</sup> Therefore the spirited emotions precede the affective.

ON THE OTHER HAND the affective emotions bear upon sense-good *sans phrase*, but the spirited upon a restricted area of good, viz. that hard to

(art. 1 & 3 corp.); sometimes, ‘are stronger than’ (art. 3 ad 2); sometimes, ‘are more important than’ (art. 2, ad 1); sometimes, apparently, ‘of superior dignity to’ (art. 3 *sed contra*). The shift is indeed most marked in the statement of objections: e.g. the conclusions of 2 ad 1 and 3 ad 2 are *potior*, urged as establishing *prior* and *prima*; but even in the Replies to these objections the ambiguity goes unremarked. I shall therefore commonly translate *sunt priores* by the deliberately vague ‘have precedence over’.

<sup>a</sup>Aristotle’s examples are those of a person removing a column from beneath the weight it supports, or cutting a string that attaches a bladder under water to the stone that holds it down.

Cum igitur bonum simpliciter sit prius quam bonum contractum, videtur quod passiones concupisibilis\* sint priores passionibus irascibilis.

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod passiones concupisibilis ad plura se habent quam passiones irascibilis. Nam in passionibus concupisibilis invenitur aliquid pertinens ad motum (sicut desiderium), et aliquid pertinens ad quietem (sicut gaudium et tristitia). Sed in passionibus irascibilis non invenitur aliquid pertinens ad quietem, sed solum pertinens ad motum. Cujus ratio est quia id in quo jam quiescit, non habet rationem difficultis seu ardui, quod est objectum irascibilis.

Quies autem, cum sit finis motus, est prior in intentione, sed posterior in executione. Si ergo comparentur passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupisibilis quæ significant quietem in bono, manifeste passiones irascibilis præcedunt, ordine executionis, hujusmodi passiones concupisibilis: sicut spes præcedit gaudium, unde et causat ipsum, secundum illud Apostoli, *Spe gaudentes.*<sup>5</sup> Sed passio concupisibilis importans quietem in malo, scilicet tristitia, media est inter duas passiones irascibilis. Sequitur enim timorem: cum enim occurrerit malum quod timebatur causatur tristitia. Præcedit autem motum iræ: quia cum ex tristitia præcedente aliquis insurget in vindictam, hoc pertinet ad motum iræ. Et quia rependere vicem malis apprehenditur ut bonum, cum iratus hoc consecutus fuerit, gaudet. Et sic manifestum est quod omnis passio irascibilis terminatur ad passionem concupisibilis pertinentem ad quietem, scilicet ad gaudium vel ad tristitiam.

Sed si comparentur passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupisibilis quæ important motum, sic manifeste passiones concupisibilis sunt priores, eo quod passiones irascibilis addunt supra passiones concupisibilis: sicut et objectum irascibilis addit supra objectum concupisibilis arduitatem sive difficultatem. Spes enim supra desiderium addit quandam conatum, et quandam elevationem animi ad consequendum bonum arduum. Et similiter timor addit supra fugam seu abominationem quandam depressionem animi, propter difficultatem mali.

Sic ergo passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupisibilis quæ important motum in bonum vel malum; et inter passiones concupisibilis quæ important quietem in bono vel in malo. Et sic patet quod passiones irascibilis et principium habent a passionibus concupisibilis, et in passiones concupisibilis terminantur.

i. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procederet si de ratione objecti concupisibilis esset aliquid oppositum arduo, sicut de ratione

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\*Piana reads *Ad plura se habent quam*, have relationships with a greater number of objects than.

attain. Now good pure and simple precedes good under some qualification. Therefore the affective emotions precede the spirited.

**REPLY:** The affective emotions display a greater diversity than do the spirited, for they comprise both elements of movement (as in desire) and elements of repose (as in joy and sadness); whereas the spirited emotions display no elements of repose, only those of movement. For the object of the spirited orexis is something difficult of attainment: and a thing is no longer difficult of attainment once one has come to rest in its possession or endurance.

Now since all movement is directed towards some ultimate point of rest, it is rest which comes first in one's intentions, but movement which comes first in actual occurrence. If therefore we compare the spirited emotions with those affective emotions which involve coming to rest in some good state of affairs, the former obviously precede the latter in actual occurrence: for instance, hope comes before joy, and causes it—one thinks of St Paul's words, *Let hope keep you joyful.*<sup>5</sup> But the affective emotion that involves coming to rest in some evil state of affairs, viz. sadness, is midway between the two relevant spirited emotions. It comes after fear: for when the evil that one feared comes to pass, one feels distress or sadness; but it precedes anger, for the impulse to seek revenge which often arises from sadness and disappointment is the motion of anger. Indeed, since avenging an evil is seen as something good, the angry man who achieves his revenge finds joy in it. Every spirited emotion therefore has as its term one of the affective emotions which involve coming to rest, viz. joy or sadness.

If, however, we compare the spirited emotions with those affective emotions which involve movement, the latter clearly take precedence, for the former add something to them; just as the object of the spirited orexis adds to that of the affective the note of arduousness or difficulty. Hope adds to desire a certain drive, a buoyancy of spirit about winning the arduous good. Fear adds to aversion or disgust a sense of defeatism because the threatened evil will be hard to avoid.

The spirited emotions are therefore midway between those affective emotions which involve movement towards some good or away from some evil, and those which involve repose in one or other of them. One sees then that the emotions of the spirited orexis find in emotions of the affective both their origin and term.

Hence: i. The argument would hold if, in the formal object of the

<sup>†</sup>Piana reads *aliquid*

<sup>5</sup>Romans 12, 12

objecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia objectum concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius est naturaliter quam objectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod removens prohibens non est movens per se, sed per accidens. Nunc autem loquimur de ordine passionum per se. Et præterea irascibilis removet prohibens quietem concupiscibilis in suo objecto. Unde ex hoc non sequitur nisi quod passiones irascibilis præcedunt passiones concupiscibilis ad quietem pertinentes.

3. De quibus etiam tertia ratio procedit.

*articulus 2. utrum amor sit prima passionum concupiscibilis*

DA SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod amor non sit prima passionum concupiscibilis. Vis enim concupiscibilis a concupiscentia denominatur, quæ est eadem passio cum desiderio. Sed denominatio fit a potiori, ut dicitur in *de Anima*.<sup>2</sup> Ergo concupiscentia est potior amore.

2. Præterea, amor quandam unionem importat: est enim *vis unitiva et concreta*, ut Dionysius dicit.<sup>3</sup> Sed concupiscentia vel desiderium est motus ad unionem rei concupitæ vel desideratae. Ergo concupiscentia est prior amore.

3. Præterea, causa est prior effectu. Sed delectatio est causa amoris: quidam enim propter delectationem amant, ut dicitur in *Ethic*.<sup>4</sup> Ergo delectatio est prior amore. Non ergo prima inter passiones concupiscibilis est amor.

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit, quod omnes animæ passiones ex amore causantur: *amor enim inhians habere quod amat, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, lætitia est*.<sup>5</sup> Amor ergo est prima passionum concupiscibilis.

RESPONSIUS: Dicendum quod objectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. Naturaliter autem bonum est prius malo: eo quod malum est privatio boni. Unde et omnes passiones quarum objectum est bonum naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum objectum est malum, unaquæque scilicet sua opposita: quia enim bonum quæritur ideo refutatur oppositum malum.

<sup>1</sup>cf IA2æ. 27, 4. IA. 20, 1. III Sent. 27, 1, 3

<sup>2</sup>De Anima II, 4. 416b23

<sup>3</sup>De divinis nominibus 4. PG 3, 709

<sup>4</sup>Ethics VIII, 2 and 3. 1155b12 and 21

<sup>5</sup>De civitate Dei XIV, 7. PL 41, 410

affective orexis, there were some element which was the opposite of 'the arduous', the distinctive element in the formal object of the spirited orexis. But there is not: the object of the affective orexis is the good pure and simple; and that naturally precedes the object of the spirited orexis, as that which is common to several things has precedence over that which is distinctive to each of them.

2. That which removes an obstacle causes the ensuing movement only consequentially and to that extent accidentally; but we are here discussing the order that holds between the emotions immediately and of their very nature. Further, the spirited orexis removes an obstacle to the affective's coming to rest in its object; the objection would therefore be warranted only in concluding that the spirited emotions precede those affective emotions which involve being at rest.

3. The third objection makes the same assumptions.

*article 2. is love the first of the affective emotions?*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that love is not the first of the affective emotions. For the Latin name for the affective faculty, *concupisibilis*, is formed from the noun *concupiscentia*, which means *desire*. But the name of a thing is taken from its most important characteristic, as Aristotle says.<sup>2</sup> Therefore desire is superior to love.

2. Love implies a certain union; as Dionysius says, it is *a uniting, binding force*.<sup>3</sup> But desire is a motion directed towards that union. Therefore desire comes before love.

3. A cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: Aristotle remarks that pleasure is often the motive for love.<sup>4</sup> Therefore pleasure comes before love, and so love is not the first of the affective emotions.

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine says that all the other emotions are caused by love: he says, *When love longs for the thing loved, that is desire; when it possesses it and enjoys it, that is joy*.<sup>5</sup> Therefore love is the first of the affective emotions.

REPLY: The formal objects of the affective orexis are sense-good and sense-evil. Now in the nature of things, good precedes evil, for evil consists in being deprived of some good; therefore in any pair of opposed emotions, the one whose object is a good has precedence over the one whose object is an evil; indeed, it is precisely because one wants some good that one rejects the opposing evil.

Bonum autem habet rationem finis: qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupisibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem vel secundum consecutionem.

Secundum quidem consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad finem. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; tertio, quiescit in fine post ejus consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel lætitia seu delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor præcedit desiderium, et desiderium præcedit delectationem.

Sed secundum ordinem intentionis est e converso: nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quæ quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.<sup>6</sup>

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc modo nominatur aliquid secundum quod nobis innotescit: voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum Philosophum.<sup>7</sup> Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur amatum, est delectatio; quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia.<sup>8</sup> Unde inter omnes passiones concupisibilis magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et propter hoc ab ea denominatur potentia.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est unio amati ad amantem. Una quidem realis, secundum scilicet conjunctionem ad ipsam rem. Et talis unio pertinet ad gaudium vel delectationem, quæ sequitur desiderium.

Alia autem est unio affectiva, quæ est secundum aptitudinem vel proportionem: prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem ad alterum et inclinationem jam participat aliquid ejus. Et sic amor unionem importat. Quæ quidem unio præcedit motum desiderii.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio causat amorem, secundum quod est prior in intentione.

<sup>6</sup>Ia2æ. II, 3 ad 3

<sup>7</sup>Peri Hermeneias I, 2. 16a3

<sup>8</sup>De Trinitate x, 12. PL 42, 984

<sup>a</sup>viz. in Latin. I have not followed this alleged terminological rule in translating

Now the good is always somewhat in the nature of an end or goal; and the end of any undertaking comes first in one's intentions, but last in actual achievement. So there are two possibilities: the affective emotions may be arranged in order either on the basis of one's intentions, or on the basis of their actual occurrence.

From the latter point of view, that ranks as first which is experienced first by the agent which is bent upon the goal in question. Now what must come first in such an agent is an attachment to the goal in question as being an attractive one, for nothing sets itself an end which it does not find in some way attractive or appropriate; second, it moves towards the goal; third, it comes to rest in the goal once it has been attained. In the present context, the attachment of the orexis to the goal in question, its feeling for its attractiveness, is love: for love is precisely such a favourable attitude to some good, such a sense of its attractiveness; the movement or impulse towards that good is desire; and the repose in it once possessed is enjoyment or pleasure. On this basis of arrangement, then, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure.

But when one arranges the emotions on the basis of intention, one finds that the order is reversed: the anticipated pleasure gives rise to desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of some good: and that enjoyment may be thought of as the end in question, as much as is the good itself: as we have seen.<sup>6</sup>

Hence: 1. Our terminology for things is largely determined by the way we come to know them, for words are symbols of mental impressions, as Aristotle says;<sup>7</sup> and for the most part we come to know a cause through its effect. Now once we possess the thing we love, the effect of love is pleasure; before that, it is desire. But love is felt more keenly when one is deprived of the thing one loves, as Augustine says.<sup>8</sup> Therefore of all the affective emotions, the one felt most keenly is desire; and so it is the one which gives its name to the faculty.<sup>a</sup>

2. There are two kinds of union possible between the thing loved and the person who loves it: one is real union, actual juxtaposition: this creates joy or pleasure, which comes after desire. The other is affective union: for once our affections are engaged, to the extent that we have a sense of affinity with a thing and feel its attractiveness, we are already in some kind of communion with it. Love therefore involves union; and that union precedes the impulse of desire.

3. Pleasure is said to cause love, in the sense that it precedes love in the order of our anticipation.

*concupiscibilis* and *irascibilis*, for fear that 'the desiring faculty' and 'the anger-prone faculty' would be too misleading (cf Introduction p. xxiii).

*articulus 3. utrum spes sit prima inter passiones irascibilis*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod spes non sit prima inter passiones irascibilis. Vis enim irascibilis ab ira denominatur. Cum igitur denominatio fiat a potiori, videtur quod ira sit potior et prior quam spes.

2. Præterea, arduum est objectum irascibilis. Sed magis videtur esse arduum quod aliquis conetur superare malum contrarium quod imminet ut futurum, quod pertinet ad audaciam, vel quod injacet jam ut præsens, quod pertinet ad iram, quam quod conetur acquirere simpliciter aliquod bonum. Et similiter magis videtur esse arduum quod conetur vincere malum præsens quam malum futurum. Ergo ira videtur esse potior passio quam audacia, et audacia quam spes. Et sic spes non videtur esse prior.

3. Præterea, prius occurrit, in motu ad finem, recessus a termino quam accessus ad terminum. Sed timor et desperatio important recessum ab aliquo: audacia autem et spes important accessum ad aliquid. Ergo timor et desperatio præcedunt spem et audaciam.

SED CONTRA, quanto aliquid est propinquius primo tanto est prius. Sed spes est propinquior amori, qui est prima passionum. Ergo spes est prior inter omnes irascibilis passiones.

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod, sicut jam dictum est,<sup>1</sup> omnes passiones irascibilis important motum in aliquid. Motus autem ad aliquid in irascibili potest causari ex duobus: uno modo, ex sola aptitudine seu proportione ad finem, quæ pertinet ad amorem vel odium; alio modo, ex præsentia ipsius boni vel mali, quæ pertinet ad gaudium vel tristitiam. Et quidem ex præsentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in irascibili, ut dictum est,<sup>2</sup> sed ex præsentia mali causatur passio iræ.

Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis proportio vel aptitudo ad finem præcedit consecutionem finis, inde est quod ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima ordine generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quæ important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, oportet quod passiones quarum objectum est bonum, scilicet spes et desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum objectum est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est prior desperatione: quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem boni, quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, unde est quasi per accidens. Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia.

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<sup>1</sup>above art. I

## THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMOTIONS (II)

article 3. is hope the first of the spirited emotions?

THE THIRD POINT: 1. It would seem that hope cannot be the first of the spirited emotions. For the Latin term for the spirited orexis is *irascibilis*, derived from *ira*, anger. Since therefore the name of a thing is taken from its primary characteristic, anger must have precedence over hope.

2. The formal object of the spirited orexis is the arduous. Now the term 'arduous' seems to apply more naturally to the effort to repel a threatened evil (in *courage*) or to throw off one actually occurring (in *anger*) than to the attempt simply to acquire some good; and it seems to apply more naturally to the attempt to overcome a present evil than one yet to befall. Therefore anger seems to have precedence over courage, and courage over hope.

3. When there is question of moving towards some goal, leaving the starting-point is logically prior to approaching the finishing-point. But the former is involved in fear and despair, the latter in courage and hope. Therefore fear and despair have precedence over hope and courage.

ON THE OTHER HAND the closer a thing to the first place, the higher its precedence. But hope is closer than are the other spirited emotions to love, which is the first of all the emotions. Therefore it has precedence over them.

REPLY: We have seen that all the spirited emotions involve movement towards some objective.<sup>1</sup> Now there are two things which can give rise to such a movement of the spirited orexis: one, that attachment to a given objective in which love and hatred consist; the other, the presence of the good or the evil in question, which gives rise to sadness or joy. There is no spirited emotion caused by the actual presence of some good, as we have seen,<sup>2</sup> but the presence of some evil causes anger.

Now in the order of actual occurrence, a sense of affinity with an objective obviously comes before its attainment; therefore anger is the last of the spirited emotions actually to arise. The others all involve some movement following on love of some good or hatred of some evil; accordingly those whose object is some good—hope and despair—have natural precedence over those whose object is some evil, viz. courage and fear. Of these hope has precedence over despair: for hope is a movement towards the good *qua* good, which is attractive by its very nature: it is therefore a movement towards the good in a perfectly natural sense of the term; whereas despair is a movement away from the good, not of course *qua* good, but under some other description; it is therefore 'a movement away

<sup>1</sup>Ia2æ. 23, 3 and 4

Quod autem spes et desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciæ: nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam: nullus enim irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare, secundum quod Avicenna dicit.<sup>3</sup>

Sic ergo patet quod spes est prima inter omnes passiones irascibilis. Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis scire velimus, primo occurunt amor et odium; secundo, desiderium et fuga; tertio, spes et desperatio; quarto, timor et audacia; quinto, ira; sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia, quæ consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in *Ethic.*<sup>4</sup> Ita tamen quod amor est prior odio, et desiderium fuga, et spes desperatione, et timor audacia, et gaudium quam tristitia, ut ex prædictis colligi potest.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut effectus a causis præcedentibus, et ita ab ea, tamquam a manifestiori, denominatur potentia.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod arduum non est ratio accedendi vel appetendi, sed potius bonum. Et ideo spes, quæ directius respicit bonum, est prior: quamvis audacia aliquando sit in magis arduum, vel etiam ira.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus primo et per se movetur in bonum, sicut in proprium objectum; et ex hoc causatur quod recedat a malo. Proportionatur enim motus appetitivæ partis, non quidem motui naturali, sed intentioni naturæ; quæ per prius intendit finem quam remotionem contrarii, quæ non quaeritur nisi propter adeptionem finis.

*articulus 4. utrum istæ sint quatuor principales passiones, gaudium, tristitia, spes et timor*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod non sint istæ quatuor principales passiones, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor. Augustinus enim non ponit spem, sed cupiditatem loco ejus.<sup>2</sup>

2. Præterea, in passionibus animæ est duplex ordo: scilicet intentionis, et consecutionis seu generationis. Aut ergo principales passiones accipiuntur secundum ordinem intentionis; et sic tantum gaudium et tristitia, quæ sunt finales, erunt principales passiones. Aut secundum ordinem consecutionis seu generationis; et sic amor erit principalis passio. Nullo ergo modo debent dici quatuor principales passiones istæ quatuor, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor.

<sup>3</sup>De *Anima* IV, 6 (22ra). Venice, 1508

<sup>4</sup>Ethics II, 5. 1105b23

from the good' only *per accidens*. By the same token fear, being a movement away from some evil, has precedence over courage. Similarly hope and despair have natural precedence over fear and courage: for courage arises from the hope of success, and fear from despair of it. Finally, anger comes after courage; as Avicenna says, no one becomes angry in the quest for vengeance unless he has the courage to avenge himself.<sup>3</sup> One sees then that hope is the first of the spirited emotions.

We are now in a position to arrange all of the emotions in the order of their actual occurrence. First come love and hatred; second, desire and aversion; third, hope and despair; fourth, fear and courage; fifth, anger; sixth and last, joy or sadness, which come after all the emotions, as Aristotle says.<sup>4</sup> From what we have said it is clear that, within these pairs, love has precedence over hatred, desire over aversion, fear over courage, and joy over sadness.

Hence: 1. The spirited faculty takes its name, *irascibilis*, from anger, *ira*, since the other emotions are its antecedent causes and it, being an effect of them, is more readily perceived than they are.

2. It is not the fact that some objective is difficult to attain which gives rise to attraction and desire, but the fact that it is good. Thus it is that hope, since it bears more directly upon the good than do courage and anger, has precedence over them; even though at times they may be faced with the greater difficulties.

3. The immediate and primary orectic movement is towards the good, which is its natural object; the movement away from the evil is consequential upon that. For orectic movement is determined, not by Nature's impulse, but by its intention; and Nature's primary concern is with the attainment of its objective. The overcoming of obstacles is a secondary concern, intended only consequentially, viz. as a means to that end.

*article 4. are joy, sadness, hope, and fear the four principal emotions?*

THE FOURTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that joy and sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal emotions: for Augustine includes desire among them, and not hope.<sup>2</sup>

2. There are two bases on which the emotions may be arranged in order: that of intention, and that of actual occurrence. On the former basis, only joy and sadness could rank as principal emotions, since in them alone the others have their end. On the latter basis, love will be the principal emotion. There is therefore no basis for saying that joy and sadness, hope and fear, are the four principal emotions.

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 26, 1, 4. *De veritate* XXVI, 5

<sup>2</sup>*De civitate Dei* XIV, 3. PL 41, 406

3. Præterea, sicut audacia causatur ex spe, ita timor ex desperatione. Aut ergo spes et desperatio debent poni principales passiones tamquam causæ; aut spes et audacia, tamquam sibi ipsis affines.

SED CONTRA est illud quod Boëtius, enumerans quatuor principales passiones, dicit:

*Gaudia pelle,  
Pelle timorem,  
Spemque fugato,  
Nec dolor adsit.<sup>3</sup>*

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod hæ quatuor passiones communiter principales esse dicuntur. Quarum duæ, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivæ et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum: unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur, ut dicitur in *Ethic*.<sup>4</sup> Timor autem et spes sunt principales, non quidem quasi completivæ simpliciter, sed quia sunt completivæ in genere motus appetitivi ad aliquid: nam respectu boni, incipit motus in amore, et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero mali, incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in timore.

Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi secundum differentiam præsentis et futuri: motus enim respicit futurum, sed quies est in aliquo præsenti. De bono igitur præsenti est gaudium; de malo præsenti est tristitia; de bono vero futuro est spes; de malo futuro est timor.

Omnes autem aliæ passiones quæ sunt de bono vel de malo præsenti vel futuro, ad has compleutive reducuntur. Unde etiam dicuntur principales hæ prædictæ quatuor passiones, quia sunt generales. Quod quidem verum est, si spes et timor designant motum appetitus communiter tendentem in aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum futurum.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod passiones istæ dicuntur principales, secundum ordinem intentionis et complementi. Et quamvis timor et spes non sint ultimæ passiones simpliciter, tamen sunt ultimæ in genere passionum tendentium in aliud quasi in futurum. Nec potest esse instantia nisi de ira. Quæ tamen non potest poni principalis passio, quia est quidam effectus audaciæ, quæ non potest esse passio principalis, ut infra dicetur.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup>De consolatione philosophiae I, 7. PL 63, 657

<sup>4</sup>Ethics II, 5. 1105b23

3. Courage is caused by hope, fear by despair. Therefore either hope and despair must rank as the principal emotions, being the causes of others; or hope and courage, being closely akin to each other.

ON THE OTHER HAND Boëthius, in the course of listing the four principal emotions, says:<sup>3</sup>

*All joy forsaking,  
Fear must thou fly,  
And hopes defy,  
No sorrow taking.*

REPLY: These four are commonly held to be the principal emotions. Joy and sadness are called principal emotions because in them all the others have their end and fulfilment; they follow on all the others, as Aristotle says.<sup>4</sup> Fear and hope are called principal, not in the sense that one says, *tout court*, that all the others find fulfilment in them, but in the sense that they are the last stage of orectic movement towards some objective: for where the objective is some good, orectic movement begins with love, passes into desire and ends in hope; where it is some evil, it begins with hatred, passes into aversion, and ends in fear.

It is therefore customary to classify these four emotions on the basis of present and future. Movement looks to the future, rest concerns the present; so joy bears upon present good, sadness upon present evil: hope upon future good, fear upon future evil.

All the other emotions also bear upon some present or future good or evil, and culminate in them. This has led some writers to say that these four are called the principal emotions because of their generality. This is true enough, provided that one uses the terms 'hope' and 'fear' to denote the common tendency of the orexis towards desire or aversion.

Hence: 1. Augustine includes desire instead of hope, since they have the same object, viz. some future good.

2. When the emotions are classified on the basis of intention and in the order of actual occurrence, joy and sadness will certainly rank as the principal ones. Unlike them, fear and hope are not the absolutely ultimate terms of the emotional process; but they are at least the culminating point of that part of the process which bears upon some objective lying in the future.

The only other possible candidate is anger; but it cannot rank as a principal emotion, since it is an effect of courage: and we shall see that courage itself cannot be one of the principal emotions.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Ia2æ. 45, 2 ad 3

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi per accidens; et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est per accidens. Et ideo hæ passiones non possunt esse principales, quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quæ consequiter audaciam.

## THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMOTIONS (II)

3. Despair involves movement away from the good, but only accidentally, not from the good as such; courage involves movement towards an evil, though again only accidentally. These therefore cannot be ranked as principal emotions, for the accidental cannot be ranked as principal; nor can anger, since it is consequent upon courage.

## De passionibus animæ in speciali

CONSEQUENTER CONSIDERANDUM EST de passionibus animæ in speciali: et primo, de passionibus concupisibilis; secundo, de passionibus irascibilis. Prima consideratio est tripartita: nam

primo considerabimus de amore et idio;  
secundo, de concupiscentia et fuga;  
tertio, de delectatione et tristitia.

Circa amorem consideranda sunt tria:

primo, de ipso amore;  
secundo, de causa amoris;  
tertio, de effectibus eius.

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<sup>a</sup>Questions 26–28 study love, Question 29 hatred, and Question 30 desire, and occupy the rest of this volume. Questions 31–39 deal with pleasure and sadness, and

## the particular emotions

NEXT WE MUST STUDY the particular emotions: first those of the affective orexis, then those of the spirited. The study of the affective emotions falls into three parts:

- first, love and hatred;
- second, desire and aversion;
- third, pleasure and sadness.<sup>a</sup>

The questions about love fall under three headings:

- first, love itself (26);
- second, its causes (27);
- third, its effects (28).

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occupy the next volume (20) in the present series. The spirited emotions are studied in Questions 40-48, and occupy Volume 21.

## Quæstio 26. de amore

Circa primum quæruntur quatuor:

1. utrum amor sit in concupiscibili;
2. utrum amor sit passio;
3. utrum amor sit idem quod dilectio;
4. utrum amor convenienter dividatur in amorem amicitiae et amorem concupiscentiae.

*articulus 1. utrum amor sit in concupiscibili*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod amor non sit in concupiscibili. Dicitur enim *Sap.*, *Hanc, scilicet sapientiam, amavi et exquisivi a juventute mea.*<sup>2</sup> Sed concupiscibilis, cum sit pars appetitus sensitivi, non potest tendere in sapientiam, quæ non comprehenditur sensu. Ergo amor non est in concupiscibili.

2. Præterea, amor videtur esse idem cuilibet passioni: dicit enim Augustinus, *Amor inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, lætitia; fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est; idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia est.*<sup>3</sup> Sed non omnis passio animæ est in concupiscibili; sed timor, etiam hic enumeratus, est in irascibili. Ergo non est simpliciter dicendum quod amor sit in concupiscibili.

3. Præterea, Dionysius ponit quemdam amorem naturalem.<sup>4</sup> Sed amor naturalis magis videtur pertinere ad vires naturales, quæ sunt animæ vegetabilis. Ergo amor non simpliciter est in concupiscibili.

SED CONTRA est quod Philosophus dicit, quod *amor est in concupiscibili.*<sup>5</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens, cum utriusque objectum sit bonum. Unde secundum differentiam appetitus est differentia amoris.

Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius; et hujusmodi dicitur appetitus naturalis. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis convenit secundum suam naturam, non per

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 26, 1, 2; 27, 1, 2

<sup>2</sup>*The Wisdom of Solomon* 8, 2

<sup>3</sup>*De civitate Dei* XIV, 7. PL 41, 410

<sup>4</sup>*De divinis nominibus* 4. PG 3, 713

<sup>5</sup>*Topics* II, 7. 113b2

<sup>6</sup>Medieval Latin had no simple equivalent of the useful distinctions made in English between *love* and *like*, and between *hate* and *dislike*. Since St Thomas

## Question 26. love

Under the first of these headings there are four points of inquiry:

1. is love<sup>a</sup> seated in the affective orexis?
2. is love an emotion?
3. is *dilectio* identical with *amor*?
4. may love be divided into love-of-friendship and love-of-desire?

### *article 1. is love seated in the affective orexis?*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that love is not seated in the affective orexis. For we read in the book of *Wisdom*, *I have loved wisdom and sought her from my youth.*<sup>2</sup> But the affective orexis is a sensory faculty and so could not have a non-sensory object such as wisdom. Therefore love is not seated in the affective orexis.

2. Love seems to be identical with every emotion; for Augustine says, *Love longing for the thing it loves is desire; love possessing and enjoying it is pleasure; love shrinking from what endangers it is fear; love experiencing that befall is sadness.*<sup>3</sup> But not all the emotions are seated in the affective orexis; one emotion mentioned in this passage, viz. fear, belongs to the spirited faculty. One cannot therefore say, without qualification, that love is seated in the affective orexis.

3. Dionysius speaks of 'natural love'.<sup>4</sup> But this surely would belong to those natural functions which arise from the vegetative part of the soul. Therefore love is not to be located, without qualification, in the affective orexis.

ON THE OTHER HAND there is Aristotle's statement, *Love is seated in the affective orexis.*<sup>5</sup>

REPLY: Love is essentially connected with orexis, since they have the same object, viz. the good. There will therefore be as many kinds of love as there are kinds of orexis and wanting.

Now one sort of orexis follows, not knowledge possessed by its subject, but knowledge possessed by someone else; this is called 'natural orexis'. For an inanimate entity 'wants' the things that accord with its nature,

treats *amor* and *odium* as single concepts, and some important points turn on his doing so, I shall always render them *love* and *hate*, even when the milder word would be more natural in English.

apprehensionem propriam, sed per apprehensionem instituentis naturam, ut dictum est.<sup>6</sup> Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex judicio libero. Et talis est appetitus sensitivus in brutis: qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, in quantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum judicium. Et talis est appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas.

In unoquoque autem horum appetitum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali principium hujusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis: sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis. Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivo. Et pertinet ad concupiscibilem: quia dicitur per respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est objectum irascibilis.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de amore intellectivo vel rationali.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod amor dicitur esse timor, gaudium, cupiditas et tristitia, non quidem essentialiter, sed causaliter.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animæ vegetativæ, sed in omnibus potentiis animæ, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus: quia, ut Dionysius dicit, *Omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile;*<sup>7</sup> cum unaquæque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam.

#### articulus 2. utrum amor sit passio

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus est passio. Sed omnis amor *est virtus quædam*, ut dicit Dionysius.<sup>1</sup> Ergo amor non est passio.

2. Praeterea, amor est unio quædam vel nexus, secundum Augustinum.<sup>2</sup> Sed unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo amor non est passio.

<sup>6</sup>Ia. 6, 1 ad 2; 103, 1 ad 2 & 3

<sup>7</sup>De divinis nominibus 4. PG 3, 708

<sup>1</sup>De divinis nominibus 4. PG 3, 713

<sup>2</sup>De Trinitate VIII, 10. PL 42, 960

<sup>b</sup>Medieval science taught that the terrestrial world was composed of four ‘elements’: earth, water, air, fire. Each of these had its ‘natural place’: that of earth was the

not through its own knowledge of them, but through that possessed by the Author of its nature: as we have shown.<sup>6</sup> A second sort of orexis does indeed follow knowledge possessed by its own subject, but as a matter of necessity, not from free choice. The sensory orexis in dumb animals is like this; in men, however, there is something of freedom about it, to the extent namely that it is subject to rational control. Third, there is the orexis which arises both through consciousness and by free choice. These are the features of the rational or intellectual orexis, commonly called 'the will'.

Now in each of these cases, 'love' denotes that which produces the inclination to move towards the end in question. In the case of the natural orexis, this cause, which might be called 'natural love', is a sense of affinity with the object in question; thus a heavy body's sense of affinity with its natural place arises from its weight, and might be called 'natural love'.<sup>b</sup> Similarly the terms 'sensory love', and 'intellectual or rational love', apply to the attachment, the sense of affinity with some good, the feeling of its attractiveness, felt respectively by the sensory orexis or the will: i.e. sensory love is seated in the sensory orexis, as intellectual love is seated in the will. More specifically, sensory love is seated in the affective faculty, for its object is sense-good *sans plus*: not sense-good difficult of attainment, which is the object of the spirited orexis.

Hence: 1. The text quoted is speaking of intellectual or rational love.

2. The term 'love' is here applied to fear, joy, desire, and sadness, not because love is identical with them, but because it gives rise to them.

3. Natural love is not confined to the vegetative powers of the soul; it is found in all the faculties of the soul, in all parts of the body, and indeed in all created things: as Dionysius says, *All things tend to love what is beautiful and good*;<sup>7</sup> for everything has a built-in sense of affinity with whatever accords with its nature.

#### *article 2. is love a passion?*

THE SECOND POINT: 1. It would seem that love is not a passion. For virtues are not passions; but all love is *a kind of virtue*, as Dionysius says.<sup>1</sup> Therefore love is not a passion.

2. Augustine says that love is a kind of union or bond.<sup>2</sup> But such concepts belong to the category of *relation*; and therefore not to the category of *passion*. Therefore love is not a passion.

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centre of the terrestrial sphere, that of water above it, that of air above that, and that of fire in the outermost layer of the sphere. The natural movement of the elements—of free bodies to fall, of water to flow downhill, of flame to rise—was attributed to the inclination of a substance to find its natural place.

3. Præterea, Damascenus dicit quod passio est motus quidam.<sup>3</sup> Amor autem non importat motum appetitus, qui est desiderium; sed principium hujusmodi motus. Ergo amor non est passio.

SED CONTRA est quod Philosophus dicit, quod amor est passio.<sup>4</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod passio est effectus agentis in paciente. Agens autem naturale duplicum effectum inducit in patiens: nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa gravitas, quæ est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quæ est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile. Nam appetitus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in *de Anima*:<sup>5</sup> appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in ejus intentione;\* et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium. Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quæ est gaudium. Sic ergo, cum amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor est passio: proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia virtus significant principium motus vel actionis, ideo amor, inquantum est principium appetitivi motus, a Dionysio vocatur virtus.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod amor est *virtus unitiva*,<sup>6</sup> et Philosophus dicit, quod unio est opus amoris.<sup>7</sup>

\*Piana reads *faciens quodammodo in eo ejus intentionem*, imprinting itself, so to say, on the orexis

<sup>3</sup>*De Fide orthodoxa* II, 22. PG 94, 940

<sup>4</sup>*Ethics* VIII, 5. 1157b28

<sup>5</sup>*De Anima* III, 10. 433b22

<sup>6</sup>*De divinis nominibus* 4. PG 3, 709

<sup>7</sup>*Politics* II, 1. 1262b10

<sup>8</sup>cf above art. 1, note b, p. 64.

<sup>9</sup>Should one have translated *passio* throughout this article as *passion* or *emotion*? i.e. as passion = passivity, Aristotle's tenth category, or as the subdivision of that category which comprises the human emotions? Naturally the whole context of the present treatise suggests the latter; but the argument tends to establish the former.

3. Damascene says that passion is a kind of movement.<sup>3</sup> But the movement of the sensory orexis is desire, not love; love is the cause of that movement. Therefore love is not a passion.

ON THE OTHER HAND there is Aristotle's statement that love is a passion.<sup>4</sup>

REPLY: The term 'passion' denotes the effect produced in a thing when it is acted upon by some agent. Now where natural agencies are in question, the effect is two-fold: first a form is produced, then a movement arising from that form: for instance, that which brings a body into existence gives it both weight, and the movement that results from weight. Since the weight is the cause of the body's moving towards its natural place<sup>a</sup> it may be called a 'natural love'.

Correspondingly, the effect produced in the orexis by a desirable object is a sense of affinity with it, a feeling of its attractiveness; then this gives rise to a movement of the orexis towards the object. For there is a certain circularity in the orectic process, as Aristotle remarks;<sup>5</sup> first the object works on the orexis, imprinting itself there, as one might say; then the orexis moves towards the object, with the purpose of actually possessing it; so the process ends where it began. The first effect produced in the orexis by the object is called *love*, which is simply a feeling of the object's attractiveness; this feeling gives rise to an orectic movement towards the object, viz. *desire*; and finally this comes to rest in *joy*.

Since therefore love consists in an effect produced in the orexis by the desirable object, love is clearly a passion: a passion in the strict sense when seated in the affective orexis, in an extended sense when seated in the will.<sup>b</sup>

Hence: 1. The term 'virtue' connotes a cause of movement or action; Dionysius therefore applies it to love since love gives rise to a movement of the orexis.

2. There is this much of 'union' about love that, as a result of the pleasure felt in the orexis at the thought of the object, a person feels towards that object as if it were himself, or a part of himself. Love therefore is not the union itself; union is a result of love. Hence Dionysius calls love a force that leads to union,<sup>6</sup> and Aristotle says that union is an effect of love.<sup>7</sup>

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(1) Even the *Sed contra* suggests the former: for Aristotle, at the place quoted, is distinguishing between *φίλησις* and *φίλια*: *φίλια*, friendship, he says, is a disposition, which for him belongs in the category of *ποιότης*, quality; *φίλησις*—a feeling or experience of love on a particular occasion—is a *πάθος*, a passivity: his word for the tenth category. (2) The burden of the Reply is that love consists in the orexis' being acted-upon; and this is the categorial passion = passivity.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod amor, etsi non nominet motum appetitus tendentem in appetibile, nominat tamen motum appetitus quo immutatur ab appetibili, ut ei appetibile complaceat.

*articulus 3. utrum amor sit idem quod dilectio*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod amor sit idem quod dilectio. Dionysius enim dicit quod hoc modo se habent amor et dilectio, sicut quatuor et bis duo, rectilineum et habens rectas lineas.<sup>2</sup> Sed ista significant idem. Ergo amor et dilectio significant idem.

2. Præterea, appetitivi motus secundum objecta differunt. Sed idem est objectum dilectionis et amoris. Ergo sunt idem.

3. Præterea, si dilectio at amor in aliquo differunt, maxime in hoc differre videntur, quod *dilectio sit in bono accipienda, amor autem in malo, ut quidam dixerunt*, secundum quod Augustinus narrat.<sup>3</sup> Sed hoc modo non differunt: quia, ut ibidem dicit Augustinus, in sacris Scripturis utrumque accipitur in bono et in malo. Ergo amor a dilectione non differt; sicut ipse Augustinus ibidem concludit quod *non est aliud amorem dicere, et aliud dilectionem dicere*.

SED CONTRA est quod Dionysius dicit quod quibusdam sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen dilectionis.<sup>4</sup>

RESPONSO: Dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo pertinentia: scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum Philosophum, est quasi habitus;<sup>5</sup> amor autem et dilectio significantur per modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipi potest.

Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam amor communius est inter ea: omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor,\* sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio supra amorem electionem præcedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit supra amorem,

\*Piana reads *Omnis enim amor dilectio est vel caritas*, every instance of *amor* is an instance of *dilectio* or *caritas*.

<sup>1</sup>cf III Sent. 27, 2, 1. In *De divinis nominibus* IV, lect. 9

<sup>2</sup>*De divinis nominibus* 4. PG 3, 709

<sup>3</sup>*De civitate Dei* XIV, 7. PL 41, 410

<sup>4</sup>*De divinis nominibus* 4. PG 3, 709

<sup>5</sup>*Ethics* VIII, 5. 1157b28

3. It is true that the term ‘love’ does not refer to the movement of the orexis towards the desirable object; but it does refer to the movement or reaction which the object produces in the orexis, giving rise there to the sense of its attractiveness.

*article 3. is dilectio identical with amor?*<sup>a</sup>

THE THIRD POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that *dilectio* is identical with *amor*. For Dionysius says that *amor* is to *dilectio* as *four* is to *twice two*, or *rectilinear* to *bound by straight lines*.<sup>2</sup> But these are pairs of words identical in meaning. Therefore *amor* and *dilectio* must also be identical in meaning.

2. Orectic movements are differentiated by their objects. But *dilectio* and *amor* have the same object. They are therefore identical.

3. If *amor* were to be distinguished from *dilectio*, the criterion of distinction between them would be that attributed to some writers by Augustine: they said that *dilectio bears upon good things*, *amor upon evil*.<sup>3</sup> But this is a false criterion; as Augustine remarks, the Scripture uses each term in reference both to good and to evil. Therefore *amor* is not to be distinguished from *dilectio*; as Augustine himself concludes, *There is no difference between the terms amor and dilectio*.

ON THE OTHER HAND Dionysius says that some holy men have thought that the term *amor* denotes something more God-like than does the term *dilectio*.<sup>4</sup>

REPLY: There are four words whose meanings are very much alike: *amor*, *dilectio*, *caritas*, and *amicitia*; still, they are not interchangeable. For *amicitia*, as Aristotle remarks, is dispositional, whereas *amor* and *dilectio* are episodic;<sup>5</sup> and *caritas* may be either.

Furthermore, these last three terms refer to acts in different ways. *Amor* has the widest reference of the three; every instance of *dilectio* or *caritas* is an instance of *amor*, but not vice versa. *Dilectio*, as the word itself suggests, adds to the notion of *amor* an implicit reference to an antecedent *electio* or choice; it is therefore not seated in the affective orexis, but in the will, and so is confined to rational natures. *Caritas* adds to the notion of

<sup>a</sup>Since there is no exact English counterpart to *amor* and *dilectio*, I leave them untranslated. The article may therefore be seen, partly as an inquiry into ordinary usage in medieval Latin, and partly as stipulative definitions of certain important terms.

perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo; sic enim amor idem est quod dilectio.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod objectum amoris est communius quam objectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio, sicut dictum est.<sup>6</sup>

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod non differunt amor et dilectio secundum differentiam boni et mali, sed sicut dictum est.<sup>7</sup> In parte tamen intellectiva idem est amor et dilectio. Et sic loquitur ibi Augustinus de amore; unde parum post subdit quod *recta voluntas est bonus amor, et perversa voluntas est malus amor*. Quia tamen amor, qui est passio concupiscibilis, plurimos inclinat ad malum, inde habuerunt occasionem qui prædictam differentiam assignaverunt.

4. Ad quartam dicendum quod ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, præcipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem præsupponit judicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum ratio propria ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est.<sup>8</sup> Et propter hoc divinius est amor quam dilectio.

*articulus 4. utrum amor convenienter dividatur in amorem amicitiae et amorem concupiscentiae*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod amor inconvenienter dividatur in amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Amor enim est passio, amicitia est habitus, ut dicit Philosophus.<sup>2</sup> Sed habitus non potest esse pars divisiva passionis. Ergo amor non convenienter dividitur per amorem concupiscentiae et amorem amicitiae.

2. Præterea, nihil divididitur per id quod ei connemeratur: non enim homo connumeratur animali. Sed concupiscentia connumeratur amori,

<sup>6</sup>In the body of the article <sup>7</sup>In the body of the article <sup>8</sup>In the body of the article  
<sup>1</sup>cf. ia. 60, 3. 2a2æ. 23, 1. 11 *Sent.* 3, 2, 4. III *Sent.* 29, 3. *In De div. nom.* 4, *lect.* 9 & 10. *De spe* 3

<sup>2</sup>Ethics VIII, 5. 1157b28  
<sup>b</sup>The Latin adjective *carus*, from which the noun *caritas* is formed, is ambiguous in much the same way as the English adjective ‘dear’: each may mean both ‘costly’ and ‘held in affection’.

<sup>a</sup>The force of the phrases *-of-friendship* and *-of-desire* is adjectival; modern English, like St Thomas’ Latin, has no adjectives that quite serve the purpose.

<sup>b</sup>St Thomas locates dispositions in the category of *quality*, *ποιότης*.

*amor* the note of a certain perfection in that *amor*, the suggestion that the object loved is highly prized: as the very word *caritas* suggests.<sup>b</sup>

Hence: 1. Dionysius is there speaking of *amor* and *dilectio* in so far as they are seated in the intellectual orexis; and in that sense, they are identical.

2. The object of *amor* is wider than that of *dilectio*, since *amor*, as we have said,<sup>6</sup> has a wider range of reference than has *dilectio*.

3. *Amor* and *dilectio* do not differ in having respectively for their objects the evil and the good, but in the way we have just explained.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, in so far as they are present in the will, they are identical. This is Augustine's own terminology in the passage cited; so he adds a little later, *When the will is sound, its love is good; when it is perverted, its love is evil*. However, the fact that love, being seated in the affective orexis, leads many people into wrong-doing lent colour to the account of the distinction which these writers gave.

4. Some writers have held that *amor*, even in so far as it is in the will, is a more God-like quality than *dilectio* for the reason that *amor* suggests a certain passivity, especially in so far as it is in the sensory orexis; whereas *dilectio* pre-supposes rational consideration. For a man can make his way to God more swiftly and surely when he is drawn passively through *amor*, by God himself, than through the activity of his own reason; and that activity, as we have remarked,<sup>8</sup> is the distinctive feature of *dilectio*. The word *amor* therefore refers to something more God-like than does the word *dilectio*.

#### article 4. may love be divided into love-of-friendship and love-of-desire?<sup>a</sup>

THE FOURTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would not seem that love may be divided into love-of-friendship and love-of-desire. For love is a passion, whereas friendship is a disposition, as Aristotle says.<sup>2</sup> But dispositions do not fall under the category of passion.<sup>b</sup> Therefore it is not appropriate to divide love into love-of-friendship and love-of-desire.

2. A species cannot be subdivided in terms of a fellow species: *man* and *animal* are not fellow species of a single genus.<sup>c</sup> But desire and love

<sup>a</sup>I have paraphrased the major; literally, it reads, 'Nothing is divided by means of a thing which is numbered along with it.' The example given is not very well chosen; it points to a case where a class is appropriately subdivided. An example of the objector's major premises would be: *black-man*, a species of the genus *man*, cannot be subdivided in terms of its fellow species *white-man*. The premise stands in need of some qualification: green, a species of colour, may be subdivided in terms of its fellow species blue and yellow, into bluish-green and yellowish-green.

sicut alia passio ab amore. Ergo amor non potest dividi per concupiscentiam.

3. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, triplex est amicitia, utilis, delectabilis et honesta.<sup>3</sup> Sed amicitia utilis et delectabilis habet concupiscentiam. Ergo concupiscentia non debet dividi contra amicitiam.

SED CONTRA, quaedam dicimus amare quia ea concupiscimus: sicut dicitur aliquis amare vinum propter dulce quod in eo concupiscit, ut dicitur in *Topic.*<sup>4</sup> Sed ad vinum, et ad hujusmodi, non habemus amicitiam, ut dicitur in *Ethic.*<sup>5</sup> Ergo aliis est amor concupiscentiæ, et aliis est amor amicitiæ.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit, *amare est velle alicui bonum.*<sup>6</sup> Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod vult alteri habetur amor concupiscentiæ: ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum habetur amor amicitiæ.

Hæc autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiæ simpliciter et per se amatur: quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiæ non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum est amor simpliciter; amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiæ et concupiscentiæ. Nam ille proprius dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus nobis.

2. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod in amicitia utili et delectabili, vult quidem aliquis aliquod bonum amico; et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio amicitiæ. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiæ, deficit a ratione verae amicitiæ.

<sup>3</sup>*Ethics VIII, 3. 1156a7*

<sup>4</sup>*Topics II. 3. 11a3*

<sup>5</sup>*Ethics VIII, 2. 1155b29*

<sup>6</sup>*Rhetic II, 4. 1380b35*

<sup>d</sup>This is not quite the point that Aristotle is making. He is distinguishing three ways in which one thing may be said to be 'of' another: as an end, as a means to an end, or as an accidental circumstance. He gives as an example of the latter, in the case of

are fellow species of the genus emotion. Therefore love cannot be subdivided in terms of desire.

3. Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship: friendship may be based on convenience, on pleasure, or on virtue.<sup>3</sup> But the first two of these involve some element of desire. Therefore desire cannot be contradistinguished from love.

ON THE OTHER HAND we sometimes say that we love a thing because we desire it; for instance, Aristotle says that a man may be said to love wine because he desires its sweetness.<sup>4d</sup> But there is no *friendship* between ourselves and things like wine, as Aristotle remarks elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> Therefore love-of-desire is one thing, love-of-friendship another.

**REPLY:** *Love consists in wanting good things for someone*, as Aristotle says.<sup>6</sup> The movement of love therefore has a two-fold object: the good thing which is wanted for someone, whether oneself or another person; and the one for whom it is wanted. The former is the object of love-of-desire; the latter is the object of love-of-friendship.

Within this division there is a certain order of precedence. The object of love-of-friendship is loved for its own sake, and in the primary sense of 'love'; the object of love-of-desire is loved for the sake of something other than itself, and not in the primary sense of 'love'. Just as the term 'entity' is applied in its primary sense to that which itself has existence, and only in its secondary sense to that which exists in something else: so the term 'good', being coextensive with 'entity', applies in its primary sense to that which possesses goodness; for that which is good for something other than itself is 'good' only in a secondary sense. It follows then that that love which consists in wanting good things for someone is love in the primary sense; and that which consists in loving a thing in so far as it contributes to someone else's welfare, is love in the secondary sense.

Hence: 1. Love is divided, not into friendship and desire, but into love-of-friendship and love-of-desire. For a person is properly called our friend when we want some good thing for him; whereas we are said to desire something when we want it for ourselves.

2. This reply also meets the second objection.

3. Even in friendship based on convenience or on pleasure, one wants some good thing for one's friend; to this extent the term 'friendship' is therefore justified. But since that good thing is ultimately directed to one's own profit or pleasure, these kinds of friendship, to the extent that they consist in love-of-desire, fall short of perfect friendship.

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desire, the desire of wine in a man who likes sweet things: 'he desires wine, not because it is wine, but because it is sweet'.

## Quæstio 27. de causa amoris

Deinde considerandum est de causa amoris. Et circa hoc queruntur quatuor.

1. utrum bonum sit sola causa amoris;
2. utrum cognitio sit causa amoris;
3. utrum similitudo;
4. utrum aliqua alia animæ passionum.

## articulus 1. utrum bonum sit sola causa amoris

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod non solum bonum sit causa amoris. Bonum enim non est causa amoris, nisi quia amatur. Sed contingit etiam malum amari, secundum illud *Psalm.*, *Qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam:*<sup>2</sup> alioquin omnis amor esset bonus. Ergo non solum bonum est causa amoris.

2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit quod *eos qui mala sua dicunt, amamus.*<sup>3</sup> Ergo videtur quod malum sit causa amoris.

3. Præterea, Dionysius dicit quod non solum bonum, sed etiam pulchrum est omnibus amabile.<sup>4</sup>

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit, *Non amatur certe nisi bonum.* Solum igitur bonum est causa amoris.<sup>5</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est,<sup>6</sup> amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quæ est vis passiva. Unde objectum ejus comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illus sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris objectum. Amoris autem proprium objectum est bonum: quia amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum. Unde relinquitur quod bonum sit propria causa amoris.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum numquam amatur nisi sub

<sup>1</sup>cf 1a2æ. 29, 1

<sup>2</sup>Psalms 10, 6

<sup>3</sup>Rhetic II, 4. 1381b29

<sup>4</sup>De divinis nominibus 4. PG 3, 708

<sup>5</sup>De Trinitate VIII, 3. PL 42, 949

<sup>6</sup>1a2æ. 26, 1 et 2

<sup>a</sup>Thus the Vulgate. The Hebrew has, *If a man loves violence, the soul of Jahve hates him.*

## Question 27. the causes of love

Next we must study the causes of love. There are four points of inquiry:

1. is love caused only by what is good?
2. is knowledge a cause of love?
3. is similarity a cause of love?
4. can one of the other emotions be assigned as the cause of love?

### *article 1. is love caused only by what is good?*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that love is not caused only by what is good. For a thing is said to 'cause love' only because it is loved. But evil can be loved: as the Psalmist says, *He that loves evil-doing hates his own soul*;<sup>2a</sup> otherwise all love would be good. Therefore love is not caused only by what is good.

2. Aristotle says, *We love people who acknowledge their own evil-doing*.<sup>3</sup> It seems therefore that love can be caused by what is evil.

3. Dionysius says that it is not only the good but also the beautiful, which all men find lovable.<sup>4</sup>

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine says, *It is quite certain that only what is good is loved*.<sup>5</sup> Therefore love is caused only by what is good.

REPLY: We have already shown that love is seated in the orectic faculty;<sup>6</sup> and since that is a passive power, its object functions as the cause of its movement or action. Therefore that which is the object of love will properly be called the 'cause' of love. Now only what is good can be the object of love for, as we have shown, love involves an attachment to the object loved<sup>b</sup> a feeling for its attractiveness: and a thing's good lies in that with which it has affinity and kinship. It follows then that it is what is good which is precisely the cause of love.

Hence: 1. Evil is never loved except under some good description: i.e.

<sup>b</sup>Are we to translate *amatum* 'the beloved' or 'the thing loved'? The trouble with the former is that, in modern English, it is normally applied to love of a person, and indeed a person loved romantically; the trouble with the latter is that it would exclude persons. I shall therefore use the slightly clumsy phrase 'the object loved', with three caveats: (1) 'loved' would often be better rendered 'liked': cf note *a* to 26, 1; (2) 'the object loved' may be the object sometimes of love-of-friendship, sometimes of love-of-desire; (3) the object loved may be sometimes a person, sometimes a thing.

ratione boni, scilicet in quantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, in quantum tendit in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum. Et per hunc modum homo diligit iniquitatem, in quantum per iniquitatem adipiscitur aliquid bonum, puta delectationem vel pecuniam vel aliquid huiusmodi.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui mala sua dicunt, non propter mala amantur, sed propter hoc quod dicunt mala sua: hoc enim quod est dicere mala sua, habet rationem boni, in quantum excludit fictionem seu simulationem.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus: sed ad rationem pertinet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. Unde et illi sensus præcipue respiciunt pulchrum qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes: dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum non utimur nomine pulchritudinis: non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam: ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitu; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.

#### *articulus 2. utrum cognitio sit causa amoris*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod cognitio non sit causa amoris. Quod enim aliquid queratur, hoc ex amore contingit. Sed aliqua queruntur quæ nesciuntur, sicut scientiæ: cum enim in his idem sit eas habere quod eas nosse, ut Augustinus dicit,<sup>2</sup> si cognoscerentur haberentur, et non quererentur. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.

2. Præterea, ejusdem rationis videtur esse quod aliquid incognitum ametur, et quod aliquid ametur plus quam cognoscatur. Sed aliqua amantur plus quam cognoscantur: sicut Deus, qui in hac vita potest per seipsum amari, non autem per seipsum cognosci. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.

<sup>1</sup>cf 2a2æ. 26, 2 ad 1. 1 Sent. 15, 4, 1 ad 3

<sup>2</sup>Lib. 83 quæst. 35. PL 40, 24

“Literally, ‘The beautiful and the good are identical in reality; it is only the mind that makes a distinction between them.’ The reply should be read in the light of what St Thomas has said in the *Prima Pars*: ‘A good thing is also a beautiful thing, for both things have the same basis in reality, namely, the possession of form; and this is why *the good is esteemed beautiful*. *Good* and *beautiful* are not however synonymous. For good (being *what all things want*) has to do properly with *orexis* and so involves the idea of an end (for an orectic experience is a kind of movement towards a thing). Beauty, on the other hand, involves an implicit reference to

a thing which is good from some secondary point of view is sometimes looked on as good pure and simple.

Love is therefore evil when directed towards something which is not genuinely good. It is in this sense that a man ‘loves evil-doing’: by doing evil he can obtain some desirable thing, such as pleasure, money, or the like.

2. People who acknowledge their evil-doing are loved, not for the evil they have done, but for having acknowledged it; for such acknowledgement is good inasmuch as it excludes insincerity and pretence.

3. ‘Good’ and ‘beautiful’ have the same reference but differ in meaning.<sup>c</sup> For the good, being ‘what all things want’, is that in which the orexis comes to rest; whereas the beautiful is that in which the orexis comes to rest through contemplation or knowledge. Those senses are therefore chiefly associated with beauty which contribute most to our knowledge, viz. sight and hearing when ministering to reason; thus we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds, but not of beautiful tastes and smells: we do not speak of beauty in reference to the other three senses.

‘Beautiful’ therefore adds to ‘good’ a reference to the cognitive powers; ‘good’ refers simply to that in which the orexis takes pleasure: ‘beautiful’ refers to that which gives pleasure when it is perceived or contemplated.

#### *article 2. is knowledge a cause of love?*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> i. It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For if one seeks something, one must love it. But there are some things one seeks without knowing them—scientific knowledge, for instance: Augustine says that, in the case of such things, possessing them means knowing them;<sup>2</sup> if therefore one had knowledge of them, one would not be seeking them. Therefore knowledge is not a cause of love.

2. Loving something that we do not know seems to be in essentially the same case as loving something better than we know it. But some things are loved better than they are known: for instance, in this life we can love God in himself, but we cannot know him in himself. Therefore knowledge is not a cause of love.

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knowledge, and we call a thing beautiful when it pleases a person who contemplates it.’ (Ia. 5, 4 ad 1; page 73 in Volume II of the present series.) One may remark that the point comes, not from Aristotle’s Greek, but from William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of it. Aristotle said (in the opening sentence of the *Nichomachean Ethics*), that the good is ‘what all things aim at’, *ἐργίεται*. The obviously different Greek words *όρεξις* and *ἐργίεται* were rendered by the obviously similar Latin words *appetitus* and *appetunt*; and no doubt it was this that often led St Thomas to tie them so closely, as in the present case.

3. Præterea, si cognitio esset causa amoris, non posset inveniri amor ubi non est cognitio. Sed in omnibus rebus invenitur amor, ut dicit Dionysius:<sup>3</sup> non autem in omnibus invenitur cognitio. Ergo cognitio non est causa amoris.

SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus probat quod nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum.<sup>4</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum est causa amoris per modum objecti. Bonum autem est objectum appetitus, nisi prout est apprehensum. Et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod amatur. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit quod visio corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi.<sup>5</sup> Et similiter contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis, est principium spiritualis amoris. Sic igitur cognitio est causa amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi cognitum.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui querit scientiam non omnino ignorat eam; sed secundum aliquid eam præcognoscit, vel in universalis, vel in aliquo ejus effectu, vel per hoc quod audit eam laudari, ut Augustinus dicit.<sup>6</sup> Sic autem eam cognoscere non est eam habere; sed cognoscere eam perfecte.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quæ secundum rem sunt conjuncta, et componere quodammodo ea quæ sunt diversa, unum ulteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re, sicut partes et virtutes et proprietates.

Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quæ respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur ametur.

Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur: quia potest perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognosatur. Sicut maxime patet in scientiis, quas aliqui amant propter aliquam summariam cognitionem quam de eis habent: puta quod sciunt rhetorican esse scientiam per quam homo potest persuadere, et hoc in rhetorica amant. Et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam amor naturalis, qui est in omnibus

<sup>3</sup>De divinis nominibus 4, PG 3, 708

<sup>4</sup>De Trinitate VIII, 1. PL 42, 971

3. If knowledge were the cause of love, there could be no love where there was no knowledge. But love is found in all things, as Dionysius says;<sup>3</sup> whereas knowledge is not found in all things. Therefore knowledge is not a cause of love.

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine argues that nobody loves what he does not know.<sup>4</sup>

REPLY: We have shown that a good thing is a cause of love in the sense that it is an object; but it can be the object of the orexis only in so far as it is known; therefore some knowledge of a thing is necessary before it can be loved. That is why Aristotle says that sensory love is born of seeing a thing;<sup>5</sup> and similarly, spiritual love is born of the spiritual contemplation of beauty or goodness. Knowledge is therefore said to be a cause of love for the same reason as is the good, which can be loved only when one has knowledge of it.

Hence: 1. When a person seeks scientific knowledge, he is not completely ignorant of it; there is some sense in which he already knows something of it, either in a vague general way, or in the results it has produced, or from having heard it praised, as Augustine says.<sup>6</sup> It is not knowledge of this sort that constitutes scientific knowledge, but only perfect knowledge.

2. Some things are necessary for perfect knowledge that are not necessary for perfect love. Knowledge is an activity of the reason, and reason distinguishes different aspects of a thing which are in reality united, and unites things which are in reality distinct by instituting comparisons between them. For perfect knowledge, therefore, one must know the various elements of a thing one by one: its parts, its capacities, its distinctive features.

But love is seated in the orectic faculties, which bear upon a thing as it is in itself; for perfect love it is therefore enough for a thing to be loved as it is seen to be in itself.

It can therefore happen that a thing is loved better than it is known, for it can be loved perfectly without being known perfectly. This is especially true in the arts and sciences, which a person may love as a result of having some very general notion of them; for instance, he may know that rhetoric is the art of successful persuasion, and love rhetoric on that score. The same thing holds with regard to the love of God.

3. Even 'natural love', which all things have, is in some sense caused by

<sup>3</sup>Ethics IX, 5. 1167a4

<sup>4</sup>De Trinitate VII, 1. PL 42, 974

rebus, causatur ex aliqua cognitione, non quidem in ipsis rebus naturalibus existente, sed in eo qui naturam instituit, ut supra dictum est.<sup>7</sup>

*articulus 3. utrum similitudo sit causa amoris*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod similitudo non sit causa amoris. Idem enim non est causa contrariorum. Sed similitudo est causa odii: dicitur enim *Prov.* quod *inter superbos semper sunt jurgia*;<sup>2</sup> et Philosophus dicit quod figuli corrixantur ad invicem.<sup>3</sup> Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.

2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit quod aliquis amat in alio quod esse non vellet: sicut homo amat histrionem, qui non vellet esse histrio.<sup>4</sup> Hoc autem non contingeret, si similitudo esset propria causa amoris: sic enim homo amaret in altero quod ipse haberet, vel vellet habere. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.

3. Præterea, quilibet homo amat id quo indiget, etiam si illud non habeat: sicut infirmus amat sanitatem, et pauper divitias. Sed inquantum indiget et caret eis, habet dissimilitudinem ad ipsa. Ergo non solum similitudo, sed etiam dissimilitudo est causa amoris.

4. Præterea, Philosophus dicit quod *beneficos in pecunias et salutem amamus: et similiter eos qui circa mortuos servant amicitiam, omnes diligunt.*<sup>5</sup> Non autem omnes sunt tales. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Eccl.*, *Omne animal diligit simile sibi.*<sup>6</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris. Sed considerandum est quod similitudo inter aliqua potest attendi duplum. Uno modo, ex hoc quod utrumque habet idem in actu: sicut duo habentes albedinem, dicuntur similes. Alio modo, ex hoc quod unum habet in potentia et in quadam inclinatione illud quod aliud habet in actu: sicut si dicamus quod corpus grave existens extra suum locum habet similitudinem cum corpore gravi in suo loco existenti. Vel etiam secundum

<sup>7</sup>IA2æ. 26, 1

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 27, 1, 1 ad 3. *De Hebdomad. lect.* 2. *In Ethic.* VIII, *lect.* 1. *In Joann.* 15, *lect.* 4

<sup>2</sup>*Proverbs* 13, 10

<sup>3</sup>*Ethics* VIII, 1. 1155a35

<sup>4</sup>*Confessions* IV, 14. PL 32, 702

<sup>5</sup>*Rhetoric* II, 4. 1381b16

<sup>6</sup>*Ecclesiasticus* 13, 19

<sup>7</sup>The sense of the question is: Is the fact that A and B are similar likely to cause A to love B?

knowledge: knowledge possessed, not indeed by natural things themselves, but by the Author of their nature, as we have remarked.<sup>7</sup>

*article 3. is similarity a cause of love?*<sup>a</sup>

THE THIRD POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that similarity is not a cause of love. For the same thing cannot be the cause of two contrary effects. But similarity is a cause of hatred: as the book of *Proverbs* says, *Proud men are always quarrelling with their like:*<sup>2b</sup> and Aristotle remarks that potters are constantly wrangling between themselves.<sup>3c</sup> Therefore similarity is not a cause of love.

2. Augustine says that we love in others what we should not want to be ourselves: one may love an actor, he says, without wanting to be an actor oneself.<sup>4</sup> Now this would not happen if similarity were a cause of love: for if it were, one would love in others what one was, or wanted to be, oneself. Therefore similarity is not a cause of love.

3. We love what we need, even when we are without it: a sick man loves health, a poor man wealth. But in so far as we need a thing and are without it, we are unlike it. Therefore it is not similarity but dissimilarity that is the cause of love.

4. Aristotle says, *We love those who are generous towards others with money or in matters of personal safety; and all men love those who retain their affection for friends who are dead.*<sup>5</sup> But not all people possess these qualities (which they love in those who do). Therefore similarity is not a cause of love.

ON THE OTHER HAND the book of *Ecclesiasticus* says, *Every living thing loves its own kind.*<sup>6</sup>

REPLY: Similarity, strictly so called, is a cause of love. However, there are two ways in which things may be similar. First, two things may be similar because they both actually possess the same qualities: e.g. two things are said to be similar if they are both white. Second, things may be similar because one has in potentiality and as an object of natural inclination what the other actually possesses (for instance, we may say that a heavy body which is out of its natural place is similar to a heavy body which is actually in it); or because there is always a certain similarity between a potentiality

<sup>a</sup>Thus the Vulgate. The Hebrew reads, *By insolence the foolish sow discord.*

<sup>b</sup>Literally, Aristotle's words are, *Men who are alike are potters to each other.* It seems that this is an allusion to a line of Hesiod, *Potter with potter contends, and joiner quarrels with joiner.*

quod potentia habet similitudinem ad actum ipsum, nam in ipsa potentia quodammodo est actus.

Primus ergo similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae. Ex hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam, sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa: sicut duo homines sunt unum in specie humanitatis, et duo albi in albedine. Et ideo affectus unius tendit in alterum, sicut in unum sibi; et vult ei bonum sicut et sibi. Sed secundus modus similitudinis causat amorem concupiscentiae, vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis. Quia unicuique existenti in potentia, in quantum hujusmodi, inest appetitus sui actus: et in ejus consecutione delectatur, si sit sentiens et cognoscens.

Dictum est autem supra quod in amore concupiscentiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum quod concupiscit.<sup>7</sup> Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi est unus in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicujus formæ. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in participatione formæ, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod amat; efficitur ei odiosus, non in quantum est similis, sed in quantum est proprii boni impeditus. Et propter hoc figuli corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro: et inter superbos sunt jurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia, quam concupiscunt.

1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod aliquis in altero amat quod in se non amat,<sup>\*</sup> invenitur ratio similitudinis secundum proportionalitatem: nam sicut se habet aliis ad hoc quod in eo amatur, ita ipse se habet ad hoc quod in se amat. Puta si bonus cantor bonum amet scriptorem, attenditur ibi similitudo proportionis, secundum quod uterque habet quod convenit ei secundum suam artem.
3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad id quod amat, sicut quod est potentia ad actum, ut dictum est.
4. Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum eamdem similitudinem potentiae ad actum, ille qui non est liberalis, amat eum qui est liberalis, in quantum expectat ab eo aliquid quod desiderat. Et eadem ratio est de perseverante in amicitia ad eum qui non perseverat. Utrobique enim videtur esse amicitia propter utilitatem.

\*Piana reads *quod in se amat*, which we love in ourselves

<sup>7</sup>IA.2æ. 26, 4

<sup>d</sup>cf supra.

and its corresponding actuality, for the latter is in some sense contained in the former.

The first of these two kinds of similarity gives rise to love-of-friendship or love-of-goodwill, for the fact that two people are alike in having some form means that they are, in a sense, one in that form: thus two men are at one in their membership of the species 'humanity', and two white men at one in their possessing the form 'whiteness'. The result is that the affections of the one are bent upon the other as being one with himself, and he wishes well to the other as to himself. The second kind of similarity, however, gives rise to love-of-desire, or to friendship based on convenience or pleasure.<sup>d</sup> For anything which is in some sort of potentiality has a desire for the corresponding actuality and, if it is a creature capable of feeling and knowledge, takes pleasure in its realization.

Now we have shown that, in the case of love-of-desire, a person is really loving himself, wanting the desired good, not for someone else, but for himself.<sup>e</sup> But a person's love for himself is greater than his love of any other person, for he is one with himself in actual substance, whereas he is one with another person only through some similarity of form. If therefore another person's being similar to us, through some shared form, hinders our obtaining some thing that we want, he becomes hateful to us: not *qua* similar, but *qua* obstacle to our desire. That is why potters quarrel with each other—because one is a threat to the other's business; and 'proud men quarrel' because one may deprive the other of the status they both covet.

1. Hence the answer to the first objection is clear.
2. Even when we love in another person a quality which we do not love in ourselves, there is at least a similarity of relationship between us: viz. he is to the quality we love in him, as we are to the quality we love in ourselves. When a gifted singer, for instance, loves a talented writer, there is at least this similarity of relationship existing between them, that each of them has what success in his own art requires.
3. When a person loves a quality of which he stands in need, he bears that similarity to the quality which any potentiality bears to its corresponding actuality: as we have remarked.
4. It is on that same pattern—the similarity of a potentiality to the corresponding actuality—that the ungenerous person loves the generous one: he hopes to get from him something that he wants. The same account holds for a constant friend in the eyes of an inconstant one. In each of these cases it would seem that friendship is simply a matter of convenience.

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<sup>d</sup>An allusion to Aristotle's definition of love already quoted: 'wishing a person well', or 'wanting good things for a person'.

Vel dicendum quod, licet non omnes homines habeant hujusmodi virtutes secundum habitum completum, habent tamen eas secundum quædam seminalia rationis, secundum quæ qui non habet virtutem diligit virtuosum, tamquam suæ naturali rationi conformem.

*articulus 4. utrum aliqua alia passionum animæ sit causa amoris*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod aliqua alia passio possit esse causa amoris. Dicit enim Philosophus quod aliqui amantur propter delectationem.<sup>1</sup> Sed delectatio est passio quædam. Ergo aliqua alia passio est causa amoris.

2. Præterea, desiderium quædam passio est. Sed aliquos amamus propter desiderium alicujus<sup>\*</sup> quod ab eis expectamus: sicut apparet in omni amicitia quæ est propter utilitatem. Ergo aliqua alia passio est causa amoris.

3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, *Cujus rei adipiscendae spem quisque non gerit, aut tepide amat, aut omnino non amat, quamvis quam pulchra sit videat.*<sup>2</sup> Ergo spes etiam est causa amoris.

SED CONTRA est quod omnes aliæ affectiones animi ex amore causantur, ut Augustinus dicit.<sup>3</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod nulla alia passio animæ est quæ non præsupponat aliquem amorem. Cujus ratio est quia omnis alia passio animæ vel importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptatione procedit: quæ pertinet ad rationem amoris. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animæ sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicujus: sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum quis amat aliquid propter delectationem, amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione; sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore præcedente: nullus enim delectatur nisi in re aliquo modo amata.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod desiderium rei alicujus semper præsupponit amorem illius rei. Sed desiderium alicujus rei potest esse causa ut res alia ametur: sicut qui desiderat pecuniam amat propter hoc eum a quo pecuniam recipit.

\*Piana omits *alicujus*

<sup>1</sup>Ethics VIII, 3. 1156a12

Alternatively, one might say that even though not everyone has these virtues in their full flower, the seeds of them are present in every man's reason. The result is that even though one is not virtuous oneself, one loves the person who is, as measuring up to the standards demanded by one's own reason.

*article 4. can any of the other emotions be a cause of love?*

THE FOURTH POINT: 1. It would seem possible for love to be caused by some other emotion. For Aristotle says that some people are loved because of the pleasure they give.<sup>1</sup> But pleasure is an emotion. Therefore one of the other emotions is a cause of love.

2. Desire is an emotion. But we love some people from desire of what we hope to get from them, as in friendships of convenience. Therefore one of the other emotions is a cause of love.

3. Augustine says, *When one has no hope of obtaining a thing, one loves it half-heartedly or not at all, no matter how beautiful it seems.*<sup>2</sup> Therefore the emotion of hope is a cause of love.

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine says that all the other feelings of the soul are caused by love.<sup>3</sup>

REPLY: There is none of the other emotions which does not presuppose love of some kind. For every other emotion involves movement towards, or repose in, some object. Now all movement or repose arises from a sense of affinity with, or attachment to, some object; and it is precisely in this that love consists. It is therefore impossible to say, as a universal rule, that any of the other emotions is a cause of love. However, it may happen that in some particular instance love is caused by another emotion, just as one good may be the cause of another.

Hence: 1. When one loves something because of the pleasure it promises, it is true that pleasure is the cause of that love; but the pleasure has in its turn been caused by an antecedent love: for no one takes pleasure in a thing unless he already has some kind of love for it.

2. Desire of a thing always presupposes love of it. Thus desiring one thing can be the cause of loving another thing, as when someone who desires money loves the person who gives him money.

<sup>2</sup>De Trinitate x, 1. PL 42, 973

<sup>3</sup>De civitate Dei XIV, 7. PL 41, 410

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod spes causat vel auget amorem, et ratione delectationis, quia delectationem causat: et etiam ratione desiderii, quia spes desiderium fortificat, non enim ita intense desideramus quæ non speramus. Sed tamen et ipsa spes est alicujus boni amati.

#### THE CAUSES OF LOVE

3. Hope causes, or increases, love: sometimes by virtue of the emotion of pleasure, which it arouses; and sometimes by virtue of the emotion of desire, which it intensifies: for without some hope there is no strong desire. But here again, one does not hope for something unless one has first felt love for it.

## Quæstio 28. de effectibus amoris

Deinde considerandum est de effectibus amoris. Et circa hoc quæruntur sex.

1. utrum unio sit effectus amoris;
2. utrum mutua inhæsio;
3. utrum extasis sit effectus amoris;
4. utrum zelus;
5. utrum amor sit passio læsiva amantis;
6. utrum amor sit causa omnium quæ amans agit.

*articulus 1. utrum unio sit effectus amoris*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod unio non sit effectus amoris. Absentia enim unioni repugnat. Sed amor compatitur secum absentiam: dicit enim Apostolus, *Bonum œmularimi in bono semper* (loquens de seipso, ut Glossa dicit),<sup>2</sup> et non tantum cum præsens sum apud vos.<sup>3</sup> Ergo unio non est effectus amoris.

2. Præterea, omnis unio aut est per essentiam, sicut forma unitur materiæ, et accidens subjecto, et pars toti vel alteri parti ad constitutionem totius; aut est per similitudinem vel generis, vel speciei, vel accidentis. Sed amor non causat unionem essentiæ: alioquin numquam haberetur amor ad ea quæ sunt per essentiam divisa. Unionem autem quæ est per similitudinem, amor non causat, sed magis ab ea causatur, ut dictum est.<sup>4</sup> Ergo unio non est effectus amoris.

3. Præterea, sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu. Non autem amans in actu fit amatum in actu. Ergo unio magis est effectus cognitionis quam amoris.

SED CONTRA est quod Dionysius dicit, quod amor quilibet est *virtus unitiva*.<sup>5</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem secundum rem: puta cum amatum præsentialiter adest amanti. Alia vero secundum affectum. Quæ quidem unio consideranda est ex

<sup>1</sup>cf III Sent. 27, 1, 1. In De Div. Nom. 4, lect. 12

<sup>2</sup>Glossa interlinearis vi, 85

<sup>3</sup>Galatians 4, 18

<sup>4</sup>Ia2æ. 27, 3

## Question 28. the effects of love

Next we must study the effects of love. There are six points of inquiry:

1. is union one effect of love?
2. is mutual indwelling another?
3. is transport another?
4. is jealousy another?
5. is love an emotion that does harm to the lover?
6. is love the cause of everything that the lover does?

### *article 1. is union an effect of love?*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence and union are mutually incompatible. But love is perfectly compatible with absence: as St Paul says (speaking of himself, as the Gloss tells us),<sup>2</sup> *Court the good from a good motive always, and not only when I am present among you.*<sup>3</sup> Therefore union is not an effect of love.

2. Union exists, either when two things are united in reality—as form is united with matter, accident with subject, part with whole, or part with other parts to form a whole; or when similarity unites them in membership of the same genus, species or accident. But love does not unite things in reality: otherwise there could never be cases of loving things that were really distinct. Neither can love be the cause of things being united through similarity; for love is not a cause, but an effect, of similarity, as we have seen.<sup>4</sup> Therefore union is not an effect of love.

3. The actualization of a cognitive sense-faculty and the actualization of its object are one and the same;<sup>a</sup> and the actualization of the intellect and the actualization of its object are one and the same. But the actualization of the lover is not identical with the actualization of the object loved. Therefore union is an effect of knowledge rather than of love.

ON THE OTHER HAND Dionysius calls love a *unifying force*.<sup>5</sup>

REPLY: There are two ways in which a person may be united with the object of his love. First, they may be united in reality; this is the case when the object loved is present to the lover in actual fact. Second, they may be united only by inclination and feeling; and this, orectic union, must be

<sup>b</sup>*De divinis nominibus* 4, PG. 3, 709

<sup>a</sup>'e.g. if a dish is sweet, then its tasting sweet to me and my tasting its sweetness are one and the same event.' Kenny, op. cit. p. 147.

apprehensione præcedente: nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem.

Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiæ et amicitiæ, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse. Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiæ, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum: unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse *alter ipse*:<sup>6</sup> et Augustinus dicit, *Bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animæ sue*.<sup>7</sup>

Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective: quia movet ad desiderandum et quærendum præsentiam amati, quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinensis. Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter: quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit quod amor est quasi *vita*\* *quædam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amat*.<sup>8</sup> Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor: quod vero dicit copulare intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod objectio illa procedit de unione reali. Quam quidem requirit delectatio† sicut causam: desiderium vero est in reali absentia amati; amor vero et in absentia et in præsencia.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quædam enim unio est causa amoris. Et hæc quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum: quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est.<sup>9</sup> Quædam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et hæc est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quæ quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiæ, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiæ, ut ad aliquid sui. Quædam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et hæc est unio realis, quam amans quærit de re amata. Et hæc quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris: ut enim Philosophus refert,‡ Aristophanes dixit quod *amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri*

\*Piana reads *junctura*, a joint

†Piana reads *dilectio*, love

‡Piana reads *dicit*

<sup>6</sup>Ethics IX, 4: 116a31; and IX, 9: 1169b6

<sup>7</sup>Confessions IV, 6. PL 32, 698

<sup>8</sup>De Trinitate VIII, 10. PL 42, 960

<sup>9</sup>1a2æ. 27, 3

<sup>10</sup>The Scholastics' *causa* was much closer to Aristotle's *aitia* than to the modern English *cause*, which is almost identical with their *causa efficiens*. St Thomas accepts Aristotle's fourfold division of causes. *Causa*, *aitia*, can signify 1. that from and in

studied in terms of the kind of knowledge which gives rise to it: for all orectic movement follows knowledge of some kind.

The two kinds of love—love-of-desire and love-of-friendship—will therefore arise from two different ways of considering the unity between the lover and the object loved. When one has love-of-desire for a thing, one sees it as contributing in some way to one's well-being. When one has love-of-friendship for a person, one wants good things for him as one does for oneself; one therefore looks on him as another self, wishing him well in the same way as one does oneself. That is why a friend is described as an *other self*,<sup>6</sup> and Augustine says, *Someone well called his friend, 'half of my soul'?*<sup>7</sup>

Now of these two kinds of union—real, and orectic—love is an *efficient cause*<sup>b</sup> of the first, since it moves one to desire and seek the presence of the object loved as possessing a special affinity with oneself. It is a *formal cause* of orectic union, for love consists precisely in such a union or tie. Thus Augustine says that love is *a vital principle uniting, or wanting to unite, two things together: to wit, the lover and the thing loved.*<sup>8</sup> In this description, the term *uniting* refers to orectic union, without which there is no love; and the phrase *wanting to unite* refers to real union.

Hence: 1. The objection applies to real union. Pleasure is caused only by real union; desire implies the real absence of the object loved; but love remains whether the object is present or absent.

2. There are three ways in which union is related to love. One kind of union is a *cause* of love. In the case of one's love of oneself, it is a substantial union; in the case of one's love of other things, it is a union of similarity, as we have seen.<sup>9</sup> A second kind of union is in fact *love* itself. This is the union of hearts. It resembles substantial union in that the lover sees the object loved as part of himself, in love-of-friendship, and as part of his property, in love-of-desire. But a third kind of union is an *effect* of love: this is real union, which the lover seeks with the object loved. However, it is, of course, a union appropriate to the nature of love. Aristotle quotes Aristophanes' remark that lovers long for the two of them to

which a thing comes into being which corresponds to its matter, *materia*, ὕλη: 2. its own intrinsic form or species, *eidos*, corresponding to *μορφή* as the inner shaping principle of matter, and the exemplar, *παράδειγμα*, in the mind of the maker as a reason, *λόγος*; 3. the originator of its production, *causa movens, efficiens, agens*, θέτεν ἡ κίνησις ποιῶν; and 4. that for the sake of which it is, *ἐνεχα* or the end, *τέλος*.<sup>2</sup> T. McDermott in Volume II of the present series, p. 210. cf R. P. Phillips: 'A man building a house is its *efficient cause*; it is built to afford protection from the weather, and this is its *final cause*; it is made of bricks and mortar, its *material cause*; and it is a building, and a building of a particular kind, and that is its *formal cause*.' *Modern Thomistic Philosophy*, London: 1941, II, p. 234.

*unum:*<sup>10</sup> sed quia *ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi*, quærunt unionem quæ convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis hujusmodi conjungantur.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio perficitur per hoc quod cognitum unitur cognoscenti secundum suam similitudinem. Sed amor facit quod ipsa res quæ amatur, amanti aliquo modo uniatur, ut dictum est. Unde amor est magis unitivus quam cognitio.

*articulus 2. utrum mutua inhæsio sit effectus amoris*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod amor non causet mutuam inhæsionem, ut scilicet amans sit in amato, et e converso. Quod enim est in altero continetur in eo. Sed non potest idem esse continens et contentum. Ergo per amorem non potest causari mutua inhæsio, ut amatum sit in amante et e converso.

2. Præterea, nihil potest penetrare in interiora alicujus integri, nisi per aliquam divisionem. Sed dividere quæ sunt secundum rem conjuncta non pertinet ad appetitum, in quo est amor, sed ad rationem. Ergo mutua inhæsio non est effectus amoris.

3. Præterea, si per amorem amans est in amato, et e converso, sequetur quod hoc modo amatum uniatur amanti sicut amans amato. Sed ipsa unio est amor, ut dictum est.<sup>2</sup> Ergo sequitur quod semper amans ametur ab amato: quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo mutua inhæsio est effectus amoris.

SED CONTRA est quod dicitur *Ioan*, *Qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet et Deus in eo.*<sup>3</sup> Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso.\*

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod iste effectus mutuae inhæsionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, in quantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud *Philipp.*, *eo quod habeam vos in corde.*<sup>4</sup>

Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem, in quantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nititur singula quæ ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora

\*Piana omits *et e converso*

<sup>10</sup>*Politics* II, I, 1262b11

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 27, I, I ad 4

<sup>2</sup>art. I

<sup>3</sup>*I John* 4, 16

<sup>4</sup>*Philippians* I, 7

become one;<sup>10</sup> but he points out that, seeing that if that happened, one or both would be destroyed, they seek the kind of union which is appropriate to them: viz. to be together, to talk together, to be united in other such relationships.

3. In knowledge the object known is united with the person who knows it by means of a representation; but in love it is the object itself which is united with the person who loves it. Love is therefore a more powerful unifying force than is knowledge.

*article 2. is mutual indwelling an effect of love?*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> It would seem that love does not cause the lover and the person he loves mutually to dwell in each other.<sup>a</sup> For if one thing dwells in another, it is contained by it. But one thing cannot both contain, and be contained by, some other thing. Love therefore cannot cause the lover and the person he loves to dwell mutually in each other.

2. Nothing can penetrate into the interior of a single whole without introducing some sort of division into it. But to divide up things which are really united is the function of the reason, not of the orexis, to which love belongs. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

3. If love makes the lover, X, dwell in the person he loves, Y, and vice versa, then Y is united with X as much as X is united with Y. But we have seen that this union is itself precisely love.<sup>2</sup> It would therefore follow that one was always loved by the person who loved; and this is certainly not the case. Mutual indwelling is therefore not an effect of love.

ON THE OTHER HAND St John says, *He that dwells in charity dwells in God, and God in him.*<sup>3</sup> But charity is the love of God. By the same token, then, love of any kind makes the person loved dwell in the lover, and vice versa.<sup>b</sup>

REPLY: Mutual indwelling is both a cognitive and an orectic effect of love.

Cognitively, the person loved, Y, is said to dwell in the lover, X, in the sense that he is constantly present in X's thoughts: as St Paul wrote to the Philippians, *I hold you in my heart.*<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, X is cognitively present in Y in the sense that he is not satisfied with a surface knowledge of him, but strives for personal insight into everything about him, and

<sup>a</sup>This article makes sense only if it is taken as applying to the love of one *person* for another. I shall translate *amatus* accordingly.

<sup>b</sup>St Thomas himself explicitly states that charity does not belong to the sensory orexis, but to the will (2a2ae. 24, 1 ad 1). Why then should it follow that what is true of charity is also true of the *emotion* of love?

ejus ingreditur. Sicut de Spiritu Sancto, qui est amor Dei, dicitur, *I ad Cor.*, quod *scrutatur etiam profunda Dei*.<sup>5</sup>

Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in ejus affectu: ut vel delectetur in eo aut in bonis ejus, apud præsentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscentiæ; vel in bona quæ vult amato, per amorem amicitiæ: non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. Unde et amor dicitur *intimus*; et dicuntur *viscera caritatis*.

E converso autem amans est in amato aliter quidem per amorem concupiscentiæ, aliter per amorem amicitiæ. Amor namque concupiscentiæ non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut superficiali adēptione vel fruitione amati; sed quærerit amatum perfecte habere, quasi ad intima illius perveniens. In amore vero amicitiæ amans est in amato inquantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere, secundum Philosophum.<sup>6</sup> Ut sic, inquantum quæ sunt amici æstimat sua, amans videatur esse in amato, quasi idem factus amato. Inquantum autem e converso vult et agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante.

Potest autem et tertio modo mutua inhæsio intelligi in amore amicitiæ, secundum viam redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amatum continetur in amante, inquantum est impressum in affectu ejus per quandam complacentiam. E converso vero amans continetur in amato, inquantum amans sequitur aliquo modo id quod est intimum amati. Nihil enim prohibet diverso modo esse aliquid continens et contentum: sicut genus continetur in specie et e converso.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod rationis apprehensio præcedit affectum amoris. Et ideo, sicut ratio disquirit, ita affectus amoris subintrat in amatum, ut ex dictis patet.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit in tertio modo mutuæ inhæsionis, qui non invenitur in quolibet amore.

<sup>5</sup> *1 Corinthians 2, 10*

<sup>6</sup> *Ethics IX, 13. 1165b27. Rhetoric II, 4. 1381a3*

e.g. *animal* is part of the definition of *man*, and *man* is one species of the genus *animal*.

<sup>6</sup> It is found, namely, only in love-of-friendship, in which mutual love is indeed

penetrates into his very soul. Thus St Paul says of the Holy Spirit, who is the love of God, *He searches everything, even the depth of God.*<sup>5</sup>

Orectically, Y is said to dwell in X in the sense that, as a result of the affection the thought of him arouses, he is constantly present in X's feelings. In Y's presence, X feels pleasure in him or in the good things about him. In Y's absence, X feels desire for him in the case of love-of-desire, or desire for the good things he wants for Y in the case of love-of-friendship. This desire is not caused by some extrinsic things, as is the case when one wants something for oneself or for another person as a means to some further end; it arises from the feeling for Y that is rooted deep within X. This is why we often speak of love as 'intimate', and use phrases like 'the heart of love'.

On the other hand, X is said to dwell orectically in Y in one way in the case of love-of-desire, and in another way in the case of love-of-friendship. In love-of-desire, X cannot be content with a mere external or surface possession or enjoyment of Y; he must possess him perfectly, and penetrate to his very soul. But in love-of-friendship, X dwells in Y in the sense that he looks on his friend's good or ill fortune as his own, his friend's will as his own will. It is as if he enjoys his friend's good fortune or suffers his misfortune in his own person; as Aristotle says, friends have a common will, and they take pleasure and pain in the same things.<sup>6</sup> X therefore dwells in Y in so far as he looks on Y's interests as his own, and identifies himself with Y. On the other hand, Y dwells in X in so far as X's identifying himself with Y leads him to direct his wishes and actions to Y's interests as if they were his own.

There is a third way in which mutual indwelling is an effect of love. In love-of-friendship love itself is reciprocal: friends love each other, and each desires and seeks good things for the other.

Hence: 1. The person loved, Y, is 'contained' in the person X who loves him in the sense that affection for him makes him present in X's feelings. On the other hand, X is 'contained' in Y because X in a certain sense penetrates to what is most intimate in Y. For there is nothing to prevent a thing's 'containing' in one sense but 'being contained' in another: just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.<sup>c</sup>

2. The feeling of love is always preceded by some perception of the reason. Just as the reason searches the mind of the person loved, then, love seeks to penetrate his very heart, as we have seen.

3. This objection applies only to the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.<sup>d</sup>

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always present. In fact, for Aristotle and St Thomas it is a defining characteristic of friendship that love be mutual, and mutually known as such.

*articulus 3. utrum extaxis sit effectus amoris*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod extasis non sit effectus amoris. Extasis enim quandam alienationem importare videtur. Sed amor non semper facit alienationem: sunt enim interdum amantes sui compotes. Ergo amor non facit extasim.

2. Præterea, amans desiderat amatum sibi uniri. Magis ergo amatum trahit ad se, quam etiam pergit in amatum, extra se exiens.

3. Præterea, amor unit amatum amanti, ut dictum est. Si ergo amans extra se tendit, ut in amatum pergit, sequitur quod semper plus diligit amatum quam seipsum. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo extasis est effectus amoris.

SED CONTRA est quod Dionysius dicit quod *divinus amor extasim facit*, et quod ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim passus.<sup>2</sup> Cum ergo quilibet amor sit quædam similitudo participata divini amoris, ut ibidem dicitur,<sup>3</sup> videtur quod quilibet amor causet extasim.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod extasim pati dicitur aliquis cum extra et ponitur. Quod quidem contingit et secundum vim apprehensivam, se secundum vim appetitivam.

Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam aliiquid dicitur extra se ponendo quando ponitur extra cognitionem propriam sibi: vel quia ad superiorem sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad comprehendenda aliqua quæ sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalem appprehensionem rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiora deprimitur; puta, cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit dicitur extasim passus.

Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliiquid extasim pati quando appetitus alicujus in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum.

Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est:<sup>4</sup> intensa autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam extasim facit amor directe: simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae, amor autem concupiscentiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore concupiscentiae quodammodo fertur amans extra

<sup>1</sup>cf 2a2æ. 175, 2. III *Sent.* 27, 1, 1 ad 4

<sup>2</sup>*De divinis nominibus* IV, 13. PG 3, 712

<sup>3</sup>*De divinis nominibus* IV, 16. PG 3, 713

<sup>4</sup>art. 2

<sup>5</sup>St Thomas' *extasis* is not a Latin word, but simply a transliteration of the Greek *ἐξστασίς*, = (1) a being-put-out-of-one's-proper-place, and (2) a being-put-out-

article 3. is transport<sup>a</sup> an effect of love?

THE THIRD POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that transport is not an effect of love. For a 'transport' seems to involve some loss of rational balance; but lovers are often quite sane. Therefore transport is not an effect of love.

2. The person who loves another wants to be united with him. He therefore draws the other to himself, rather than leaving himself and going out to the other.

3. Love joins a person to the one he loves, as we have seen. If therefore he takes leave of himself to be with the other, it would follow that one always loves another person more than one loves oneself. This is certainly not true. Therefore transport is not an effect of love.

ON THE OTHER HAND Dionysius says, *Divine love produces transport*,<sup>2</sup> and claims that God himself suffered ecstasy because of love.<sup>3</sup> Since therefore all love is in some sort a copy and share of the divine love, as Dionysius also remarks, it would seem that love does produce ecstasy or transport.

REPLY: To 'suffer transport' is to be carried outside of oneself;<sup>b</sup> and this may happen through the cognitive faculties or through the orectic.

As for the cognitive powers, a person may be said to be 'carried outside of himself' when he is brought to a mental state no longer within his normal compass. He may be elevated above his normal powers: when a man is raised to an understanding of things above the range of reason and the senses, he is said to be 'transported' because he has been carried beyond the natural limitations of rational and sensory knowledge. He may be debased below his normal state: a man is often said to fall into a transport or ecstasy of violent passion or madness.

As for the orectic powers, a person is said to experience transport when the orexis is quite carried away towards some other person or thing, and so is carried out of itself.

Cognitive transport is caused by love dispositively; for as we have seen, love keeps turning a person's mind to thoughts of the beloved,<sup>4</sup> and intense pre-occupation with one thought withdraws the mind from others. Orectic transport is caused by love directly: love-of-friendship is its direct

of-one's-mind. In this article St Thomas is speaking of (2), but assuming that the link with (1) is more than purely verbal. This may be better brought out in English by the word *transport* than *ecstasy*.

<sup>a</sup>cf the similar expression in English, 'He was beside himself.' This is probably nearer than the English 'ecstasy' to St Thomas' *extasis*, at least in the range of the term's application, and the intensity of the experience it suggests.

seipsum: in quantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, querit frui aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum querit sibi habere non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine intra ipsum\* concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicujus simpliciter exit extra se: quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amatum.†

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de prima extasi.
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de amore concupiscentiae, qui non facit simpliciter extasim, ut dictum est.
3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui amat, intantum extra se exit, in quantum vult bona amici et operatur. Non tamen vult bona amici magis quam sua. Unde non sequitur quod alterum plus quam se diligat.

*articulus 4. utrum zelus sit effectus amoris*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod zelus non sit effectus amoris. Zelus enim est contentionis principium: unde dicitur *ad Cor.*, *Cum sit inter vos zelus et contentio*,<sup>2</sup> etc. Sed contentio repugnat amori. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris.

2. Præterea, objectum amoris est bonum, quod est communicativum sui. Sed zelus repugnat communicationi: ad zelum enim pertinere videtur quod aliquis non patiatur consortium in amato; sicut viri dicuntur zelare uxores quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris. Ergo zelus non est effectus amoris.

3. Præterea, zelus non est sine odio, sicut nec sine amore: dicitur enim in *Psalm.*, *Zelavi super iniquos*.<sup>3</sup> Non ergo debet dici magis effectus amoris quam odii.

SED CONTRA est quod Dionysius dicit quod Deus appellatur Zelotes<sup>4</sup> propter multum amorem quem habet ad existentia.<sup>5</sup>

\*Piana reads *ipsam*

†Piana reads *amicum*

<sup>1</sup>cf *In De Div. Nom.* 4, *lect.* 10. *In Joann.* 2, *lect.* 2. *In 1 Cor.* 14, *lect.* 1. *In 2 Cor.* 11, *lect.*

<sup>2</sup>*1 Cor.* 3, 3

<sup>3</sup>*Psalm* 72, 3

<sup>4</sup>*Exodus* 20, 5

<sup>5</sup>*De divinis nominibus* 4. PG 3, 712

<sup>a</sup>The word *zelus* is hardly known in classical Latin, but one sometimes finds *zelotypia*, a transliteration of the Greek *Ζηλοτυπία*, = jealousy, rivalry, envy. The Greek word *Ζηλός* means ‘eager rivalry’ or ‘jealousy’ in a good sense: the

cause *tout court*, love-of-desire its direct cause in a qualified sense. For in love-of-desire, the lover is 'carried out of himself' in the sense that he is not content to enjoy what is already in his possession, but is anxious to enjoy something which is as yet outside his grasp; but since he is anxious to have that other thing for himself, he is not 'carried out of himself' *tout court*; the ultimate term of his feeling lies within himself. In love-of-friendship, however, the ultimate term of the person's feeling is 'located outside of him' *tout court*, for he wants some good thing for his friend, and works for it, exercising thought and care about his friend's interests for his friend's sake.

Hence: 1. The argument holds only for transport of the cognitive powers.

2. The argument holds only for love-of-desire which, as we have seen, is not a cause of transport *tout court*.

3. The lover is carried outside of himself in so far as he wants and works for his friend's good. However, he does not want his friend's good more than his own; it does not follow, then, that he loves his friend more than he does himself.

*article 4. is jealousy<sup>a</sup> an effect of love?*

THE FOURTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that jealousy is not an effect of love. For jealousy is a source of dissension: for instance, St Paul speaks of jealousy and dissension among the Corinthians.<sup>2</sup> But dissension is incompatible with love. Therefore jealousy is not an effect of love.

2. The object of love is some good thing; and goodness always tends to be self-communicative. But jealousy is the very opposite of self-communicative; for a jealous person cannot bear to share the object of his love with another person: thus men are said to be jealous about their wives, because they will not share them with other men. Therefore jealousy is not an effect of love.

3. Jealousy goes with hate as much as it goes with love: thus the Psalmist says, *I burned with jealousy of the wicked*.<sup>3</sup> It should not therefore be called an effect of love any more than of hatred.

ON THE OTHER HAND Dionysius says that God is called 'a jealous God'<sup>4</sup> because of his great love for all things.<sup>5</sup>

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opposite of  $\varphi\thetaονος$ , envy. For this reason, and even more for the various usages in the present article, 'jealousy' is probably better than 'zeal' or 'emulation' as the translation of *zelus*.

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intentione amoris provenit. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel repugnans. Cum igitur amor sit quidam motus in amatum, ut Augustinus dicit,<sup>6</sup> intensus amor querit excludere omne quod sibi repugnat. Aliter tamen hoc contingit in amore concupiscentiæ, et aliter in amore amicitiæ.

Nam in amore concupiscentiæ, qui intense aliiquid concupiscit movetur contra omne illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni quietæ ejus quod amat. Et hoc modo viri dicuntur zelare uxores, ne per consortium aliorum impediatur singularitas quam in uxore habere querunt. Similiter etiam qui querunt excellentiam, moventur contra eos qui excellere videntur, quasi impedientes eorum excellentiam. Et iste est zelus invidiæ, de quo dicitur in *Psalm.*, *Noli cœmulari in malignantibus, neque zelaveris facientes iniquitatem.*<sup>7</sup>

Amor autem amicitiæ querit bonum amici: unde quando est intensus facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bonis amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo repellere studet. Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare pro Deo, quando ea quæ sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, repellere secundum posse conatur; secundum illud *Reg.*, *Zelo zelatus sum pro Domino exercituum.*<sup>8</sup> Et *Joan.* super illud, *Zelus domus tuæ comedit me,*<sup>9</sup> dicit Glossa quod *bono zelo comeditur, qui quælibet prava quæ viderit, corrigere satagit; si nequit, tolerat et gemit.*<sup>10</sup>

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Apostolus ibi loquitur de zelo invidiæ; qui quidem est causa contentionis, non contra rem amatam, sed pro re amata contra impedimenta ipsius.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum amatur inquantum est communicabile amanti. Unde omne illud quod perfectionem hujus communicationis impedit efficitur odiosum. Et sic ex amore boni zelus causatur. Ex defectu autem bonitatis contingit quod quædam parva bona non possunt integre simul possideri a multis. Et ex amore talium causatur zelus invidiæ. Non autem proprie ex his quæ integre possunt a multis possideri: nullus enim invidet alteri de cognitione veritatis quæ integre cognosci potest; sed forte de excellentia circa cognitionem hujus.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod aliquis odio habet ea quæ repugnant amico ex amore procedit. Unde zelus proprie ponitur effectus amoris magis quam odii.

<sup>6</sup>Lib. 83 Quæst. 35. PL 40, 23

<sup>7</sup>Psalms 36, 1

<sup>8</sup>III Kings 19, 14

<sup>9</sup>John 2, 17

<sup>10</sup>Glossa Ordinaria v, 193 E

**REPLY:** Jealousy, in whatever sense one takes the term, arises from the intensity of love. For the more intensely an active power is bent upon a given objective, the more vigorously does it resist anything opposed to or incompatible with that objective. Since therefore love is an active power bent upon the object loved, as Augustine says,<sup>6</sup> an intense love will strive to resist anything opposed to it. However, this works out differently in the cases of love-of-desire and love-of-friendship.

In the case of love-of-desire, a person who desires a thing intensely feels an antipathy to anything which stands in the way of his obtaining or peacefully enjoying it. It is in this way that a man is said to be jealous about his wife: he fears that her associating with others may jeopardize the uniqueness of his own relationship with her; and an ambitious man feels antipathy to successful men as standing in the way of his own advancement. This sort of jealousy is called *envy*; the Psalmist is speaking of it when he says, *Fret not yourself because of the wicked; envy not those who do wrong.*<sup>7</sup>

In the case of love-of-friendship, however, the object is the good of one's friend; when it is intense, therefore, it rouses in one an antipathy to anything prejudicial to that good. In this way a person is said to be jealous for his friend's interests when he makes a point of repulsing anything said or done against them. In this way too a person is said to be jealous for God's interests when he strives to the best of his power to prevent anything that goes against the honour or the will of God. Thus the Scripture says, *I have been all jealousy for the Lord of Hosts;*<sup>8</sup> and commenting on the text of St John, *I was consumed by jealousy for the house of God,*<sup>9</sup> the Gloss says that it is a perfectly proper jealousy which consumes a man who strives to correct evil wherever he sees it, and if he cannot correct it, bears it with grief.<sup>10</sup>

Hence: 1. St Paul at that place is speaking of the sort of jealousy called envy. That certainly is a cause of dissension: not of course against the object loved, but for it as against obstacles to it.

2. A good thing is loved in so far as it is communicable to the person who loves it; anything therefore becomes hateful which is an obstacle to that communication. Jealousy, then, is caused by love of some good thing.

Now some prizes are of such limited goodness that they cannot simultaneously be completely possessed by several people; and love of things like that gives rise to envy. But this is not the case with things that can be completely possessed by several people; no-one envies another person for possessing knowledge, since it can be completely possessed by many people: though a person may be envied as being the foremost in his field.

3. The fact that a person hates things that are inimical to the object he loves itself arises from love. Jealousy is therefore counted an effect of love rather than of hatred.

## articulus 5. utrum amor sit passio læsiva amantis

AD QUINTUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod amor sit passio læsiva. Languor enim significant læsionem quandam languentis. Sed amor causat languorem: dicitur enim *Cant.*, *Fulcite me floribus, stupate me malis, quia amore langueo.*<sup>2</sup> Ergo amor est passio læsiva.

2. Præterea, liquefactio est quedam resolutio. Sed amor est liquefactivus: dicitur enim *Cant.*, *Anima mea liquefacta est, ut dilectus meus locutus est.*<sup>3</sup> Ergo amor est resolutivus. Est ergo corruptivus et læsivus.

3. Præterea, fervor designat quedam excessum in caliditate, qui quidem excessus corruptivus est. Sed fervor causatur ex amore: Dionysius enim, inter ceteras proprietates ad amorem Seraphim pertinentes, ponit calidum et acutum et superfervens.<sup>4</sup> Et *Cant.* dicitur de amore quod *lampades ejus sunt lampades ignis atque flammarum.*<sup>5</sup> Ergo amor est passio læsiva et corruptiva.

SED CONTRA est quod dicit Dionysius quod singula seipsa amant contentive,<sup>6</sup> idest conservative. Ergo amor non est passio læsiva, sed magis conservativa et perfectiva.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est,<sup>7</sup> amor significat coaptationem quandam appetitivæ virtutis ad aliquod bonum. Nihil autem quod coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens ex hoc ipso læditur, sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur. Quod vero coaptatur ad aliquid quod non est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso læditur et deterioratur. Amor igitur boni convenientis est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis: amor autem boni quod non est conveniens amanti est læsivus et deteriorativus amantis. Unde homo maxime perficitur et melioratur per amorem Dei: læditur autem et deterioratur per amorem peccati, secundum illud *Osee, Facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quæ dilexerunt.*<sup>8</sup>

Et hoc quidem dictum sit de amore quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, accidit quod amor sit læsivus propter excessum immutationis: sicut accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animæ qui exercetur per aliquam immutationem organi corporalis.

Ad ea vero quæ in contrarium objiciuntur, dicendum quod amori attribui possunt quatuor effectus proximi: scilicet liquefactio, fruitio, languor er fervor.

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 27, 1, 1 ad 4

<sup>2</sup>*Song of Songs* 2, 5

*article 5. is love an emotion that does harm to the lover?*

THE FIFTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that love is a harmful emotion. For languor is a kind of sickness, and love causes languor: as the *Canticle* says, *Sustain me with raisins, refresh me with apples: for I languish from love.*<sup>2</sup> Therefore love is a harmful emotion.

2. To melt is surely to suffer some sort of harm. But love causes melting: as the *Canticle* says, *How my heart melted within me at the sound of my beloved's voice!*<sup>3</sup> Therefore love is harmful and hurtful.

3. Fever is an excess in the body's heat: a harmful excess. But love causes fever: in his list of the properties of seraphic love Dionysius includes acute fever;<sup>4</sup> and the *Canticle* says of love, *It is a torch of fire and flames.*<sup>5</sup> Love is therefore a harmful, damaging emotion.

ON THE OTHER HAND, Dionysius says that everything loves itself in a way that serves self-preservation.<sup>6</sup> Love is therefore not a harmful but a healthful emotion that makes one a better person.

REPLY: As we have seen, love consists in the attachment of an orectic faculty to some good.<sup>7</sup> Now a thing is never harmed by becoming attached to something appropriate; it is improved and enriched by it. Attachment to something inappropriate, however, causes deterioration and damage. A person is all the better, therefore, for love of a good which is appropriate to him; but he is worse off, and indeed suffers harm, from love of a good which is, for him, inappropriate. It is therefore the love of God which enriches a man supremely; and he suffers greatest harm from the love of sin: as *Hosea* says, *They have become detestable, like the things they loved.*<sup>8</sup>

So much for the formal aspect of love, i.e. that which affects the orexis. The material aspect is the physiological modification produced by the emotion of love, and this may be harmful when it is excessive; but that is equally the case with the operation of the senses, and of any other mental faculty whose functioning is accompanied by physiological modifications.

Hence: There are four proximate effects which we may attribute to love: melting, pleasure, languor, and fever.

<sup>2</sup>*Song of Songs* 5, 6

<sup>4</sup>*De cœlesti hierarchia* 7. PG 3, 205

<sup>5</sup>*Song of Songs* 5, 6

<sup>6</sup>*De divinis nominibus* 4. PG 3, 708

<sup>7</sup>*Ia2æ.* 26, 1 & 2; 27, 1

<sup>8</sup>*Hosea* 9, 10

Inter quæ primum est liquefactio, quæ opponitur congelationi. Ea enim quæ sunt congelata in seipsis constricta sunt, ut non possint de facili subintractionem alterius pati. Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut jam supra dictum est.<sup>9</sup> Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret.

Si ergo amatum fuerit præsens et habitum, causatur delectatio sive fruitio. Si autem fuerit absens, consequuntur duæ passiones: scilicet tristitia de absentia, quæ significatur per languorem (unde et Tullius maxime tristitiam ægritudinem nominat),<sup>10</sup> et intensus desiderium de consecutione amati, quod significatur per fervorem.

Et isti quidem sunt effectus amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivæ virtutis ad objectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi.\*

*articulus 6. utrum amor sit causa omnium quæ amans agit*

AD SEXTUM sic proceditur<sup>1</sup>: 1. Videtur quod amans non agat omnia ex amore. Amor enim quædam passio est, ut supra dictum est.<sup>2</sup> Sed non omnia quæ agit homo agit ex passione: sed quædam agit ex electione, et quædam ex ignorantia, ut dicitur in *Ethic.*<sup>3</sup> Ergo non omnia quæ homo agit, agit ex amore.

2. Præterea, appetitus est principium motus et actionis in omnibus animalibus, ut patet in *de Anima*.<sup>4</sup> Si igitur omnia quæ quis agit, agit ex amore, aliæ passiones appetitivæ partis erunt superfluæ.

3. Præterea, nihil causatur simul a contrariis causis. Sed quædam fiunt ex odio. Non ergo omnia sunt ex amore.

SED CONTRA est quod Dionysius dicit quod propter amorem boni omnia agunt quæcumque agunt.<sup>5</sup>

\*Piana omits *organii*

<sup>9</sup>art. 2

<sup>10</sup>De Tusculanis Quæstionibus III, 11

<sup>1</sup>cf III Sent. 27, 1, 1

<sup>2</sup>IA2æ. 26, 2

<sup>3</sup>Ethics v, 8. 1135b21–1136a6

<sup>4</sup>De Anima III, 10. 433a21

<sup>5</sup>De divinis nominibus 4. PG 3, 708

The first of these is *meeting*. The opposite of this is *freezing*, for frozen things are so tight-packed that they cannot easily let other things penetrate them. But with love, the orexis is quick to take into itself the object loved: this is how that object 'dwells in' the lover, as we have seen.<sup>9</sup> Coldness or hardness of heart is therefore a state incompatible with love; whereas 'melting' or warmth suggests a certain softness which means that the heart will be quick to let the object loved enter into it.

If the object loved is actually possessed, the result is pleasure and enjoyment. If it is not, two emotions result: first, sadness over its absence, which is often called *languor* (thus Cicero applies the term 'ailment' above all to sadness);<sup>10</sup> and second, intense desire for its possession: and this is often called *fever*.

These are effects of love in its formal aspect, i.e. *qua* relationship of orexis and object. But there are other effects, corresponding to these, by way of the various physiological modifications.

*article 6. is love the cause of everything the lover does?*<sup>a</sup>

THE SIXTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would not seem that all a lover's actions are done out of love. For love is an emotion, as we have seen.<sup>2</sup> But not all of one's actions are done out of emotion: one does some things from choice, and some from ignorance, as Aristotle says.<sup>3</sup> Therefore not all that one does is done out of love.

2. In any animal, the source of all movement and action is the orexis, as Aristotle shows.<sup>4</sup> If therefore love were the sole cause of all one's action, the other emotions would be redundant.

3. Contrary causes cannot produce the same effect. But some actions are done out of hatred. Therefore not all actions are done out of love.

ON THE OTHER HAND Dionysius says that it is from love of the good that all things do whatever they do.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Two words of warning need to be said about the thesis of this article. (1) In spite of its place in the Treatise on the Emotions, 'love' here is not only the emotion of love, but extends to intellectual love on the one side and to natural love on the other. Indeed, it has the same extension as the maxim, *Every agent acts for the sake of some end*, and that is not restricted even to animals. (2) The thesis proposed here is not: 'When John is in love with Jane, everything he does is prompted by love of her'; St Thomas is not guilty of the 'boy-girl' fallacy which Geach accuses Aristotle of having committed in *Ethics I, 1*, viz: 'Every boy loves some girl; therefore there is some girl whom every boy loves.' The thesis here is rather: We love all sorts of people and things, and there is some kind of love at work whenever we act.

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra dictum est.<sup>6</sup> Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quocumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod objectio illa procedit de amore qui est passio in appetitu sensitivo existens. Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem: sic enim Dionysius loquitur de amore.<sup>7</sup>

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex amore, sicut jam dictum est,<sup>8</sup> causantur et desiderium et tristitia et delectatio, et per consequens omnes aliæ passiones. Unde omnis actio quæ procedit ex quacumque passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa. Unde non superfluunt aliæ passiones, quæ sunt causæ proximæ.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod odium etiam ex amore causatur, sicut infra dicetur.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup>1a2æ. I, 2

<sup>7</sup>*De divinis nominibus* 4. PG 3, 708

## THE EFFECTS OF LOVE

REPLY: Every agent acts with some end in view, as we have seen.<sup>6</sup> Now a person's end is a good that he desires and loves. Every agent whatsoever, therefore, performs every action out of love of some kind.

1. The first objection tells against love as an emotion seated in the sensory orexis. Our present discussion, however, concerns love in general; it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love. It is of love in this comprehensive sense that Dionysius is speaking in the passage referred to in the *Sed contra*.<sup>7</sup>

2. We have seen that it is love which is the cause of desire, sadness, and pleasure, and consequently of all the other emotions.<sup>8</sup> Love is therefore the originating cause of every action which has one of the other emotions as its immediate cause, and as such these other emotions are by no means redundant.

3. Hatred also is caused by love, as we shall see.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>art. 5

<sup>9</sup>Ia2æ. 29, 2

## Quæstio 29. de odio

Deinde considerandum est de odio. Et circa hoc quæruntur sex.

1. utrum causa et objectum odii sit malum;
2. utrum odium causetur ex amore;
3. utrum odium sit fortius quam amor;
4. utrum aliquis possit habere odio seipsum;
5. utrum aliquis possit habere odio veritatem;
6. utrum aliquid possit haberis odio in universali.

### *articulus 1. utrum causa et objectum odii sit malum*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod objectum et causa odii non sit malum. Omne enim quod est, in quantum hujusmodi, bonum est. Si igitur objectum odii sit malum, sequitur quod nulla res odio habeatur, sed solum defectus alicujus rei. Quod patet esse falsum.

2. Præterea, odire malum laudabile est: unde in laudem quorumdam dicitur *Macc.*, quod *leges optime custodiebantur, propter Oniæ pontificis pietatem, et animos odio habentes mala.*<sup>2</sup> Si igitur nihil oditur nisi malum, sequitur quod omne odium sit laudabile. Quod patet esse falsum.

3. Præterea, idem non est simul bonum et malum. Sed idem diversis est odibile et amabile. Ergo odium non solum est mali, sed etiam boni.

SED CONTRA, odium contrariatur amori. Sed objectum amoris est bonum, ut supra dictum est.<sup>3</sup> Ergo objectum odii est malum.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, cum appetitus naturalis derivetur ab aliqua apprehensione, licet non conjuncta, eadem ratio videtur esse de inclinatione appetitus naturalis, et appetitus animalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem conjunctam, sicut supra dictum est.<sup>4</sup>

In appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod sibi convenit, quæ est amor naturalis, ita ad id quod est ei repugnans et corruptivum habet dissonantiam naturalem, quæ est odium naturale.

Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in intellectivo, amor est consonantia quædam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens: odium vero est

<sup>1</sup>cf 1a2æ. 46, 2

<sup>2</sup>II Macchabees 3, 1

<sup>3</sup>1a2æ. 26, 1; 27, 1

<sup>4</sup>1a2æ. 26, 1

## Question 29. hatred

Next we must study hatred. There are six points of inquiry:

1. is it only what is evil that is the cause and object of hatred?
2. is love a cause of hatred?
3. is hatred stronger than love?
4. can a person hate himself?
5. can a person hate the truth?
6. can a universal be an object of hatred?

### *article 1. is it only what is evil that is the object of hatred?*

THE FIRST POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that evil is not the cause and object of hatred. For whatever has being, in so far as it has being, is good. If therefore evil is the object of hatred, it would follow that no thing is hated, but only the lack of some thing: which is obviously untrue.

2. Hatred of evil is praiseworthy: thus in *Maccabees* it is matter for praise that *the laws were kept perfectly, thanks to the piety of Onias, the high priest, and to those who hated evil.*<sup>2a</sup> If therefore nothing but evil is hated, it would follow that all hatred is praiseworthy; which is obviously not so.

3. The same thing is not both good and evil at once. But the same thing can be loved by one person and hated by another. Therefore good may be hated as well as evil.

ON THE OTHER HAND hatred is the contrary of love. But the object of love is that which is good, as we have seen.<sup>3</sup> Therefore the object of hatred is that which is evil.

REPLY: A thing's natural orexis follows knowledge of some kind, though not knowledge which the thing itself possesses; so one may expect the same account to hold for the reactions of the natural orexis as for those of the animal orexis, which follows knowledge possessed by the animal itself, as we have seen.<sup>4</sup>

Now as far as the natural orexis is concerned, everything is naturally in harmony with what is agreeable to it, and this constitutes 'natural love'; and similarly, it is naturally out of harmony with what is alien or detrimental to it: and this constitutes 'natural hatred'.

The same thing holds for the animal and the intellectual orexis: love consists in the orexis' feeling itself in harmony with something that is seen

<sup>a</sup>The Greek has, *thanks to the piety of Onias, the high priest, and to his hatred of evil.*

dissonantia quædam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum. Sicut autem omne conveniens, inquantum hujusmodi, habet rationem boni, ita omne repugnans, inquantum hujusmodi, habet rationem mali. Et ideo, sicut bonum est objectum amoris, ita malum est objectum odii.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem repugnantis, sed magis convenientis: quia omnia convenient in ente. Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum habet rationem repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per comparationem ad alterum.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum quod non est vere bonum, ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni esse bonum.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri: sicut calor convenit igni, et repugnat aquæ. Secundum appetitum vero animalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem apprehenditur ab uno sub ratione boni, et ab alio sub ratione mali.

#### *articulus 2. utrum odium causetur ex amore*

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod amor non sit causa odii. Ea enim quæ ex opposito dividuntur, naturaliter sunt simul, ut dicitur in *Prædicamentis*.<sup>2</sup> Sed amor et odium, cum sint contraria, ex opposito dividuntur. Ergo naturaliter sunt simul. Non ergo amor est causa odii.

2. Præterea, unum contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed amor et odium sunt contraria. Ergo amor non est causa odii.

3. Præterea, posterius non est causa prioris. Sed odium est prius amore, ut videtur: nam odium importat recessum a malo, amor vero accessum ad bonum. Ergo amor non est causa odii.

SED CONTRA est quod dicit Augustinus quod omnes affectiones causantur ex amore.<sup>3</sup> Ergo et odium, cum sit quædam affectio animæ, causatur ex amore.

<sup>1</sup>cf CG IV, 19

<sup>2</sup>Categories x, 3. 14b33

<sup>3</sup>De civitate Dei XIV, 7. PL 41, 410

<sup>a</sup>Aristotle is distinguishing between the terms *simultaneous in time* and *simultaneous in nature*. He explains the latter thus: ‘The term *simultaneous in nature* is applied to two things when the existence of each necessitates that of the other, but neither

as agreeable; hatred, in the orexis' feeling itself out of harmony with something that is seen as alien and harmful. Now just as anything agreeable, precisely in so far as it is agreeable, is what we call good; so anything disagreeable, precisely in so far as it is disagreeable, is what we call evil. Thus, just as the object of love is that which is good, so the object of hatred is that which is evil.

Hence: 1. Being *qua* being is agreeable rather than disagreeable by its nature; for all things agree in having being. But being *qua* the being of some particular thing may be disagreeable to some other particular being. In this way one being may be hateful to another, and thus may be evil: not evil in itself, but for that other.

2. Just as a thing may be taken to be good which is not really good; so a thing may be taken to be evil which is not really evil. It sometimes happens, therefore, that hatred of evil or love of good is not good.

3. In the field of natural orexis, something may be 'hated' by one thing and 'loved' by another because it is naturally agreeable to the first and disagreeable to the second: as is heat to fire and to water, respectively. In the field of sensory orexis, the difference arises from the fact that the same thing is seen under different aspects: under one as good, and under another as evil.

#### *article 2. is hatred caused by love?*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> 1. It would seem that love is not the cause of hatred. For two opposite species within a given genus are naturally simultaneous, as Aristotle says.<sup>2a</sup> But love and hatred, being contraries, are opposite species within the same genus. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous, and so one cannot be the cause of the other.

2. If two things are contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.

3. That which comes later is not the cause of that which precedes it. But it would seem that hatred precedes love, since hatred involves a movement away from some evil, but love a movement towards some good. Love is therefore not the cause of hatred.

ON THE OTHER HAND Augustine says that love is the cause of all our other feelings.<sup>3</sup> Since therefore hatred is one of the feelings of the soul, it is caused by love.

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is the cause of the other. Take, for instance, *double* and *half*: these have reciprocal dependence, for if a double exists, so does a half, and vice versa; yet neither is the cause of the other's existence.'

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est,<sup>4</sup> amor consistit in quadam convenientia amantis ad amatum, odium vero consistit in quadam repugnantia vel dissonantia. Oportet autem in quolibet prius considerare quid ei conveniat, quam quid ei repugnet: per hoc enim aliquid est repugnans alteri, quia est corruptivum vel impeditivum ejus quod est conveniens. Unde necesse est quod amor sit prior odio; et quod nihil odio habeatur nisi per hoc quod contrariatur convenienti quod amatur. Et secundum hoc, omne odium ex amore causatur.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in his quæ ex opposito dividuntur, quædam inveniuntur quæ sunt naturaliter simul et secundum rem et secundum rationem: sicut duæ species animalis, vel duæ species coloris. Quædam vero sunt simul secundum rationem, sed realiter unum est prius altero et causa ejus: sicut patet in speciebus numerorum, figurarum et motuum. Quædam vero non sunt simul nec secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sicut substantia et accidens: nam substantia realiter est causa accidentis; et ens secundum rationem prius attribuitur substantiæ quam accidenti, quia accidenti non attribuitur nisi inquantum est in substantia.

Amor autem et odium naturaliter sunt simul secundum rationem, sed non realiter. Unde nihil prohibet amorem esse causam odii.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod amor et odium sunt contraria, quando accipiuntur circa idem. Sed quando sunt de contrariis, non sunt contraria, sed se invicem consequentia: ejusdem enim rationis est quod ametur aliquid, et odiatur ejus contrarium. Et sic amor unius rei est causa quod ejus contrarium odiatur.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod in executione prius est recedere ab uno termino, quam accedere ad alterum terminum. Sed in intentione est e converso: propter hoc enim receditur ab uno termino, ut accedatur ad alterum. Motus autem appetitus magis perinet ad intentionem quam ad executionem. Et ideo amor est prior odio: cum utrumque sit motus appetitus.

### *articulus 3. utrum odium sit fortius quam amor*

AD TERTIUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod odium sit fortius amore. Dicit enim Augustinus, *Nemo est qui non magis dolorem fugiat, quam appetat voluptatem.*<sup>1</sup> Sed fugere dolorem pertinet ad odium: appetitus autem voluntatis pertinet ad amorem. Ergo odium est fortius amore.

2. Præterea, debilius vincitur a fortiori. Sed amor vincitur ab odio: quando scilicet amor convertitur in odium. Ergo odium est fortius amore.

<sup>4</sup>art. I

**REPLY:** We have seen that love is a matter of the loved object's being agreeable to the lover, and hatred a matter of its being alien or discordant.<sup>4</sup> Now the consideration of what is agreeable to a thing comes before the consideration of what is alien to it; for X is alien to Y precisely because it offers harm or hindrance to what is agreeable to Y. So love must precede hatred, and a thing can be hated only because it runs counter to some agreeable thing which is loved. In this sense, then, all hatred is caused by love.

Hence: 1. Two opposite species within a given genus may be naturally simultaneous (1) both in reality and in our mental analysis: as in the case of two species of animal, or of two species of colour; or (2) in our mental analysis, though in reality one precedes and causes the other: as in the case of opposed species of numbers or figures or movements; or (3) neither in reality nor in our mental analysis, as in the case of substance and accident: for substance really is the cause of accident; and in our mental analysis of their relationship, being is attributed first to substance, for it is attributed to accidents only in so far as they are present in substance.

Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous only in our mental analysis, not in reality; there is therefore nothing to prevent love's being the cause of hatred.

2. Love and hatred are contraries when they bear upon the same object; but when they bear upon contrary objects, they themselves are not contraries, but consequent one upon the other; for it is the self-same reason that makes us love one thing and hate its contrary. Thus the love of one thing causes the hatred of its contrary.

3. In actual performance, moving away from one's point of departure comes before moving towards one's destination. But in one's intentions, the opposite order holds: it is for the sake of reaching the destination that one leaves the point of departure. Now orectic movement is more concerned with intention than performance. Therefore love precedes hatred, both of them being orectic movements.

### article 3. is hatred stronger than love?

**THE THIRD POINT:** 1. It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says, *There is no one who does not flee pain more than he seeks pleasure.*<sup>1</sup> But fleeing pain is connected with hatred, and seeking pleasure is connected with love. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

2. It is the weaker that is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred, when love turns to hatred. Hatred is therefore stronger than love.

<sup>1</sup>Lib 83 Quæst. 36. PL 40, 25

3. Præterea, affectio animæ per effectum manifestatur. Sed fortius insistit homo ad repellendum odiosum, quam ad prosequendum amatum: sicut etiam bestiæ abstinent a delectabilibus propter verbera, ut Augustinus introducit.<sup>2</sup> Ergo odium est fortius amore.

SED CONTRA, bonum est fortius quam malum: quia malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit.<sup>3</sup> Sed odium et amor differunt secundum differentiam boni et mali. Ergo amor est fortior odio.

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod impossibile est effectum sua causa esse fortiorum. Omne autem odium procedit ex aliquo amore sicut ex causa, ut supra dictum est.<sup>4</sup> Unde impossibile est quod odium sit fortius amore simpliciter.

Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo, sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem quam in ea quæ sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, fortior est motus animæ in bonum quam in malum.

Sed tamen videtur aliquando odium fortius amore propter duo. Primo quidem, quia odium est magis sensibile quam amor. Cum enim sensus perceptio sit in quadam immutatione, ex quo aliquid jam immutatum est, non ita sentitur sicut quando est in ipso immutari. Unde calor febris hecticæ,\* quamvis sit major, non tamen ita sentitur sicut calor tertianæ: quia calor hecticæ\* jam versus est quasi in habitum et naturam. Propter hoc etiam, amor magis sentitur in absentia amati: sicut Augustinus dicit quod *amor non ita sentitur, cum non prodit eum indigentia*.<sup>5</sup> Et propter hoc etiam repugnantia ejus quod oditur, sensibilius percipitur quam convenientia ejus quod amatur. Secundo, quia non comparatur odium ad amorem sibi correspondentem. Secundum enim diversitatem bonorum, est diversitas amorum in magnitudine et parvitate, quibus proportionantur opposita odia. Unde odium quod correspondet majori amori, magis movet quam minor amor.

1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Nam amor voluptatis est minor quam amor conservationis sui ipsius, cui respondet fuga doloris. Et ideo magis fugitur dolor quam voluptas ametur.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod odium numquam vinceret amorem, nisi propter majorem amorem cui odium correspondet. Sicut homo magis

\*Piana reads *ethicæ*

<sup>2</sup>Ibid

<sup>3</sup>De divinis nominibus 4. PG 3, 717

<sup>4</sup>art. 2

3. It is in action that the soul's feelings are revealed. But a man acts more strongly in resisting what he hates than in pursuing what he loves: just as animals will refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine remarks.<sup>2</sup> Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

ON THE OTHER HAND good is stronger than evil, since evil is effectual only in virtue of some good, as Dionysius remarks.<sup>3</sup> But hatred differs from love as does evil from good. Love is therefore stronger than hatred.

REPLY: No effect can be stronger than its cause. But we have seen that every case of hatred is caused by love.<sup>4</sup> Hatred itself therefore cannot be stronger than love.

One must go further: love itself is positively stronger than hatred. For a thing is moved more strongly towards its end than towards the means to that end; and movement away from an evil is a means towards the attainment of some good. The soul itself, therefore, reacts more strongly to good than to evil.

Sometimes, however, hatred may give the appearance of being stronger than love: and that for two reasons. First, hatred can be more keenly felt than love. For sensory experience involves some sort of sense-impression; once the impression has been received it is therefore not so keenly felt as in the moment of reception. This is why hectic-fever, though giving one a higher temperature than does tertian-fever, does not make one feel so hot; it comes to seem normal, and one is soon habituated to it. For the same reason, absence makes one feel love more keenly: as Augustine says, *Love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love.*<sup>5</sup> And for the same reason, the unpleasantness of something hated is more keenly felt than the pleasantness of something loved.

Second, hatred may seem stronger because it is not the corresponding love with which it is being compared. For as things differ in their attractiveness, so do the degrees of love that they arouse: and to these in turn there correspond various degrees of hatred. The hatred, then, that corresponds to a greater love moves one more than does a lesser love.

1. This will make clear the answer to the first objection. For the love of pleasure is not so strong as the love of self-preservation, and it is to the latter that flight from pain corresponds; that is why we flee pain more than we love pleasure.

2. Hatred would never overcome love except because of some greater love to which the hatred corresponded. Thus a man loves himself better

<sup>2</sup>De Trinitate x, 12. PL 42, 984

diligit se quam amicum: et propter hoc quod diligit se, habet odio etiam amicum, si sibi contrarietur.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ideo intensius aliquid operatur ad repellendum odiosa, quia odium est magis sensibile.

*articulus 4. utrum aliquis possit habere odio seipsum*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod aliquis possit seipsum odio habere. Dicitur enim in *Psalm.*, *Qui diligit iniuriam, odit animam suam.*<sup>2</sup> Sed multi diligunt iniuriam. Ergo multi odiunt seipso.

2. Præterea, illum odimus, cui volumus et operamur malum. Sed quandoque aliquis vult et operatur sibi ipsi malum: puta qui interimunt seipso. Ergo aliqui habent seipso odio.

3. Præterea, Boëtius dicit quod *avaritia facit homines odiosos*:<sup>3</sup> ex quo potest accipi quod omnis homo odit avarum. Sed aliqui sunt avari. Ergo illi odiunt seipso.

SED CONTRA est quod Apostolus dicit ad *Eph.*, quod *nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit*.<sup>4</sup>

**RESPONSIO:** Dicendum quod impossibile est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat seipsum. Naturaliter enim unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni: nam malum est præter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit.<sup>5</sup> Amare autem aliquem est velle ei bonum, ut supra dictum est.<sup>6</sup> Unde necesse est quod aliquis amet seipsum; et impossibile est quod aliquis seipsum odiat, per se loquendo.

Per accidens tamen contingit quod aliquis seipsum odio habeat. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte boni quod sibi aliquis vult. Accidit enim quandoque illud quod appetitur ut secundum quid bonum esse simpliciter malum: et secundum hoc, aliquis per accidens vult sibi malum, quod est odire.

Alio modo, ex parte sui ipsius cui vult bonum. Unumquodque enim maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso: unde civitas dicitur facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui æstimant se maxime esse id quod sunt secundum naturam corporalem et sensitivam.

<sup>1</sup>cf 2a2æ. 25, 7. III Sent. 27, Exposit. text. In Psalm. 10. In Ephes. 5, lect. 9

<sup>2</sup>Psalm 10, 6

<sup>3</sup>De consolatione philosophiae II, pros. 5. PL 63, 690

than his friend: and because of his self-love, he comes to hate the friend, should the friend turn against him.

3. One's active opposition to hateful things is more vigorous, because hatred is more keenly felt.

*article 4. can one hate oneself?*

THE FOURTH POINT:<sup>1</sup> I. It would seem that one can hate oneself. For the Psalmist says, *He that loves evil-doing hates his own soul.*<sup>2</sup> But there are many people who love evil-doing. Therefore many people hate themselves.

2. If we wish someone evil and do him harm, we hate him. But sometimes a person wishes himself evil, and does himself harm: e.g. a suicide. Therefore there are people who hate themselves.

3. Boëthius says, *Avarice makes a man hateful.*<sup>3</sup> which suggests that everyone hates a miser. But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves.

ON THE OTHER HAND St Paul says, *No-one ever hated his own flesh.*<sup>4</sup>

REPLY: It is impossible for a person to hate himself, in the proper sense of the term. For everything, by its nature, wants what is good, and can want a thing for itself only in so far as it seems good from some point of view: as Dionysius says, evil lies outside the scope of the will.<sup>5</sup> Now to love someone is to want good things for him, as we have seen.<sup>6</sup> Of necessity, therefore, one must love oneself; and it is impossible to hate oneself, in the proper sense of that expression.

There are two less proper senses, however, in which a person may be said to hate himself. First, from the point of view of the good that he wants: for it sometimes happens that the thing which he wants because of some attractive appearance it presents is in fact harmful: in this sense, therefore, he wishes himself ill, and so 'hates himself'. Second, from the point of view of the part of himself for which he wants the good: for a thing 'is', above all, its most important element; thus a state is said to do what its king does, as if the king were the state. Now clearly, a man is, above all, his mind. Some people, however, think that they are, above all, body and senses. They therefore do indeed love themselves under the description of what they take themselves to be; but they are hating themselves as they really are, wanting for themselves things that run counter to reason.

<sup>1</sup>Ephesians 5, 29

<sup>2</sup>De divinis nominibus 4. PG 3, 732

<sup>3</sup>Iazæ. 26, 4

Unde amant se secundum id quod aestimant se esse, sed odiunt id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria rationi. Et utroque modo, ille qui diligit iniquitatem odit non solum animam suam sed etiam seipsum.

1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi in quantum apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt seipso, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni, in quantum est terminativum alicujus miseriæ vel doloris.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod avarus odit aliquod accidens suum, non tamen propter hoc odit seipsum: sicut æger odit suam ægritudinem, ex hoc ipso quod se amat.

Vel dicendum quod avaritia facit odiosos aliis, non autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore, secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam debeat.

*articulus 5. utrum quis possit odio habere veritatem*

AD QUINTUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod aliquis non possit habere odio veritatem. Bonum enim et ens et verum convertuntur. Sed aliquis non potest habere odio bonitatem. Ergo nec veritatem.

2. Præterea, *omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant*, ut dicitur in principio *Meta*.<sup>1</sup> Sed scientia non est nisi verorum. Ergo veritas naturaliter desideratur et amatur. Sed quod naturaliter inest, semper inest. Nullus ergo potest habere odio veritatem.

3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit quod *homines amant non factos*.<sup>2</sup> Sed non nisi propter veritatem. Ergo homo naturaliter amat veritatem. Non ergo potest eam odio habere.

SED CONTRA est quod Apostolus dicit ad *Gal.*, *Factus sum vobis inimicus, verum dicens vobis*.<sup>3</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod bonum et verum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt ratione. Bonum enim habet rationem appetibilis, non autem ens vel verum: quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo bonum, sub ratione boni, non potest odio haberi, nec in universalis nec in particulari.

Ens autem et verum in universalis quidem odio haberi non possunt: quia dissonantia est causa odii, et convenientia causa amoris; ens autem et verum sunt communia omnibus. Sed in particulari nihil prohibet quoddam

<sup>1</sup>Metaphysics I, I. 980a21

In these two senses, then, the man who loves evil-doing hates not only his soul, but himself.

1. This will make clear the answer to the first objection.
2. No one wills himself evil and does himself harm except in so far as it seems good from some point of view. Thus suicides see death as good, in so far as it puts an end to wretchedness and grief.
3. A miser hates something which is present in him, but he does not for that reason hate himself: just as a sick man hates his sickness precisely because he loves himself.

Alternatively, one might reply that avarice makes a person hateful to others, but not to himself. Indeed, it is a product of excessive self-love, leading one to want for oneself more temporal goods than one should.

*article 5. can one hate the truth?*

THE FIFTH POINT: 1. It would seem that one cannot hate truth. For *good*, *being* and *true* are interchangeable. But one cannot hate goodness. Therefore one cannot hate truth.

2. Aristotle says, *All men, by their very nature, desire knowledge.*<sup>1</sup> But one can have knowledge only of what is true. Therefore by our very nature we desire and love the truth. But what is in us by our very nature is in us always. Therefore one can never hate the truth.

3. Aristotle says, *Men like those who do not dissemble with them.*<sup>2</sup> But this can only be because of their attitude to the truth. By their very nature, therefore, men love the truth and so cannot hate it.

ON THE OTHER HAND St Paul says, *Have I become your enemy by telling you the truth?*<sup>3</sup>

REPLY: The terms *good*, *true*, and *being* are identical in denotation but not in connotation. *Good*, since it is ‘that which all things want’, connotes *desirable*, which *true* and *being* do not. It is therefore impossible to hate goodness as such, whether in general or in particular. It is equally impossible to hate being or truth in general; for hatred arises where there is difference, and love where there is agreement; and all things whatsoever agree in this, that *being* and *true* are predicated of them.

However, there is nothing to prevent a particular being or a particular truth from being hated in so far as it involves something alien or un-

<sup>1</sup>Rhetoric II, 4. 1381b28

<sup>2</sup>Galatians 4, 16

ens et quoddam verum odio haberi, inquantum habet rationem contrarii et repugnantis: contrarietas enim et repugnans non adversatur rationi entis et veri, sicut adversatur rationi boni.

Contingit autem verum aliquod particulare tripliciter repugnare vel contrariari bono amato. Uno modo, secundum quod veritas est causaliter et originaliter in ipsis rebus. Et sic homo quandoque odit aliquam veritatem, dum vellet non esse verum quod est verum.

Alio modo, secundum quod veritas est in cognitione ipsius hominis quæ impedit ipsum a prosecutione amati. Sicut si aliqui vellent non cognoscere veritatem fidei, ut libere peccarent: ex quorum persona dicitur *Job*, *Scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus.*<sup>4</sup>

Tertio modo habetur odio veritas particularis, tamquam repugnans, prout est in intellectu alterius. Puta, cum aliquis vult latere in peccato, odit quod aliquis veritatem circa suum peccatum cognoscat. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod homines *amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem.*<sup>5</sup>

1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod cognoscere veritatem secundum se est amabile: propter quod dicit Augustinus quod amant eam lucentem. Sed per accidens cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, inquantum impedit ab aliquo desiderato.
3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc procedit quod non facti amantur, quod homo amat secundum se cognoscere veritatem, quam homines non facti manifestant.

*articulus 6. utrum aliquid possit haberi odio in universali*

AD SEXTUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod odium non possit esse alicujus in universali. Odium enim est passio appetitus sensitivi, qui movetur ex sensibili apprehensione. Sed sensus non potest apprehendere universale. Ergo odium non potest esse alicujus in universali.

2. Præterea, odium causatur ex aliqua dissonantia; quæ communitati repugnat. Sed communitas est de ratione universalis. Ergo odium non potest esse alicujus in universali.

3. Præterea, objectum odii est malum. Malum autem est in rebus, et non in mente, ut dicitur in *Meta.*<sup>1</sup> Cum ergo universale sit solum in mente, quæ abstrahit universale a particulari, videtur quod odium non possit esse alicujus universalis.

SED CONTRA est quod Philosophus dicit, in *Rhetor.*, quod *ira semper fit*

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<sup>4</sup>*Job 21, 14*

pleasant: for being alien or unpleasant from some point of view is not excluded by the very concept of being or of truth as it is by the very concept of goodness.

There are three ways in which a particular truth may be at odds with or alien to some well-loved good. The first way concerns truth as present in things, where its cause and origin lies: thus a man sometimes hates a particular truth when he wishes that something which is true were not so. The second concerns the truth as present in a man's mind, when it prevents his pursuing some desired objective: thus a person might wish that he did not know the truth of the Faith, and so be free to commit sin: the book of *Job* quotes such people as saying, *We do not desire the knowledge of your ways.*<sup>4</sup> The third way concerns some truth which one hates because it is known to another person: one would like one's sin to be secret, and hates the fact that another person knows the truth about it. As Augustine says, men *love the truth when it enlightens them and hate it when it rebukes them.*<sup>5</sup>

1. This will make clear the answer to the first objection.
2. In general, one loves to know the truth: as we have just seen, Augustine says that men *love the truth when it enlightens them*. But it can happen that a particular truth is hateful, because it stands in the way of one's getting something that one wants.
3. The reason why men like a person who does not dissemble with them is that, in general, they like to know the truth, and such a person does not hide the truth from them.

#### *article 6. can a universal be an object of hatred?*

THE SIXTH POINT: 1. It would seem that a universal cannot be an object of hatred. For hatred is an emotion of the sensory orexis, which is moved by some sensory knowledge. But there can be no sensory knowledge of the universal. Therefore there can be no hatred of the universal.

2. A universal derives from what is common, hatred from what is different. Therefore there can be no hatred of a universal.

3. It is evil which is the object of hatred. Now evil, as Aristotle remarks, is in things themselves, not in the mind.<sup>1</sup> But the universal exists only in the mind, which forms it by abstraction from particular instances. Therefore a universal cannot be an object of hatred.

ON THE OTHER HAND Aristotle says, *Anger always has an individual for its*

<sup>4</sup>*Confessions* x, 23. PL 32, 794

<sup>1</sup>*Metaphysics* VI, 5. 1027b25

*inter singularia, odium autem etiam ad genera: furem enim odit et calumniam  
torem unusquisque.*<sup>2</sup>

**RESPONSIo:** Dicendum quod de universali dupliciter contingit loqui, uno modo, secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur: alia enim est consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo. Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia sensitivæ partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri\* potest in universale: quia universale fit per abstractionem a materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva.

Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod objectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat colorem universalem; sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est color simpliciter. Sic igitur odium etiam sensitivæ partis, potest respicere aliquid in universali: quia ex natura communi aliquid adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis, sicut lupus ovi. Unde ovis odit lupum generaliter. Sed ira semper causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc Philosophus dicit quod ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse ad aliquid in genere.

Sed odium secundum quod est in parte intellectiva, cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem intellectus, potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est universale: apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit universalitas.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod est commune omnibus, non potest esse ratio odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa objectio procedit de universali secundum quod substat intentioni universalitatis; sic enim non cadit sub apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo.

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\*Piana omits *ferri*

*object, whereas hatred extends to classes: everyone hates thieves and calumniators.*<sup>2</sup>

REPLY: We may speak of 'a universal' in two ways. In one, we consider the note of universality as such: in the other, the nature which we are declaring to be universal. Thus it is one thing to speak about the universal 'man', and another to speak about man as man.

Now if one takes 'universal' in the former sense, it is quite true that no sensory faculty, whether cognitive or orectic, can attain it. To form the universal one abstracts from particular material; yet it is precisely in that that every sensory faculty is rooted.

However, a sensory faculty, either cognitive or orectic, can bear universally on some class of thing. When we say that the object of sight is 'the class of coloured things', we do not mean that one can see universal colour; we mean that the quality of being visible belongs to a colour, not *qua* this or that particular colour, but simply *qua* coloured. In the same way hatred in the sensory orexis may bear upon some whole class of things, on the score that their common nature, and not just an individual member of the class, is hostile to the animal in question: e.g. wolf to sheep, so that a sheep hates wolves, in general. Anger, on the other hand, is always caused by some action that hurts us, and actions come from individuals. This is why Aristotle says that the object of anger is always some individual thing, whereas that of hatred may be some class of thing.

Hatred in the intellectual faculty, however, follows the characteristically universal cognition of the intellect. Its object may therefore be the universal in either of the senses we have noted.

Hence: 1. It is true that the senses do not perceive the universal *qua* universal; but they do perceive those things in which the character of universality is discovered by abstraction.

2. It is true that something which is common to absolutely everything cannot give rise to hatred; but there is nothing to prevent a thing's being common to a great many things, yet alien to some others: and hence being hateful to these.

3. This objection applies to the universal considered under the aspect of universality as such; but it is not under that aspect that it falls within the scope of the sensory orexis.

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<sup>2</sup>Rhetoric II, 4. 1382a4

## Quæstio 30. de concupiscentia

Deinde considerandum est de concupiscentia. Et circa hoc quæruntur quatuor.

1. utrum concupiscentia sit in appetitu sensitivo tantum;
2. utrum concupiscentia sit passio specialis;
3. utrum sint aliquæ concupiscentiæ naturales, et aliquæ non naturales;
4. utrum concupiscentia sit infinita.

*articulus 1. utrum concupiscentia sit tantum in appetitu sensitivo*

AD PRIMUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod concupiscentia non solum sit in appetitu sensitivo. Est enim quædam concupiscentia sapientiæ, ut dicitur *Sap.*, *Concupiscentia sapientiæ deducit ad regnum perpetuum*.<sup>1</sup> Sed appetitus sensitivus non potest ferri in sapientiam. Ergo concupiscentia non est in solo appetitu sensitivo.

2. Præterea, desiderium mandatorum Dei non est in appetitu sensitivo: immo Apostolus dicit, *Non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum*.<sup>2</sup> Sed desiderium mandatorum Dei sub concupiscentia cadit: secundum illud *Psalmi*, *Concupivit anima mea desiderare justificationes tuas*.<sup>3</sup> Ergo concupiscentia non est solum in appetitu sensitivo.

3. Præterea, cuilibet potentia est concupiscibile proprium bonum. Ergo concupiscentia est in qualibet potentia animæ, et non solum in appetitu sensitivo.

SED CONTRA est quod Damascenus dicit, quod irrationale obediens et persuasibile rationi dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram.<sup>4</sup> Hæc autem est irrationalis pars animæ, passiva et appetitiva. Ergo concupiscentia est in appetitu sensitivo.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit, *concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis*.<sup>5</sup> Est autem duplex delectatio, ut infra dicetur:<sup>6</sup> una quæ est in bono intelligibili, quod est bonum rationis; alia quæ est in bono secundum sensum. Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animæ tantum. Secunda autem est animæ et corporis, quia sensus est virtus in organo

<sup>1</sup>*The Wisdom of Solomon* 6, 21

<sup>2</sup>*Romans* 7, 18

<sup>3</sup>*Psalms* 118, 20

<sup>4</sup>*De Fide orthodoxa* II, 12. PG 94, 928

<sup>5</sup>*Rheticus* I, 11. 1370a17

## Question 30. sensory desire<sup>a</sup>

Next we must study sensory desire. There are four points of inquiry:

1. is desire found only in the sensory orexis?
2. is desire a distinct species of emotion?
3. are some desires natural and others non-natural?
4. is desire infinite?

### *article 1. is desire found only in the sensory orexis?*

THE FIRST POINT: 1. It would seem that desire is not found only in the sensory orexis. For there is such a thing as desire of wisdom: as the Book of Wisdom says, *The desire of wisdom leads to an everlasting kingdom.*<sup>1</sup> But wisdom cannot be an object of the sensory orexis. Therefore desire is not found only in the sensory orexis.

2. It is not in the sensory orexis that one feels a longing for God's commandments: indeed St Paul says, *Nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh.*<sup>2</sup> But a longing for God's commandments is a kind of desire; as the Psalmist says, *My soul is consumed with longing, with the desire for your ordinances.*<sup>3</sup> Desire is therefore not found only in the sensory orexis.

3. For every faculty, its own proper good is an object of desire. Desire is therefore to be found in every faculty of the soul, and not only in the sensory orexis.

ON THE OTHER HAND according to Damascene, the non-rational part of the soul, which can be commanded and persuaded by the reason, is divided into desire and anger; and this is the passive and orectic part of the soul.<sup>4</sup> It is therefore in the sensory orexis that desire is to be found.

REPLY: Aristotle says, *Desire consists in wanting what is pleasurable.*<sup>5</sup> Now there are two sorts of pleasure, as we shall see:<sup>6</sup> one is taken in the good things of intellect and reason, the other in the good things of the senses. The former, of course, belongs only to the soul. The latter, however, belongs to both soul and body, for each of the senses is a faculty seated in a

<sup>6</sup>1a2æ. 31, 3 and 4

<sup>a</sup>Following the *Revue des Jeunes* French version of the *Summa*, I translate *concupiscentia* as *sensory-desire* in the headings, and as *desire* in the text. This may serve as a reminder that it is desire as *an emotion* with which St Thomas is concerned in this Question, while accommodating his occasional use of the verb *concupiscere* in the sense of non-emotional desiring or wanting. cf *Les Passions de l'Ame*, I, M. Corvez, Paris, 1949, p. 161.

corporeo; unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius conjuncti. Talis autem delectationis appetitus videtur concupiscentia esse, quæ simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen concupiscentiæ sonat. Unde concupiscentia, proprie loquendo, est in appetitu sensitivo, et in vi concupiscibili, quæ ab ea denominatur.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus sapientiæ, vel aliorum spiritualium bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter similitudinem quandam, vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul et ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus spiritualibus deserviat; sicut in *Psalmo* dicitur, *Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum.*<sup>7</sup>

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod desiderium magis pertinere potest, proprie loquendo, non solum ad inferiorem appetitum, sed etiam ad superiorem. Non enim importat aliquam consociationem in cupiendo, sicut concupiscentia; sed simplicem motum in rem desideratam.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod unicuique potentiarum animarum competit appetere proprium bonum appetitu naturali, qui non sequitur apprehensionem. Sed appetere bonum appetitu animali, qui sequitur apprehensionem, pertinet solum ad vim appetitivam. Appetere autem aliquid sub ratione boni delectabilis secundum sensum—quod proprie est concupiscere—pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem.

#### articulus 2. utrum concupiscentia sit passio specialis

AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> 1. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit passio specialis potentiarum concupiscibilium. Passiones enim distinguuntur secundum objecta. Sed objectum concupiscibilis est delectabile secundum sensum; quod etiam est objectum concupiscentiarum, secundum Philosophum.<sup>2</sup> Ergo concupiscentia non est passio specialis in concupiscibili.

2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit quod *cupiditas est amor rerum transiuntium:*<sup>3</sup> et sic ab amore non distinguitur. Omnes autem passiones speciales ab invicem distinguuntur. Ergo concupiscentia non est passio specialis in concupiscibili.

3. Præterea, cuilibet passioni concupiscibilis opponitur aliqua passio

<sup>7</sup>*Psalms 83, 3*

<sup>1</sup>cf III *Sent.* 26, 1, 3

<sup>2</sup>*Rheticus I, II. 1370a16*

<sup>3</sup>*Lib. 83 quæst. 33. PL 40, 23*

<sup>a</sup>On the score that *concupiscere* is formed from *con-cupere*, thus suggesting that it arises from a composite faculty. It is important to remember that St Thomas is not here discussing the technical theological term *concupiscentia* which is a reaction of the will to some proposed good antecedently to the will's free choice. It was to

bodily organ; hence sensory good is the good of the body-soul composite. When it is pleasure of this sort that one wants, one is said to have desire; this involves both soul and body, as the Latin word *concupiscentia* suggests.<sup>a</sup> Desire in the strict sense therefore belongs to the sensory orexis, and specifically to the affective orexis, whose Latin name, *appetitus concupisibilis*, is derived from it.

Hence: 1. Longing for wisdom or other spiritual goods is sometimes called 'desire', either because it somewhat resembles desire; or because the longing is felt so intensely in the higher part of the soul that it spills over into the lower, sensory, orexis. In this case the lower orexis follows the higher in being, in its own way, bent upon a spiritual good, and the body itself is at the service of the things of the spirit. Thus the Psalmist can say, *My heart and my flesh cry out for the living God?*

2. *Desiderium* is quite properly ascribed to the higher orexis as well as to the lower; for it carries no suggestion, as does *concupiscentia*, of originating in a composite faculty. It simply suggests a movement towards the thing desired.

3. Every faculty of the soul 'wants' its own proper good with a 'natural desire', which does not follow knowledge. But to 'want' some good with animal desire, which does follow knowledge, belongs exclusively to the orectic faculty. Specifically, to want something because it is sensorily pleasurable—*concupiscere* in the strict sense—belongs to the affective orexis, the *vis concupiscibilis*.

*article 2. is desire a distinct species of emotion?*

THE SECOND POINT:<sup>1</sup> It would seem that desire is not a distinct species of emotion within the affective orexis. For two emotions belong to different species only if they have different objects. But the object of the affective orexis is the pleasurable: which is also the object of desire, as Aristotle remarks.<sup>2</sup> Therefore desire is not a distinct species of emotion within the affective orexis.

2. Augustine says, *Desire is the love of things that pass*;<sup>3</sup> it is therefore not distinct from love, and not a distinct species of affective emotion.

3. We have seen that when two affective emotions<sup>a</sup> fall under different

this concept that St Paul applied the term *sin* (*Rom. 6: 12*), not because it actually is sinful but because, as the Council of Trent says, 'It comes from sin and leads towards sin.'

<sup>a</sup>It will be remembered that I have commonly rendered 'the emotions of the affective orexis' as 'the affective emotions', and 'the emotions of the spirited orexis' as 'the spirited emotions'.

specialis in concupiscibili, ut supra dictum est.<sup>4</sup> Sed concupiscentiæ non opponitur aliqua passio specialis in concupiscibili. Dicit enim Damascenus quod *expectatum bonum concupiscentiam constituit, præsens vero lætitiam: similiter expectatum malum timorem, præsens vero tristitiam:*<sup>5</sup> ex quo videtur quod, sicut tristitia contrariatur lætitia, ita timor contrariatur concupiscentiæ. Timor autem non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili. Non ergo concupiscentia est specialis passio in concupiscibili.

SED CONTRA est quod concupiscentia causatur ab amore, et tendit in delectationem, quæ sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Et sic distinguitur ab aliis passionibus concupiscibilis, tamquam passio specialis.

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est,<sup>6</sup> bonum delectabile secundum sensum est communiter objectum concupiscibilis. Unde secundum ejus differentias, diversæ passiones concupiscibilis distinguuntur. Diversitas autem objecti potest attendi vel secundum naturam ipsius objecti, vel secundum diversitatem in virtute agendi. Diversitas quidem objecti activi quæ est secundum rei naturam facit materialem differentiam passionum. Sed diversitas quæ est secundum virtutem activam facit formalem differentiam passionum, secundum quam passiones specie differunt.

Est autem alia ratio virtutis motivæ ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter præsens, et secundum quod est absens: nam secundum quod est præsens facit in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens facit ad seipsum moveri. Unde ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, inquantum appetitum sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem; inquantum vero absens attrahit ad seipsum, causat concupiscentiam; inquantum vero præsens quietat in seipso, causat delectationem. Sic igitur concupiscentia est passio differens specie et ab amore et a delectatione. Sed concupiscere hoc delectabile vel illud, facit concupiscentias diversas numero.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum delectabile non est absolute objectum concupiscentiæ, sed sub ratione absentis: sicut et sensibile sub ratione præteriti est objectum memoriae. Hujusmodi enim particulares conditiones diversificant speciem passionum, vel etiam potentiarum sensitivæ partis, quæ respicit particularia.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa prædicatio est per causam, non per essentiam: non enim cupiditas est per se amor, sed amoris effectus.

Vel aliter dicendum, quod Augustinus accipit cupiditatem large pro quolibet motu appetitus qui potest esse respectu boni futuri. Unde comprehendit sub se et amorem et spem.

<sup>4</sup> Ia2æ. 23, 4

species, they are mutually contrary.<sup>4</sup> But desire is not the contrary of any species of affective emotion. For Damascene says, *A good thing gives rise to desire when hoped for, to pleasure when present, to grief when lost:*<sup>5</sup> which suggests that, as grief is the contrary of pleasure, fear would be the contrary of desire. But fear is a spirited, not an affective, emotion. Therefore desire is not a distinct species of affective emotion.

ON THE OTHER HAND desire is caused by love and tends towards pleasure—both of them affective emotions. It therefore is a species of affective emotion distinct from the others.

REPLY: We have seen that the common object of the affective orexis is the sensorily pleasurable;<sup>6</sup> we will therefore distinguish one species of affective emotion from another as we distinguish one kind of pleasurable object from another. Now we distinguish one object from another, either because of differences in their intrinsic natures, or because of differences in their active powers. The former is a basis for making a material distinction between two emotions, the latter for making a formal distinction, i.e. for assigning them to different species.

Now the relevant point for distinguishing between two good objects or ends as having different active, motive, powers, is that one is actually present and the other actually absent. When present, it causes the orexis to come to rest in it; when absent, it causes the orexis to move towards it. Thus the pleasurable, by attuning the orexis to itself, causes love; by attracting the orexis to it, causes desire; and by bringing the orexis to rest in it when present, causes pleasure. Desire therefore constitutes a species of emotion distinct from love and from pleasure. Between desiring one thing and desiring another, however, there is only a numerical distinction.

Hence: 1. The pleasurable is the object of desire, not *qua* pleasurable, but *qua* absent: rather as the object of memory is the perceptible *qua* past. For it is particular qualifications of this kind that distinguish one species of emotion from another, as indeed they distinguish one faculty of the sensory part from another: for the sensory part of the soul has particulars for its object.

2. This is a causal predication, not a definition: desire is not itself love, but an effect of love.

Alternatively, one might say that Augustine is taking ‘desire’ in a very broad sense, to refer to any orectic movement which can bear on a future good. At that rate it would include both love and hope.

<sup>4</sup>De Fide orthodoxa II, 12. PG 94, 929

<sup>5</sup>Ia2æ. 23, 1; 30, 1

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod passio quæ directe opponitur concupiscentiæ innominata est: quæ ita se habet ad malum sicut concupiscentia ad bonum. Sed quia est mali absentis sicut et timor, quandoque loco ejus ponitur timor: sicut et cupiditas loco spei. Quod enim est parvum bonum vel malum quasi non reputatur: et ideo pro omni motu appetitus in bonum vel malum futurum,\* ponitur spes et timor, quæ respiciunt bonum vel malum arduum.†

*articulus 3. utrum sint aliquæ concupiscentiæ naturales, et aliquæ non naturales*  
 AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:<sup>1</sup> i. Videtur quod concupiscentiarum non sint quædam naturales, et quædam non naturales. Concupiscentia enim pertinet ad appetitum animalem, ut dictum est.<sup>2</sup> Sed appetitus naturalis dividitur contra animalem. Ergo nulla concupiscentia est naturalis.

2. Præterea, diversitas materialis non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum secundum numerum: quæ quidem diversitas sub arte non cadit. Sed si quæ sint concupiscentiæ naturales et non naturales, non differunt nisi secundum diversa concupiscibilia: quod facit materialem differentiam, et secundum numerum tantum. Non ergo dividendæ sunt concupiscentiæ per naturales et non naturales.

3. Præterea, ratio contra naturam dividitur, ut patet in II *Physic.*<sup>3</sup> Si igitur in homine est aliqua concupiscentia non naturalis, oportet quod sit rationalis. Sed hoc esse non potest: quia concupiscentia, cum sit passio quædam, pertinet ad appetitum sensitivum, non ad voluntatem, quæ est appetitus rationis. Non ergo sunt concupiscentiæ aliquæ non naturales.

SED CONTRA est quod Philosophus ponit quasdam concupiscentias naturales, et quasdam non naturales.<sup>4</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est,<sup>5</sup> concupiscentia est appetitus boni delectabilis. Dupliciter autem est aliquid delectabile. Uno modo, quia est conveniens animalis naturæ: sicut cibus, potus, et alia hujusmodi. Et hujusmodi concupiscentia delectabilis dicitur naturalis. Alio modo

\*Piana omits *futurum*

†Piana omits *arduum*

<sup>1</sup>cf Ia2æ. 41, 3; 77, 5

<sup>2</sup>art. I, ad 3

<sup>3</sup>*Physics* II, 5: 196b22; and II, 6: 198a4

<sup>4</sup>*Ethics* III, II. 118b8. *Rhetoric* I, II. 1370a20

<sup>5</sup>art. I

3. There is no name for the emotion directly contrary to desire:<sup>b</sup> it stands to evil as desire stands to good. However, because its object is an evil not actually present, as is that of fear, it sometimes goes by the name of fear: just as hope sometimes goes by the name of desire. For a tiny good or a tiny evil is virtually ignored; consequently every orectic movement towards a future good or evil is called hope or fear, whose objects are actually a good which can be attained or an evil which can be avoided only with difficulty.

*article 3. are some desires natural and others non-natural?*

THE THIRD POINT:<sup>1</sup> i. It would not seem to be the case that some desires are natural and others non-natural. For desire is seated in the animal orexis. But we have seen that the animal orexis is to be contrasted with the natural orexis.<sup>2</sup> Therefore no desire is natural.

2. Two emotions are not specifically, but only numerically, distinct<sup>a</sup> when the difference between their objects is only a material one; and numerical distinctions are of no interest to systematic investigations. But if some desires were natural and others non-natural, their objects would differ only materially, and they themselves would be only numerically distinct. Therefore desires are not to be classified as either 'natural' or 'non-natural'.

3. The rational is to be contrasted with the natural, as Aristotle makes clear.<sup>3</sup> If therefore a man has non-natural desires, they must be rational. But that cannot be so, for desire, being an emotion, is not seated in the will, i.e. the rational orexis, but in the sensory orexis. There are therefore no non-natural desires.

ON THE OTHER HAND Aristotle distinguishes between natural and non-natural desires.<sup>4</sup>

REPLY: As we have seen, desire consists in wanting some pleasurable good;<sup>5</sup> and a thing may be pleasurable in two ways. First, it may appeal to the very nature of an animal, as do food, drink and the like; desire of that sort of pleasurable object is called 'natural' desire. Second, a thing may be

<sup>b</sup>But has not St Thomas himself said that this is called *fuga* or *abominatio* (23, 4c)? He makes no study of this emotion; the reason being, Corvez suggests, that it plays too trivial a part in the emotional life: one does not feel very strongly about an evil which is easily avoided. op. cit, p. 237.

<sup>a</sup>Two things are called 'specifically distinct' if they belong to different species; they are called 'numerically distinct' if they are two different members of the same species.

aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens animali secundum apprehensionem: sicut cum aliquis apprehendit aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectatur in ipso. Et hujusmodi delectabilis concupiscentia dicitur non naturalis, et solet magis dici cupiditas.

Primæ igitur concupiscentiæ, naturales, communes sunt et hominibus et aliis animalibus: quia utrisque est aliquid conveniens et delectabile secundum naturam. Et in his etiam omnes homines conveniunt: unde et Philosophus vocat eas communes et necessarias.<sup>6</sup> Sed secundæ concupiscentiæ sunt propriæ hominum, quorum proprium est excogitare aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, præter id quod natura requirit. Unde et Philosophus dicit primas concupiscentias esse irrationales, secundas vero cum ratione.<sup>7</sup> Et quia diversi diversimode ratiocinantur, ideo et secundæ dicuntur, in *Ethic.*, *propriæ et appositiæ*,<sup>8</sup> scilicet supra naturales.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud idem quod appetitur appetitu naturali, potest appeti appetitu animali, cum fuerit apprehensum. Et secundum hoc, cibi et potus et hujusmodi, quæ appetuntur naturaliter, potest esse concupiscentia animalis.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod diversitas concupiscentiarum naturalium a non naturalibus non est materialis tantum; sed etiam quodammodo formalis, in quantum procedit ex diversitate objecti activi. Objectum autem appetitus est bonum appprehensum. Unde ad diversitatem activi pertinet diversitas apprehensionis, prout scilicet apprehenditur aliquid ut conveniens absoluta apprehensione, ex qua causantur concupiscentiæ naturales, quas Philosophus vocat irrationales; et prout apprehenditur aliquid cum deliberatione, ex quo causantur concupiscentiæ non naturales, quæ propter hoc dicuntur *cum ratione*.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod in homine non solum est ratio universalis, quæ pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis, quæ pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut dictum est.<sup>9</sup> Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscentia quæ est cum ratione, potest ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere. Et præterea\* appetitus sensitivus potest etiam a ratione universalis moveri, mediante imaginatione particulari.

#### *articulus 4. utrum concupiscentia sit infinita*

AD QUARTUM sic proceditur: 1. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit

\*Piana reads *et propter hoc*, for this reason

<sup>6</sup>*Ethics* III, II. 118b8

<sup>7</sup>*Rhetoric* I, II. 1370a18

<sup>8</sup>*Ethics* III, II. 118b9

pleasurable because an animal perceives it under some special aspect which makes it seem appealing; for when one sees a thing as good and appealing, one consequently takes pleasure in it. Desire of pleasurable things of that kind is called 'non-natural', and in Latin the word *cupiditas* is usually reserved for it.

The first kind, i.e. the natural desires, are common to man and to the other animals, for in both cases the object is agreeable and pleasurable to their very nature. Furthermore, all men are at one in finding them so; thus Aristotle calls them 'common' and 'necessary'.<sup>6</sup> But the second kind are found only in man, for only man can see as agreeable and pleasurable something which is not strictly a natural requirement. Thus Aristotle calls the former kind non-rational, and the latter rational;<sup>7</sup> and since different men have different ways of reasoning, he also calls the latter kind *distinctive and acquired*,<sup>8</sup> i.e. additional to the natural pleasures.

Hence: 1. A thing which is desired by the natural orexis can also, given that it is perceived under the appropriate aspect, be desired by the animal orexis. It is in this way that there can be an animal desire for food, drink, and other objects of the natural orexis.

2. The distinction between natural and non-natural desires is not only a material one; to the extent that it arises from a distinction between the desire-producing objects concerned, it is a formal one. Now the object of an orexis is something seen as good. The distinction between two desire-producing objects arises therefore from the different ways of their being seen. When a thing is simply seen as attractive by straightforward perception, it gives rise to natural desire, which Aristotle calls *non-rational*; when the perception is followed by deliberation, it gives rise to non-natural desire, which Aristotle calls *rational*.

3. We have shown elsewhere that man not only has universalizing reason, which belongs to the intellectual part of the soul; he also has particular-reason, which belongs to the sensory part.<sup>9</sup> It is with this latter sense of the word 'reason' in mind that the non-natural desires are called *rational*; they can therefore belong to the sensory orexis. Furthermore the sensory orexis can also be moved by the universalizing-reason, through the intervention of the particular imagination.

#### *article 4. is desire infinite?*

THE FOURTH POINT: 1. It would seem that desire is not infinite. For the

<sup>6</sup>1a. 78, 4 and 81, 3

infinita. Objectum enim concupiscentiae est bonum; quod habet rationem finis. Qui autem ponit infinitum, excludit finem, ut dicitur in *Meta.*<sup>1</sup> Concupiscentia ergo non potest esse infinita.

2. Præterea, concupiscentia est boni convenientis: cum procedat ex amore. Sed infinitum, cum sit improprioportionatum,<sup>\*</sup> non potest esse conveniens. Ergo concupiscentia non potest esse infinita.

3. Præterea, infinita non est transire: et sic in eis non est venire ad ultimum. Sed concupiscenti fit delectatio per hoc quod attingit ad ultimum. Ergo si concupiscentia esset infinita, sequeretur quod numquam fieret delectatio.

SED CONTRA est quod Philosophus dicit quod *in infinitum concupiscentia existente, homines infinita desiderant.*<sup>2</sup>

RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est,<sup>3</sup> duplex est concupiscentia: una naturalis, et alia non naturalis. Naturalis quidem concupiscentia non potest esse infinita in actu. Est enim ejus quod natura requirit: natura vero semper intendit in aliquid finitum et certum. Unde numquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum, vel infinitum potum.

Sed sicut in natura contingit esse infinitum in potentia per successionem, ita hujusmodi concupiscentiam contingit infinitam esse per successionem; ut scilicet, post adeptum cibum, iterum alia vice desideret cibum, vel quocumque aliud quod natura requirit: quia hujusmodi corporalia bona, cum adveniunt, non perpetuo manent, sed deficiunt. Unde Dominus dixit Samaritanæ, *Qui biberit ex hac aqua, siti et iterum.*<sup>4</sup>

Sed concupiscentia non naturalis omnino est infinita. Sequitur enim rationem, ut dictum est:<sup>5</sup> rationi autem competit in infinitum procedere. Unde qui concupiscit divitias, potest eas concupiscere, non ad aliquem certum terminum, sed simpliciter se divitem esse, quantumcumque potest.

Potest et alia ratio assignari, secundum Philosophum, quare quædam concupiscentia sit finita, et quædam infinita.<sup>6</sup> Semper enim concupiscentia finis infinita est: finis enim per se concupiscitur, ut sanitas; unde major sanitas magis concupiscitur, et sic in infinitum; sicut, si album per se disgreget, magis album magis disgregat. Concupiscentia vero ejus quod est ad finem non est infinita, sed secundum illam mensuram appetitur qua convenit fini.† Unde qui finem in divitiis ponunt habent concupis-

\*Piana reads *proportionatum*

†Piana reads *si secundum illam mensuram appetit quæ convenit fini*, if the means is desired to the extent that it serves the end.

<sup>1</sup>*Metaphysics* II, 2. 994b11

<sup>2</sup>*Politics* I, 3. 1258a1

object of desire is the good, which is in the nature of an end. But the term 'infinite' implies 'endless', as Aristotle says.<sup>1</sup> Therefore desire cannot be infinite.

2. Since desire arises from love, it bears upon some good that is appropriate. But the infinite, being out of all proportion to anything finite, cannot be appropriate for the orexis. Therefore desire cannot be infinite.

3. One cannot traverse the infinite, and so one cannot come to its ultimate term. But when one desires something, there is no pleasure until one attains the ultimate term in question. If therefore desire were infinite, it would follow that one never found pleasure.

ON THE OTHER HAND Aristotle says, *Since desire is infinite, men desire an infinity of things.*<sup>2</sup>

REPLY: As we have seen, there are two sorts of desire: the natural, and the non-natural.<sup>3</sup> Now natural desire cannot be *actually* infinite, for its object is that which nature needs, and nature is always bent on what is finite and determined: a man never desires infinite food or infinite drink. However just as, in the world of nature, one finds infinite *potentia*lity of succession, so in this field of desire one finds infinite potentiality: one takes food, but the desire for food will arise again; and the same thing is true of anything else that nature needs. For such good things, when they replenish the body, do not last forever, but pass away; as Our Lord said to the Samaritan woman, *Every one who drinks this water will become thirsty again.*<sup>4</sup>

Non-natural desire, on the other hand, certainly is infinite. For as we have seen, it follows the reason;<sup>5</sup> and it is in the nature of the reason to proceed *in infinitum*. Thus when a man desires riches he may desire, not riches up to a certain limit, but simply to be as rich as he possibly can.

We may follow Aristotle and give another reason for distinguishing desire into finite and infinite.<sup>6</sup> The desire for a given end—health, for instance—is always infinite, since it is desired for its own sake. Thus greater health is more greatly desired, and so on *ad infinitum*: just as, if a white object dilates the pupil of the eye, the greater the whiteness the greater the dilation.<sup>a</sup> On the other hand, the desire for the means to a given end is not infinite; the means is desired to the extent that it leads to attaining the end. Thus a man who has made wealth his end has a desire for wealth without

<sup>1</sup>art. I

<sup>2</sup>John 4, 13

<sup>3</sup>art. 3

<sup>4</sup>Politics I, 3. 1257b25

<sup>a</sup>But surely not, in this case, *ad infinitum*.

centiam divitiarum in infinitum: qui autem divitias appetunt propter necessitatem vitae concupiscent divitias finitas, sufficientes ad necessitatem vitae, ut Philosophus dicit ibidem. Et eadem ratio est de concupiscentia quaruincumque aliarum rerum.

1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne quod concupiscitur accipitur ut quoddam finitum: vel quia est finitum secundum rem prout semel concupiscitur in actu, vel quia est finitum secundum quod cadit sub apprehensione. Non enim potest sub ratione infiniti apprehendendi: quia *infinitum est, cuius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est aliud extra sumere*, ut dicitur in *Physic.*<sup>7</sup>

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio quodammodo est virtutis infinitæ, in quantum potest infinitum aliud considerare, ut appareat in additione linearum et numerorum. Unde infinitum aliquo modo sumptum, est proportionatum rationi. Nam et<sup>\*</sup> universale, quod ratio apprehendit, est quodammodo infinitum, in quantum in potentia continet infinita singularia.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad hoc aliquis delectetur, non requiritur quod omnia consequatur quæ concupiscit; sed in quolibet concupito quod consequitur delectatur.

\*Piana omits *et*

<sup>7</sup>*Physics III, 6. 207a7*

limit; whereas one who desires wealth as a necessary means to supporting life desires only limited wealth—as much, that is, as is needed to support life: as Aristotle remarks in the same chapter. The same account may be applied to desire for any other kind of thing.

Hence: 1. Every thing which is an object of desire is taken to be finite: either because it is in fact finite, and constitutes the object of a single act; or because it is perceived or thought to be finite. For it cannot be perceived as infinite, since the infinite, as Aristotle says, is *that from which, however much one takes, there always remains something more to be taken.*<sup>7</sup>

2. The power of the reason is infinite, in a certain sense, for it can pursue its study of a matter *in infinitum*: as one sees in the case of adding lines, or numbers. There is therefore a sense in which the infinite is not out of all proportion to the reason. Thus the universal, which is the object of the reason, is infinite in a certain sense, since it contains potentially an infinite number of particulars.

3. It is not necessary, before one can enjoy any pleasure, first to obtain everything that one desires; each object of desire gives pleasure when it is obtained.

## GLOSSARY

*action, activity, actio, to poiein*, the ninth of Aristotle's categories. See Introduction, p. xx.

*actuality*, usual translation of *actus*, Aristotle's *energeia*: the correlative of *potentiality, potentia*, Aristotle's *dunamis*, q.v.

*affective orexis, appetitus concupisibilis*: that sensory orexis (q.v.) whose object is sense-good (or sense-evil) which is *not* difficult to attain (or avoid). See Introduction, p. xxiii.

*anger, ira*: the fifth of the emotions of the spirited orexis, being the impulse to attack an imminently threatening evil.

*aversion, fuga*: the fourth of the emotions of the affective orexis, being the impulse to move away from an evil which has aroused the emotion of dislike or hatred.

*categories, praedicamenta*: the ten irreducibly different kinds of predicate, and indeed (for St Thomas following Aristotle) the ten ultimate kinds of entity, viz.: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, state, activity, passivity.

*cognitive, apprehensivus*: concerned with knowledge, belief or perception: contrasted with *orectic*, q.v. See Introduction, p. xxii.

*courage, audacia*: the fourth emotion of the spirited orexis, being the impulse to face up to an imminently threatening evil with confidence of success.

*desire, desiderium*: a second-stage emotion of the sensory orexis (see Introduction, pp. xxvi–xxviii), being the impulse to move towards the attainment of some sensory good which has aroused the emotion of love.

*despair, desperatio*: the second emotion of the spirited orexis, being one's reaction on perceiving the impossibility of obtaining some good or avoiding some evil.

*emotions, passiones animæ*: the reactions of the sensory orexis to a sensory object perceived or imagined as good or evil.

*fear, timor*: the fourth emotion of the spirited orexis, being its reaction to a disagreeable object which is threatening, and will be difficult to avoid.

*hatred, odium*: a third-stage emotion of the affective orexis (see Introduction, pp. xxvi–xxviii), being a feeling of disaffection for an object perceived or imagined as sensorily disagreeable.

*hope, spes*: the first emotion of the spirited orexis, being its reaction to some good object which is seen as possible but difficult of attainment. It adds to *desire* a certain drive and a buoyancy of spirit about the prospect of winning the arduous good.

## GLOSSARY

*love, amor* (would often be better translated *liking*, cf. Note *a*, p. 62): the first of all the emotions, being located in the affective orexis: an attachment to some object arising from the sense that the object and oneself are in some way naturally fitted for each other. See Introduction, p. xxix.

*movement, motus*: either local motion, or the passing from potentiality to actuality, or from one state to another. See Introduction, pp. xxiii–xxiv and xxv–xxvi.

*orexis, appetitus*: that power of the soul concerned with tendency, desire and behaviour, in contrast with the cognitive side which is concerned with knowledge, belief or perception. See Introduction, p. xxii.

*passion, passio*: either (1) Aristotle's tenth category, *to paschein*, passivity, being-acted-upon; or (2) suffering damage, pain, deterioration or harm of some kind; or (3) an emotion. See Introduction, pp. xxix–xxi.

*pleasure, delectatio*: the fifth of the emotions of the affective orexis, consisting in the attainment and enjoyment of, and repose in, the object that was loved and desired.

*sadness, tristitia*: the sixth of the emotions of the affective orexis, consisting in the occurrence of and displeasure caused by some evil that had given rise to hatred and aversion.

*spirited orexis, appetitus irascibilis*: that sensory orexis (q.v.) whose object is a sense-good which will be difficult to attain or a sense-evil difficult to avoid. See Introduction, p. xxiii.

*will, voluntas*: the intellectual orexis, i.e. the orectic faculty of the intellectual level of the soul.

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the general reader with an interest in the 'reasons' in Christianity. Though timeless in substance and spirit, the *Summa*, a masterpiece of the thirteenth century, provides both scholars and translators with special problems. A working Latin text has been prepared for this edition, which has consulted the great Leonine edition of all St Thomas's works begun in 1882. The editors, many after long experience in teaching the text, have determined to put the thought of St Thomas into contemporary English, so far as the technicalities allow. They have recognized the fact that the style and many details of the *Summa*'s original pre-occupations are no longer ours, and do not lend themselves to rendering just as they stand. However, the difficulties facing the modern reader are here firmly grasped, rather than avoided by circumlocution. Hence a freer translation than its predecessor in English is offered, but held closely parallel to the Latin text. The result is a superb edition, for the twentieth-century scholar, of one of the greatest documents of the Christian Church.

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Fr Eric D'Arcy, M.A. (Melbourne), Ph.D. (Gregorian), D.Phil. (Oxford), Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Melbourne. Author of *Conscience and its Right to Freedom*, which has been translated into French and Spanish, and of *Human Acts*.

*In December 1963, His Holiness Pope Paul VI granted an audience at which he warmly commended this new edition of St Thomas Aquinas.*

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